Luciano Floridi

Wie kann Europa politisch und gesellschaftlich durch die Möglichkeiten der Digitalisierung profitieren und seine Krisen überwinden, von denen es in der letzten Zeit so geplagt wurde? Wie kann es ein „Humanprojekt“ und die Einheit von „grüner“ Ökologie und „blauer“ Informationstechnik realisieren? In diesem Band präsentiert Luciano Floridi eine Zusammenfassung seiner Thesen, wie sich die Digitalisierung ganz konkret auf politische und soziale Phänomene auswirkt, und wie nun weniger die Dinge als ihre Relationen an Bedeutung gewinnen.Mit kritischen Beiträgen von Manfred Broy, Markus Gabriel, Armin Grunwald, Ruth Hagengruber, Alexander Kriebitz, Christoph Lütge, Raphael Max, Catrin Misselhorn und Malte Rehbein.

Today, open source intelligence (OSINT), i.e., information derived from publicly available sources, makes up between 80 and 90 percent of all intelligence activities carried out by Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) and intelligence services in the West. Developments in data mining, machine learning, visual forensics and, most importantly, the growing computing power available for commercial use, have enabled OSINT practitioners to speed up, and sometimes even automate, intelligence collection and analysis, obtaining more accurate results more quickly. As the infosphere expands to accommodate ever-increasing online presence, so does the pool of actionable OSINT. These developments raise important concerns in terms of governance, ethical, legal, and social implications (GELSI). New and crucial oversight concerns emerge alongside standard privacy concerns, as some of the more advanced data analysis tools require little to no supervision. This article offers a systematic review of the relevant literature. It analyzes 571 publications to assess the current state of the literature on the use of AI-powered OSINT (and the development of OSINT software) as it relates to the GELSI framework, highlighting potential gaps and suggesting new research directions.

International regulation of autonomous weapon systems (AWS) is increasingly conceived as an exercise in risk management. This requires a shared approach for assessing the risks of AWS. This paper presents a structured approach to risk assessment and regulation for AWS, adapting a qualitative framework inspired by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). It examines the interactions among key risk factors—determinants, drivers, and types—to evaluate the risk magnitude of AWS and establish risk tolerance thresholds through a risk matrix informed by background knowledge of event likelihood and severity. Further, it proposes a methodology to assess community risk appetite, emphasizing that such assessments and resulting tolerance levels should be determined through deliberation in a multistakeholder forum. The paper highlights the complexities of applying risk-based regulations to AWS internationally, particularly the challenge of defining a global community for risk assessment and regulatory legitimization.

This introduction presents the project of a one-day meeting on the future of philosophical research, hosted by the Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of London, on 13 January 2012. The meeting brought together several distinguished philosophers and scholars in their roles as journal editors and publishing experts, in order to clarify and discuss the future of philosophical research. This symposium in Metaphilosophy collects a selection of the papers presented at the meeting and some invited articles

Artificial Intelligence research and regulation seek to balance the benefits of innovation against any potential harms and disruption. However, one unintended consequence of the recent surge in AI research is the potential re-orientation of AI technologies to facilitate criminal acts, term in this chapter AI-Crime. AIC is theoretically feasible thanks to published experiments in automating fraud targeted at social media users, as well as demonstrations of AI-driven manipulation of simulated markets. However, because AIC is still a relatively young and inherently interdisciplinary area—spanning socio-legal studies to formal science—there is little certainty of what an AIC future might look like. This chapter offers the first systematic, interdisciplinary literature analysis of the foreseeable threats of AIC, providing ethicists, policy-makers, and law enforcement organisations with a synthesis of the current problems, and a possible solution space.

We propose a formal framework for interpretable machine learning. Combining elements from statistical learning, causal interventionism, and decision theory, we design an idealised explanation game in which players collaborate to find the best explanation for a given algorithmic prediction. Through an iterative procedure of questions and answers, the players establish a three-dimensional Pareto frontier that describes the optimal trade-offs between explanatory accuracy, simplicity, and relevance. Multiple rounds are played at different levels of abstraction, allowing the players to explore overlapping causal patterns of variable granularity and scope. We characterise the conditions under which such a game is almost surely guaranteed to converge on a optimal explanation surface in polynomial time, and highlight obstacles that will tend to prevent the players from advancing beyond certain explanatory thresholds. The game serves a descriptive and a normative function, establishing a conceptual space in which to analyse and compare existing proposals, as well as design new and improved solutions.

