Shan Gao

The ontological status of the wave function in quantum mechanics has been analyzed in the context of conventional projective measurements. These analyses are usually based on some nontrivial assumptions, e.g. a preparation independence assumption is needed to prove the PBR theorem. In this paper, we give a PBR-like argument for psi-ontology in terms of protective measurements, by which one can directly measure the expectation values of observables on a single quantum system. The proof does not resort to nontrivial assumptions such as preparation independence assumption.

It is widely accepted that continuity is the most essential characteristic of motion; the motion of macroscopic objects is apparently continuous, and classical mechanics, which describes such motion, is also based on the assumption of continuous motion. But is motion really continuous in reality? In this paper, I will try to answer this question through a new analysis of the cause of motion. It has been argued that the standard velocity in classical mechanics cannot fulfill the causal role required for explaining continuous motion in a deterministic way. However, there is a hot debate over the solution to this causal explanation problem. The existing solutions, i.e. the "at-at" theory, the impetus view and the "no instants" view, have serious drawbacks. After reviewing their drawbacks and presenting my own objections, I propose a new solution to this causal explanation problem. It is argued that the relativity of motion or the equivalence between motion and rest demands that motion has no deterministic cause, and thus no causal explanation is needed for motion. Based on this result, I further argue that the uncaused motion is not deterministic and continuous but essentially random and discontinuous. Moreover, objects have a potential that determines the probabilities of their future positions. This suggests a possible connection with quantum mechanics. Lastly, I give a brief explanation for the apparent inconsistency between the suggested potential theory of motion and the appearance of continuous motion in the macroscopic world.

The meaning of the wave function is an important unresolved issue in Bohmian mechanics. On the one hand, according to the nomological view, the wave function of the universe or the universal wave function is nomological, like a law of nature. On the other hand, the PBR theorem proves that the wave function in quantum mechanics or the effective wave function in Bohmian mechanics is ontic, representing the ontic state of a physical system in the universe. It is usually thought that the nomological view of the universal wave function is compatible with the ontic view of the effective wave function, and thus the PBR theorem has no implications for the nomological view. In this paper, I argue that this is not the case, and these two views are in fact incompatible. This means that if the effective wave function is ontic as the PBR theorem proves, then the universal wave function cannot be nomological, and the ontology of Bohmian mechanics cannot consist only in particles. This incompatibility result holds true not only for Humeanism and dispositionalism but also for primitivism about laws of nature, which attributes a fundamental ontic role to the universal wave function. Moreover, I argue that although the nomological view can be held by rejecting one key assumption of the PBR theorem, the rejection will lead to serious problems, such as that the results of measurements and their probabilities cannot be explained in ontology in Bohmian mechanics. Finally, I briefly discuss three $$\psi$$ -ontologies, namely a physical field in a fundamental high-dimensional space, a multi-field in three-dimensional space, and RDMP (Random Discontinuous Motion of Particles) in three-dimensional space, and argue that the RDMP ontology can answer the objections to the $$\psi$$ -ontology raised by the proponents of the nomological view.

Why does time reversal involve two operations, a temporal reflection and the operation of complex conjugation? Why is it that time reversal preserves position and reverses momentum and spin? This puzzle of time reversal in quantum mechanics has been with us since Wigner’s first presentation. In this paper, I propose a new solution to this puzzle. First, it is shown that the standard account of time reversal can be derived based on the assumption that the probability current is reversed by the time reversal transformation. Next, this assumption is justified and the meaning of time reversal is clarified by analyzing the relationship between the rates of change and the instantaneous quantities which determine them. Finally, I explain how the new analysis help solve the puzzle of time reversal in quantum mechanics.

Psychophysical supervenience requires that the mental properties of a system cannot change without the change of its physical properties. In this paper, I argue that the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics or Everett's theory seems to violate the principle of psychophysical supervenience. In order to be consistent with our experience, the theory assumes psychophysical supervenience in each world, including our world. However, this permits the possibility that under certain unitary time evolution which does not lead to world branching, the wave function of each world changes and correspondingly the mental states of the observers in the world also change, while the wave function of the total worlds does not change, which violates the principle of psychophysical supervenience for all worlds. It seems that one must go beyond Everett's theory such as denying multiplicity in order to avoid the failure of psychophysical supervenience.

Recently Lewis et al. [Phys. Rev. Lett. 109, 150404 ] demonstrated that additional assumptions such as preparation independence are always necessary to rule out a psi-epistemic model, in which the quantum state is not uniquely determined by the underlying physical state. Their conclusion is based on an analysis of conventional projective measurements. Here we demonstrate that protective measurements, which are distinct from projective measurements, already shows that distinct quantum states cannot be compatible with a single state of reality. This improves the interesting result obtained by Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph [Nature Phys. 8, 475 ].

Recently the first protective measurement has been realized in experiment [Nature Phys. 13, 1191 ], which can measure the expectation value of an observable from a single quantum system. This raises an important and pressing issue of whether protective measurement implies the reality of the wave function. If the answer is yes, this will improve the influential PBR theorem [Nature Phys. 8, 475 ] by removing auxiliary assumptions, and help settle the issue about the nature of the wave function. In this paper, we demonstrate that this is indeed the case. It is shown that a psi-epistemic model and quantum mechanics have different predictions about the variance of the result of a Zeno-type protective measurement with finite N.

