•  2087
    God for All Time: From Theism to Ultimism
    In Andrei Buckareff Yujin Nagasawa (ed.), Alternative Conceptions of God, Oxford University Press. forthcoming.
  •  2087
    Divine Hiddenness
    In Paul Draper & Charles Talliaferro (eds.), A Companion to Philosophy of Religion, 2nd ed., Wiley-blackwell. 2010.
  •  1675
    The Hiddenness Problem and the Problem of Evil
    Faith and Philosophy 27 (1): 45-60. 2010.
    The problem of Divine hiddenness, or the hiddenness problem, is more and more commonly being treated as independent of the problem of evil, and as rivalling the latter in significance. Are we in error if we acquiesce in these tendencies? Only a careful investigation into relations between the hiddenness problem and the problem of evil can help us see. Such an investigation is undertaken here. What we will find is that when certain knots threatening to hamper intellectual movement are unravelled,…Read more
  •  1050
    Skeptical Theism and Skeptical Atheism
    In Justin McBrayer Trent Dougherty (ed.), Skeptical Theism: New Essays, Oxford University Press. forthcoming.
  •  812
    God, free will, and time: the free will offense part II (review)
    International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 73 (3): 1-10. 2013.
    God, free will, and time: the free will offense part II Content Type Journal Article Category Article Pages 1-10 DOI 10.1007/s11153-011-9328-z Authors J. L. Schellenberg, Mount Saint Vincent University, 166 Bedford Highway, Halifax, NS B3M2J6, Canada Journal International Journal for Philosophy of Religion Online ISSN 1572-8684 Print ISSN 0020-7047
  •  736
    Religious Diversity and Religious Skepticism
    In Kevin Schilbrack (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Religious Diversity, Wiley-blackwell. forthcoming.
    In this paper I argue that given the present state of relevant inquiry, the facts of religious diversity justify religious skepticism. Because of the diversity of religious claims, the denial of any detailed religious proposition is equivalent to a large disjunction of alternative claims. The same is true of the denial of metaphysical naturalism. And having typically acquired no detailed understanding of the whole panoply of religious views, religious believers and metaphysical naturalists are r…Read more
  •  513
    How to Make Faith a Virtue
    In Timothy O'Connor Laura Goins (ed.), Religious Faith and Intellectual Virtue, Oxford University Press. 2014.
  •  462
    The Epistemology of Modest Atheism
    European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7 (1): 51--69. 2015.
    Distinguishing between the old atheism, the new atheism, and modest atheism, and also between belief and acceptance, and belief and acceptance tokens and types, I defend the disjunctive view that either modest atheistic belief or modest atheistic acceptance, construed as type, is today epistemically justified in the context of philosophical inquiry. Central to my defence is a deductive version of the hiddenness argument and an emphasis on the early stage of philosophical inquiry that we presentl…Read more
  •  214
    The atheist’s free will offence
    International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 56 (1): 1-15. 2004.
    This paper criticizes the assumption, omnipresent in contemporary philosophy of religion, that a perfectly good and loving God would wish to confer on finite persons free will. An alternative mode of Divine-human relationship is introduced and shown to be as conducive to the realization of value as one involving free will. Certain implications of this result are then revealed, to wit, that the theist's free will defence against the problem of evil is unsuccessful, and what is more, that free wil…Read more
  •  213
    The hiddenness argument revisited
    Religious Studies 41 (2): 201-215. 2005.
    More than a few philosophers have sought to answer the atheistic argument from reasonable non-belief presented in my 1993 book Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason. In this first of two essays in response, I focus on objections sharing the defect – sometimes well-hidden – of irrelevance, using their shortcomings to highlight important features of the argument that are commonly overlooked.
  •  140
    The Hiddenness Argument Revisited
    Religious Studies 41 (3): 287-303. 2005.
    In this second of two essays responding to critical discussion of my " Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason," I show how an ' accommodationist ' strategy can be used to defuse objections that were not exposed as irrelevant by the first essay. This strategy involves showing that the dominant concern of reasons for divine withdrawal can be met or accommodated within the framework of divine - human relationship envisaged by the hiddenness argument. I conclude that critical discussion leaves the argum…Read more
  •  114
    Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason
    Cornell University Press. 1993.