Artificial intelligence (AI) as a general-purpose technology has great potential for advancing the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). However, the AI×SDGs phenomenon is still in its infancy in terms of diffusion, analysis, and empirical evidence. Moreover, a scalable adoption of AI solutions to advance the achievement of the SDGs requires private and public actors to engage in coordinated actions that have been analysed only partially so far. This volume provides the first overview of the AI×SDGs phenomenon and its related challenges and opportunities. The first part of the book adopts a programmatic approach, discussing AI×SDGs at a theoretical level and from the perspectives of different stakeholders. The second part illustrates existing projects and potential new applications.

In recent years, policymakers, academics, and practitioners have increasingly called for the development of global governance mechanisms for artificial intelligence (AI). This paper considers the prospects for these calls in light of two other geopolitical trends: digital sovereignty and digital expansionism. While calls for global AI governance promote the surrender of some state sovereignty over AI, digital sovereignty and expansionism seek to secure greater state control over digital technologies. To demystify the tensions between these trends and their potential consequences, we undertake a case analysis of digital sovereignty and digital expansionism in China, the European Union, and the United States. We argue that the extraterritoriality embedded in these three actors’ policies and escalatory competitive narratives, particularly those from the US, will likely undermine substantive global AI governance cooperation. However, nascent areas of alignment or compromise, notably in data governance and technical standards, could prove fruitful starting points for building trust in multilateral fora, such as the G20 or United Nations.

This work fulfills the need for a conceptual and technical framework to improve understanding of Information Quality (IQ) and Information Quality standards. The meaning and practical implementation of IQ are addressed, as it is relevant to any field where there is a need to handle data and issues such as accessibility, accuracy, completeness, currency, integrity, reliability, timeliness, usability, the role of metrics and so forth are all a part of Information Quality. In order to support the cross-fertilization of theory and practice, the latest research is presented in this book. The perspectives of experts from beyond the origins of IQ in computer science are included: library and information science practitioners and academics, philosophers of information, of engineering and technology, and of science are all contributors to this volume. The chapters in this volume are based on the work of a collaborative research project involving the Arts and Humanities Research Council and Google and led by Professor Luciano Floridi, University of Oxford. This work will be of interest to anyone handling data, including those from commercial, public, governmental and academic organizations. The expert editors’ contributions introduce issues of interest to scientists, database curators and philosophers, even though the issues may be disguised in the language and examples common to a different discipline.

Chi siamo e che tipo di relazioni stabiliamo gli uni con gli altri? Luciano Floridi sostiene che gli sviluppi nel campo delle tecnologie dell’informazione e della comunicazione stiano modificando le risposte a domande così fondamentali. I confini tra la vita online e quella offline tendono a sparire e siamo ormai connessi gli uni con gli altri senza soluzione di continuità, diventando progressivamente parte integrante di un’“infosfera” globale. Questo passaggio epocale rappresenta niente meno che una quarta rivoluzione, dopo quelle di Copernico, Darwin e Freud. L’espressione “onlife” definisce sempre di più le nostre attività quotidiane: come facciamo acquisti, lavoriamo, ci divertiamo, coltiviamo le nostre relazioni. In ogni campo della vita, le tecnologie della comunicazione sono diventate forze che strutturano l’ambiente in cui viviamo, creando e trasformando la realtà. Saremo in grado di raccoglierne i frutti? Quali, invece, i rischi impliciti? Floridi suggerisce che dovremmo sviluppare un approccio in grado di rendere conto sia delle realtà naturali sia di quelle artificiali, in modo da affrontare con successo le sfide poste dalle tecnologie correnti e dalle attuali società dell’informazione.

This volume focuses on the responsibilities of online service providers (OSPs) in contemporary societies. It examines the complexity and global dimensions of the rapidly evolving and serious challenges posed by the exponential development of Internet services and resources. It looks at the major actors – such as Facebook, Google, Twitter, and Yahoo! – and their significant influence on the informational environment and users’ interactions within it, as well as the responsibilities and liabilities such influence entails. It discusses the position of OSPs as information gatekeepers and how they have gone from offering connecting and information-sharing services to paying members to providing open, free infrastructure and applications that facilitate digital expression and the communication of information. The book seeks consensus on the principles that should shape OSPs’ responsibilities and practices, taking into account business ethics and policies. Finally, it discusses the rights of users and international regulations that are in place or currently lacking.