In QBism the wave function does not represent an element of physical reality external to the agent, but represent an agent’s personal probability assignments, reflecting his subjective degrees of belief about the future content of his experience. In this paper, I argue that this view of the wave function is not consistent with protective measurements. The argument does not rely on the realist assumption of the ψ-ontology theorems, namely the existence of the underlying ontic state of a quantum system.

It is shown that the de Broglie-Bohm theory has a potential problem concerning the charge distribution of a quantum system such as an electron. According to the guidance equation of the theory, the electron's charge is localized in a position where its Bohmian particle is. But according to the Schrödinger equation of the theory, the electron's charge is not localized in one position but distributed throughout space, and the charge density in each position is proportional to the modulus square of the wave function of the electron there. Although this tension may be resolved by assuming that the electron's charge is not e but 2e, one for its Bohmian particle and the other for its wave function, the resolution will introduce more serious problems.

It has been debated whether protective measurement implies the reality of the wave function. In this paper, I present a new analysis of the relationship between protective measurement and the reality of the wave function. First, I briefly introduce protective measurements and the ontological models framework for them. Second, I give a simple proof of Hardy's theorem in terms of protective measurements. It shows that when assuming the ontic state of the protected system keeps unchanged during a protective measurement, the wave function must be real. Third, I analyze two suggested psi-epistemic models of a protective measurement, in which the ontic state of the system is affected by the measurement. It is shown that although these models can explain the appearance of expectation values of observables in a single measurement, their predictions about the variance of the result of a non-ideal protective measurement are different from those of quantum mechanics. Finally, I argue that no psi-epistemic models exist for an ideal protective measurement in the ontological models framework, and in order to account for the definite result of an ideal protective measurement, the wave function must be a property of the protected system, defined either at a precise instant or during an infinitesimal time interval around an instant. Moreover, this result can also be extended to the wave function of an unprotected system. This new proof of the reality of the wave function does not rely on auxiliary assumptions, and it may help settle the issue about the nature of the wave function.

It is a fundamental and widely accepted assumption that a measurement result exists universally, and in particular, it exists for every observer, independently of whether the observer makes the measurement or knows the result. In this paper, we will argue that, based on an analysis of protective measurements, this assumption is rejected by the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, and worlds, if they indeed exist according to the interpretation, can only exist relative to systems which are decoherent with respect to the measurement result.

It is shown that the de Broglie-Bohm theory has a potential problem concerning the mass and charge distributions of a quantum system such as an electron. According to the de Broglie-Bohm theory, the mass and charge of an electron are localized in a position where its Bohmian particle is. However, protective measurement indicates that they are not localized in one position but distributed throughout space, and the mass and charge density of the electron in each position is proportional to the modulus square of its wave function there.

Transcendentalism and Confucianism involve different understandinsgs of the concepts of nature, wilderness, and supreme goodness in terms of the metaphysical understanding of nature and how it influences the understanding of human nature. The goodness of Tao is not transcendental as understood by transcendentalism. Rather the goodness of Tao as the important moral values is shaped by human beings’ experience of the natural world. It is this deeper philosophical reason why transcendentalism encourages the aesthetic appreciation of wilderness while Confucianism encourages the aesthetic appreciation of humanized nature.

According to Penrose, the fundamental conflict between the superposition principle of quantum mechanics and the general covariance principle of general relativity entails the existence of wavefunction collapse, e.g. a quantum superposition of two different space-time geometries will collapse to one of them due to the ill-definedness of the time-translation operator for the superposition. In this paper, we argue that Penrose's conjecture on gravity's role in wavefunction collapse is debatable. First of all, it is still a controversial issue what the exact nature of the conflict is and how to resolve it. Secondly, Penrose's argument by analogy is too weak to establish a necessary connection between wavefunction collapse and the conflict as understood by him. Thirdly, the conflict does not necessarily lead to wavefunction collapse. For the conflict or the problem of ill-definedness for a superposition of different space-time geometries also needs to be solved before the collapse of the superposition finishes, and once the conflict has been resolved, the wavefunction collapse will lose its physical basis relating to the conflict. In addition, we argue that Penrose's suggestions for the collapse time formula and collapse states are also problematic.

It is argued that in Bohmian mechanics the effective wave function of a subsystem of the universe does not encode the influences of other particles on the subsystem. This suggests that the ontology of Bohmian mechanics does not consist only in Bohmian particles and their positions. It is nonetheless pointed out that since the wave function in configuration space may represent the state of ergodic motion of non-Bohmian particles in three-dimensional space, the ontology of Bohmian mechanics may still consist only in particles.

In this paper, I present a new analysis of the meaning of the phase in quantum mechanics. First, I give a simple but rigorous proof that the global phase is not real in \(\psi\) -ontic quantum theories. Next, I argue that a similar strategy cannot be used to prove the reality of the global phase due to the existence of the tails of the wave function. Finally, I argue that the relative phase is not a nonlocal property of two regions together, and adding a relative phase to one local branch of a superposition only changes the local properties at the boundary of the region of the branch.