    In Part 1 of this book, the first full-length treatment of its topic, J. L. Schellenberg argues that when we notice how
  •  92
    How to be an atheist and a sceptic too: Response to Mccreary
    Religious Studies 46 (2): 227-232. 2010.
    Mark McCreary has argued that I cannot consistently advance both the hiddenness argument and certain arguments for religious scepticism found in my book The Wisdom to Doubt (WD). This reaction was expected, and in WD I explained its shortsightedness in that context. First, I noted how in Part III of WD, where theism is addressed, my principal aim is not to prove atheism but to show theists that they are not immune from the scepticism defended in Parts I and II. To the success of this aim, McCrea…Read more
  •  85
    Whither philosophy of religion?
    with Brian Leftow and Pamela Sue Anderson
    Religious Studies 51 (3): 441-454. 2015.
    The post-war expansion of university faculties climaxed in the early 1970s. Since then, there have been more professional philosophers than ever before in history: a startling claim, but sober truth. In analytic philosophy, they have worked with more rigour and better training than even the Scholastics. It would take a surprising lack of talent among us, or perhaps argue some deep defect in the questions we ask, if the result werenotmore progress in philosophy than most periods can boast. And in…Read more
  •  81
    On reasonable nonbelief and perfect love: Replies to Henry and Lehe
    Faith and Philosophy 22 (3): 330-342. 2005.
    Some Christian philosophers wonder whether a God really would oppose reasonable nonbelief. Others think the answer to the problem of reasonable nonbelief is that there isn’t any. Between them, Douglas V. Henry and Robert T. Lehe cover all of this ground in their recent responses to my work on Divine hiddenness. Here I give my answers to their arguments
  •  77
    I argue that Poston and Dougherty are mistaken in supposing that the hiddenness argument contains ambiguities about the nature of belief. And the attempt to extract from their mistaken account some reasons for favouring a broad, disjunctive view of divine -- creature relationship that will be convincing for individuals not in the grip of theological assumptions comes up dry
  •  70
    Pluralism and probability
    Religious Studies 33 (2): 143-159. 1997.
    In this paper I discuss a neglected form of argument against religious belief -- generically, 'the probabilistic argument from pluralism'. If the denial of a belief is equivalent to the disjunction of its alternatives, and if we may gain some idea as to the probabilities of such disjunctions by adding the separate probabilities of their mutually exclusive disjuncts, and if, moreover, the denials of many religious beliefs are disjunctions known to have two or more mutually exclusive members each …Read more
  •  68
    Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion
    Cornell University Press. 2005.
    Providing an original and systematic treatment of foundational issues in philosophy of religion, J. L. Schellenberg's new book addresses the structure of..
  •  60
    Philosophy of religion: a state of the subject report
    Toronto Journal of Theology 25 (1): 95-110. 2009.
  •  58
    The Wisdom to Doubt is a major contribution to the contemporary literature on the epistemology of religious belief.
  •  56
    A Reply to Wykstra
    Philo 14 (1): 101-107. 2011.
    Wykstra’s paper defends two objections to my reasoning in The Wisdom to Doubt. One says that we in fact do take evidence to be representative of all the relevant evidence that exists when forming the judgment that it makes some proposition probable, the other that our judgments as to the representativeness of evidence are often justified, and can be justified even in matters of religion. Both objections are instructive but ultimately unsuccessful, as I show here
  •  53
    God, the Best, and Evil, by Bruce Langtry
    Mind 118 (472): 1155-1160. 2009.
    (No abstract is available for this citation)
  •  48
    What Divine Hiddenness Reveals
    God or Blind Nature? Philosophers Debate the Evidence. 2008.
  •  48
    A New Logical Problem of Evil Revisited in advance
    Faith and Philosophy. forthcoming.
  •  47
    In this paper I argue that moral virtue is sometimes causally necessary both for theistic belief and for nonbelief. I then argue for some further connectionsbetween these results and the Calvinist view, recently revived in the philosophy of religion, according to which theistic belief is typically warranted and all those who dissent from such belief persist in their nonbelief because of sin. Specifically, I maintain that the virtue of belief militates against its being warranted, and that the vi…Read more