An increasing number of technology firms are implementing processes to identify and evaluate the ethical risks of their systems and products. A key part of these review processes is to foresee potential impacts of these technologies on different groups of users. In this chapter, we use the expression Ethical Foresight Analysis to refer to a variety of analytical strategies for anticipating or predicting the ethical issues that new technological artefacts, services, and applications may raise. This chapter examines several existing EFA methodologies currently in use. It identifies the purposes of ethical foresight, the kinds of methods that current methodologies employ, and the strengths and weaknesses of each of these current approaches. The conclusion is that a new kind of foresight analysis on the ethics of emerging technologies is both feasible and urgently needed.

Although the employment situation of disabled people has widely been identified as in need of improvement, progress in this area remains slow. While some progress has been made in including the physically or sensory disabled in the workplace, other types of disability have been largely neglected. This applies particularly to disabled workers in atypical employment, such as those whose workplace is the Digital Economy. In this article, we discuss the case of disabled app developers as a significant example of how the current regulatory framework fails to be inclusive in its attempts to protect the rights of disabled Digital Economy workers. We identify two problems that are at the heart of this: first, a continuing failure to collect relevant and comprehensive data on disability, and second, a lack of accountability towards disabled workers in atypical employment. Consequently, we call for better data collection and argue for urgent policy changes to close the existing accountability gap.

This book presents the latest research on the challenges and solutions affecting the equilibrium between freedom of speech, freedom of information, information security, and the right to informational privacy. Given the complexity of the topics addressed, the book shows how old legal and ethical frameworks may need to be not only updated, but also supplemented and complemented by new conceptual solutions. Neither a conservative attitude (“more of the same”) nor a revolutionary zeal (“never seen before”) is likely to lead to satisfactory solutions. Instead, more reflection and better conceptual design are needed, not least to harmonise different perspectives and legal frameworks internationally. The focus of the book is on how we may reconcile high levels of information security with robust degrees of informational privacy, also in connection with recent challenges presented by phenomena such as “big data” and security scandals, as well as new legislation initiatives, such as those concerning “the right to be forgotten” and the use of personal data in biomedical research. The book seeks to offer analyses and solutions of the new tensions, in order to build a fair, shareable, and sustainable balance in this vital area of human interactions.

El artículo ofrece una amplia exposición y defensa del «construccionismo», tanto como un enfoque metafilosófico, como una metodología filosófica, con referencias a la tradición filosófica que la ha inspirado, la llamada tradición del «conocimiento del fabricante». La tesis principal defendida es que la «tradición del conocimiento del usuario» propuesta por Platón debería ser complementada, si no reemplazada, por un enfoque construccionista de los problemas filosóficos en general y del conocimiento en particular. En pocas palabras, un agente epistémico sabe algo cuando ese agente es capaz de construir ese algo e insertar la información obtenida en la red correcta de relaciones que lo explican. O, en términos aún más intuitivos, un agente se califica como un agente epistémico no cuando es un usuario pasivo de cierta información sino cuando es un productor crítico de ella. Su pericia epistémica aumenta en relación con el alcance y profundidad de las preguntas que es capaz de formular y responder sobre un tema particular. El conocimiento del fabricante es el conocimiento de la ontología del artefacto semántico y ésta es una lección epistemológica fundamental que podemos aprender de las disciplinas poiéticas como la informática y la economía. De modo que el construccionismo desvía el foco del conocimiento mimético, pasivo y declarativo de que algo es así, para concentrarse más en el conocimiento poiético, interactivo y práctico de algo que es el caso, esto es, de los artefactos semánticos. Una vez aplicado a la interpretación de la filosofía misma, el construccionismo sugiere agregar la ingeniería conceptual al análisis conceptual como un método fundamental.

To address the rising concern that algorithmic decision-making may reinforce discriminatory biases, researchers have proposed many notions of fairness and corresponding mathematical formalizations. Each of these notions is often presented as a one-size-fits-all, absolute condition; however, in reality, the practical and ethical trade-offs are unavoidable and more complex. We introduce a new approach that considers fairness—not as a binary, absolute mathematical condition—but rather, as a relational notion in comparison to alternative decision-making processes. Using U.S. mortgage lending as an example use case, we discuss the ethical foundations of each definition of fairness and demonstrate that our proposed methodology more closely captures the ethical trade-offs of the decision-maker.

