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1772Logical FormIn Gillian Russell & Delia Graff Fara (eds.), Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language, Routledge. pp. 29-41. 2013.This chapter reviews some of the history of discussions of logical form and offers a truth-theoretic account that traces back to Donald Davidson
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2168Fodor’s Challenge to the Classical Computational Theory of MindMind and Language 23 (1). 2008.In The Mind Doesn’t Work that Way, Jerry Fodor argues that mental representations have context sensitive features relevant to cognition, and that, therefore, the Classical Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) is mistaken. We call this the Globality Argument. This is an in principle argument against CTM. We argue that it is self-defeating. We consider an alternative argument constructed from materials in the discussion, which avoids the pitfalls of the official argument. We argue that it is also un…Read more
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789Davidson’s Objection to Horwich’s Minimalism about TruthJournal of Philosophy 101 (8): 429-437. 2004.This paper shows how one can respond within truth-theoretic semantics, without appeal to parataxis, to Donald Davidson's objection to the intelligibility of Paul Horwich's statement of the minimalist position on truth.
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112The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality (edited book)Routledge. 2017.The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality is the first of its kind, synthesizing research from several disciplines for all students and professionals interested in better understanding the nature and structure of social reality. The contents of the volume are divided into eight sections, each of which begins with a short introduction: Collective Action and Intention Shared and Joint Attitudes Epistemology and Rationality in the Social Context Social Ontology Collectives and Responsibil…Read more
APA Central Division
Bloomington, Indiana, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
| Philosophy of Language |
| Philosophy of Action |
| Philosophy of Mind |
| Epistemology |
| Metaphysics |
PhilPapers Editorships
| Collective Intentionality |