L. Nathan Oaklander

What is the nature of temporal passage—the movement of events or moments of time from the future through the present into the past? Is the future and the past as real as the present, or is the present—or perhaps the present and the past—all that exists? What role, if any, does language play in giving us an insight into temporal reality? Is it possible to travel through time into distant regions of the future or the past? What accounts for the direction of time, the sense we have that we are moving toward the future and not back into the past? What is the relation between the physics of time and the philosophy of time? These are the kind of dizzying questions that have been addressed by metaphysicians since antiquity, and time has remained a critical concept for many thinkers and philosophers since then (for instance, in his Confessions, St Augustine, restating an observation by Plotinus, wrote: ‘So what is time? If no one asks me, I know; if I seek to explain it, I do not’). Interest in the subject has also been enduring—and has blossomed anew in the past century. The Philosophy of Time is a new title in the Routledge series, Critical Concepts in Philosophy. It meets the need for an authoritative reference work to make sense of the subject’s vast literature and the continuing explosion in research output. Edited by L. Nathan Oaklander, a leading scholar in the philosophy of time, this new Major Work from Routledge brings together in four volumes the canonical and the very best cutting-edge scholarship in the field to provide a synoptic view of all the key issues and current debates. With a comprehensive introduction to the collection, newly written by the editor, which places the collected material in its historical and intellectual context, The Philosophy of Time is an essential work of reference and is destined to be valued by philosophers of time—as well as those working in related areas of philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of religion—as a vital research resource

In R. D. Ingthorsson’s provocative and carefully researched book, McTaggart’s Paradox, the author aims to demonstrate that “practically every writer is guilty of some or other of the misunderstandings of McTaggart’s paradox that I outline in this book”. The most dramatic misunderstanding that commentators make is the failure to realize that McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time depends on the principle of temporal parity: the thesis that all times, whether A times or B times, exist equally or co-exist. Since temporal parity is also a central tenet of the B view, B-theorists cannot use McTaggart’s paradox to support their view as temporal parity also demonstrates that the B-theory cannot accommodate change or account for the temporality of earlier than and later than. Ingthorsson concludes that only if we reject temporal parity, the B view, and all versions of the A view except presentism, can we account for the intuitively plausible view, “the one that coincides with ‘the man on the street’ … that only those things exist that exist now, and that only those things will count as co-existing that are simultaneous with each other”.

The Philosophy of Time Society (PTS) grew out of a National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Seminar on the Philosophy of Time offered by George Schlesinger in 1991. The members of that seminar wanted to promote interest in the philosophy of time and Jon N. Turgerson offered to become the first Director of the PTS with the initial costs underwritten by the Drake University Center for the Humanities. Thus, the PTS was formed in 1993. Its goal is to promote the study of the philosophy of time from a broad analytic perspective, and to provide a forum as an affiliated group with the American Philosophical Association (APA), to discuss the issues in and related to the philosophy of time. The society held its first meeting during the Eastern Division of the APA in Atlanta, GA, in December 1993. In 1997, L. Nathan Oaklander began his tenure as Executive Director of PTS and, with his term ending in 2000, he decided to put together a volume of selected papers read at PTS meetings over the years. The result is the present volume. It contains some of the latest developments in the field, including discussions of books by Michael Tooley (Time, Tense, and Causation), and D. H. Mellor (Real Time II), and much more. The main issue in the philosophy of time is and remains the status of temporal becoming and the passage of time.

If propositions are made true in virtue of corresponding to facts, then what are the truth-makers of true negative propositions such as ‘The apple is not red’? Russell argued that there must be negative facts to account for what makes true negative propositions true and false positive propositions false. Others, more parsimonious in their ontological commitments, have attempted to avoid them. Wittgenstein rejected them since he was loath to think that the sign for negation referred to a negative element in a fact. A contemporary of Russell’s, Raphael Demos, attempted to eliminate them by appealing to ‘incompatibility’ facts. More recently, Armstrong has appealed to the totality of positive facts as the ground of the truth of true negative propositions. Oaklander and Miracchi have suggested that the absence or non-existence of the positive fact (which is not itself a further fact) is the basis of a positive proposition being false and therefore of the truth of its negation.