Moral reasoning traditionally distinguishes two types of evil:moral and natural. The standard view is that ME is the product of human agency and so includes phenomena such as war, torture and psychological cruelty; that NE is the product of nonhuman agency, and so includes natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods, disease and famine; and finally, that more complex cases are appropriately analysed as a combination of ME and NE. Recently, as a result of developments in autonomousagents in cyberspace, a new class of interesting and importantexamples of hybrid evil has come to light. In this paper, it is called artificial evil and a case is made for considering it to complement ME and NE to produce a more adequate taxonomy. By isolating the features that have led to the appearance of AE, cyberspace is characterised as a self-contained environment that forms the essential component in any foundation of the emerging field of Computer Ethics. It is argued that this goes someway towards providing a methodological explanation of whycyberspace is central to so many of CE's concerns; and it isshown how notions of good and evil can be formulated incyberspace. Of considerable interest is how the propensity for anagent's action to be morally good or evil can be determined evenin the absence of biologically sentient participants and thusallows artificial agents not only to perpetrate evil but conversely to `receive' or `suffer from'it. The thesis defended is that the notion of entropy structure,which encapsulates human value judgement concerning cyberspace ina formal mathematical definition, is sufficient to achieve thispurpose and, moreover, that the concept of AE can be determinedformally, by mathematical methods. A consequence of this approachis that the debate on whether CE should be considered unique, andhence developed as a Macroethics, may be viewed, constructively,in an alternative manner. The case is made that whilst CE issues are not uncontroversially unique, they are sufficiently novel to render inadequate the approach of standard Macroethics such as Utilitarianism and Deontologism and hence to prompt the search for a robust ethical theory that can deal with them successfully. The name Information Ethics is proposed for that theory. Itis argued that the uniqueness of IE is justified by its beingnon-biologically biased and patient-oriented: IE is anEnvironmental Macroethics based on the concept of data entityrather than life. It follows that the novelty of CE issues suchas AE can be appreciated properly because IE provides a newperspective. In light of the discussion provided in this paper, it is concluded that Computer Ethics is worthy of independent study because it requires its own application-specific knowledge and is capable of supporting a methodological foundation, Information Ethics.

The SARS-CoV-2 (COVID-19) pandemic has caused social and economic devastation. As the milestone of two years of ‘living with the virus’ approaches, governments and businesses are attempting to develop means of reopening society whilst still protecting public health. However, developing interventions – particularly technological interventions – that find a safe, socially acceptable, and ethically justifiable balance between these two seemingly opposing demands is extremely challenging. There is no one right solution, but the current most popular ‘solution’ is the so-called ‘COVID-19 Vaccine Passport’ (also known as COVID-19 passes or certificates), the use of which may be supported by both human rights and international public health law if they are designed and implemented appropriately. (We use the term ‘Vaccine Passport’ because it has been adopted by the popular press. Though it has been used in many ways, here we use it generically to refer to a document that certifies that an individual has been vaccinated against COVID-19 and on that basis grants the bearer more liberties than to those who have not been vaccinated. Later, we will discuss why it is necessary to move beyond considering only vaccinations, which informs our preferred term of ‘COVID-19 Status Pass’.) We set out to answer the following questions: how should governments and businesses assess the risks in light of human rights, public health ethics, and digital ethics concerns which emerge from developing and deploying COVID-19 Vaccine Passports? What design decisions should businesses make when developing COVID-19 Vaccine Passports to help ensure they respect human rights, and both public health and digital ethics? Do the implications for human rights, public health, and digital ethics vary depending on where and when COVID-19 Vaccine Passports are used? What are the rights and powers of the individual to object to or seek remedy for the use of COVID-19 Vaccine Passports? How can the risks of inequalities and social division derived from the deployment of COVID-19 Vaccine Passports be avoided or mitigated? We conducted a literature review and documentary analysis, supplementing our findings with news articles where appropriate. The following pages report our results, concluding with a series of actionable recommendations for businesses, national governments, and supranational organisations.

It has been suggested that to overcome the challenges facing the UK’s National Health Service of an ageing population and reduced available funding, the NHS should be transformed into a more informationally mature and heterogeneous organisation, reliant on data-based and algorithmically-driven interactions between human, artificial, and hybrid agents. This transformation process would offer significant benefit to patients, clinicians, and the overall system, but it would also rely on a fundamental transformation of the healthcare system in a way that poses significant governance challenges. In this chapter, we argue that a fruitful way to overcome these challenges is by adopting a pro-ethical approach to design that analyses the system as a whole, keeps society-in-the-loop throughout the process, and distributes responsibility evenly across all nodes in the system.

Pensare l’infosfera: La filosofia come design concettuale di Luciano Floridi è la traduzione, rivista e parziale, di un libro pubblicato in inglese sulla logica dell’informazione (The Logic of Information, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2019). All’interno della riflessione sul digitale che il filosofo italiano sta conducendo ormai da qualche decennio, questo saggio si colloca come terza parte di una tetralogia legata alla filosofia dell’informazione. I primi due volumi, The Philosophy of Information e The Ethics of Information, sono già stati pubblicati rispettivamente nel 2011 e nel 2013 mentre l’ultimo, riguardante la politica dell’informazione, è in corso di stesura. Come esplicitato dallo stesso Floridi nell’introduzione, l’oggetto di indagine del testo è la filosofia stessa, precisamente rispetto al suo metodo e alla sua natura. Ciò che a essa manca è proprio uno spazio fuori di sé in cui si possa avere un dibattito su cosa sia la buona filosofia. Floridi prova a crearlo definendo la filosofia come «passione per il sapere e il capire». Questo significa che per fare buona filosofia non basta porre domande o cercare risposte ma bisogna «avere coraggio nel porre le domande giuste al momento giusto e offrire le risposte corrette, anche se spiacevoli e impopolari». La situazione in cui la riflessione è situata si potrebbe sintetizzare così: «La filosofia oggi è un po’ come un computer che ha perso memoria a causa dei bachi del sistema. Bisogna riavviarla». La base da cui far ripartire la filosofia, per Floridi, si fonda su quella che lui stesso chiama «la quarta rivoluzione», ovvero quella delle tecnologie digitali che sempre più «influenzano il modo in cui concepiamo il mondo e ci rapportiamo a esso, così come il modo in cui concepiamo noi stessi e interagiamo tra noi».

The Cambridge Companion to Humanism. Jill Kraye. Cambridge Companions to Literature. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. xvii + 320. £35.00 hbk, £12.95 pbk. ISBN 0–521–43038–0, 0–521–43624–9. Scepticism in the History of Philosophy ‐ A Pan‐American Dialogue. Edited by Richard H. Popkin. Dordrecht‐Boston‐London, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996. pp. xxii + 285, hbk, £99.00, ISBN 0–7923–3769–7 Jewish Thought and Scientific Discovery in Early Modern Europe. David B. Ruderman. Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1995. pp. xi + 392. ISBN 0–300–06112–9 Pluralism and The Personality of the State. David Runciman. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. xiv + 279. £35.00. ISBN 0521–55191–9 Gassendi et L'Europe. Edited by Sylvia Murr. Paris, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1997. pp. 494. FF 240. ISBN 2–7116–1306–2 Nicholas Malebranche: Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion. Edited by Nicholas Jolley, trans. by David Scott. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997. pp. xlii + 287. John Locke: Anleitung des menschlichen Verstandes. Eine Abhandlung von den Wunderwerken. In der Übersetzung Königsberg 1755 von Georg David Kypke, edited by Terry Boswell, Riccardo Pozzo and Clemens Schwaiger. Stuttgart‐Bad Cannstatt, 1996, 2 vols., pp. xxviii + 2187pp. viii + 140. DM 186. ISBN 3–7728–1711–4 Leibniz's ‘New System’. Edited by Roger S. Woolhouse, Florence, Leo S. Olschki, 1996. pp. x + 201. ISBN 88–222–4454–0. Mary Astell: Political Writings. Edited by Patricia Springborg. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. xlviii + 286. £45.00 £15.95 ISBN 0–521–41800–3 0–521–42845–9 Mary Wollstonecraft: A Vindication of the Rights of Men and A Vindication of the Rights of Woman. Edited by Sylvana Tomaselli. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. xxxvii + 349. £35.00, £8.95 ISBN 0–521–43053–4 0–521–43633–8 Knud Haakonssen: Natural Law and Moral Philosophy. From Grotius to the Scottish Enlightenment. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996. pp. x + 386. £45.00 hbk. ISBN 0–521–49686–1. £15.95 pbk. ISBN 0–521–49802–3 Hartwig Wiedebach: Die Bedeutung der Nationalität für Hermann Cohen. Europaea Memororia. Studien und Texte zur Geschichte der europäischen Ideen. Hildesheim, Georg Olms Verlag, 1997. pp. viii + 340.

In this short article, I argue that (a) the distinction between what counts as natural and moral evil is not fixed; that (b) science and technology can transform natural evil into moral evil; that (c) two main philosophical anthropologies explain moral evil as due to ignorance (Socrates) or wickedness (Hobbes); and hence that (d) a society that seeks to counter evil should rely on science and technology to transform natural evil into moral evil and then on education (Paideia) and regulations (Nomos) to minimise or even eliminate moral evil.