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Fred Dretske
(1932 - 2013)

Last affiliation: Duke University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    194
    • Most Recent
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    • Topics
  •  Events
    2
  •  News and Updates
    129

 More details
  • Duke University
    Department of Philosophy
    Researcher
Durham, North Carolina, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Epistemology
Philosophy of Mind
  • All publications (194)
  •  771
    Perception without awareness
    In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual experience, Oxford University Press. pp. 147--180. 2006.
    Unconscious PerceptionPerceptionUnconscious States
  •  147
    Causal irregularity
    with Aaron Snyder
    Philosophy of Science 39 (1): 69-71. 1972.
    Causation, Miscellaneous
  •  2
    The intentionality of perception
    In Barry Smith (ed.), John Searle, Cambridge University Press. pp. 154-168. 2003.
    Intentionalist Theories of Perception
  •  296
    Knowing what you think vs. knowing that you think it
    In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge, De Gruyter. pp. 389-400. 2004.
    Externalism and Slow SwitchingKnowledge-Wh
  •  214
    Perception from an epistemological point of view
    Journal of Philosophy 68 (19): 584-591. 1971.
    Aspects of Consciousness
  •  94
    Conscious acts and their objects
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4): 676-677. 1991.
    Philosophy of Cognitive SciencePhilosophy of Consciousness
  •  307
    Two Conceptions of Knowledge
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 40 (1): 15-30. 1991.
    There are two ways to think about knowledge: From the bottom-up point of view, knowledge is an early arrival on the evolutionary scene; it is what animals need in order to coordinate their behavior with the environmental conditions. The top-down approach, departing from Descartes, considers knowledge constituted by a justified belief which gains its justification only in so far as the process by means of which it is reached conforms to canons of sciemific inference and rational theory choice. Ke…Read more
    There are two ways to think about knowledge: From the bottom-up point of view, knowledge is an early arrival on the evolutionary scene; it is what animals need in order to coordinate their behavior with the environmental conditions. The top-down approach, departing from Descartes, considers knowledge constituted by a justified belief which gains its justification only in so far as the process by means of which it is reached conforms to canons of sciemific inference and rational theory choice. Keith Lehrer's epistemology is analyzed as a top-down intemahst position and criticised with examples that show that in certain cases obviously knowledge is attained without meeting the standards for reliability of sources and processing of the required informantion.
    KnowledgeEpistemological States and Properties
  •  25
    Is Knowledge Closed Under Known Entailment? The Case Against Closure
    In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 13-26. 2013.
    Closure of Knowledge
  •  1
    Aspects of cognitive representation
    In Myles Brand (ed.), _The Representation Of Knowledge And Belief_, Tucson: University of Arizona Press. 1986.
    Naturalizing Mental Content, MiscComputation and Representation, Misc
  •  2
    Seeing and Knowing
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 21 (1): 121-124. 1970.
    Science, Logic, and Mathematics
  •  1
    Essays on Nonconceptual Content
    Bradford Book/MIT Press. 2003.
    Conceptual and Nonconceptual ContentSensation and Perception
  •  1022
    Conclusive reasons
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1): 1-22. 1971.
    This Article does not have an abstract
    Epistemological States and PropertiesReasons and OughtsSubjective and Objective ReasonsReasons and R…Read more
    Epistemological States and PropertiesReasons and OughtsSubjective and Objective ReasonsReasons and RationalityClosure of Knowledge
  •  1
    Mental events as structuring causes of behavior
    In John Heil & Alfred Mele (eds.), Mental Causation, Clarendon Press. pp. 121--135. 1993.
    Reasons and CausesExplanatory Role of Content
  •  403
    [No title] (edited book)
    with Sven Bernecker
    Oxford University Press. 2000.
    Epistemology, General WorksEpistemology of Testimony
  •  100
    Reply to hawthorne
    In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 43--46. 2013.
    Ontology
  •  141
    Differences that make no difference
    Philosophical Topics 22 (1/2): 41-57. 1994.
    Dennett's Functionalism
  •  108
    The stance stance
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3): 511-512. 1988.
    Philosophy of Cognitive ScienceAspects of Consciousness
  •  172
    Minds, machines, and money: What really explains behavior
    In J. A. M. Bransen & S. E. Cuypers (eds.), Human Action, Deliberation and Causation, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 157--173. 1998.
    Explanatory Role of Content
  •  113
    Reasons and falsification
    Philosophical Quarterly 15 (58): 20-34. 1965.
    Epistemology of Specific Domains, Misc
  •  253
    Counting to Infinity
    Analysis 25 (Suppl-3): 99. 1965.
    Kalam Cosmological ArgumentThe Infinite
  •  86
    The Metaphysics of Information
    In Alois Pichler & Herbert Hrachovec (eds.), Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Information: Proceedings of the 30th International Ludwig Wittgenstein-Symposium in Kirchberg, 2007, De Gruyter. pp. 273-284. 2008.
    Conceptions of Information
  • Mind and brain
    In Richard Warner & Tadeusz Szubka (eds.), The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate, Blackwell. 1994.
  •  234
    Precis of "Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes"
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (4): 783-786. 1990.
    Causal Theory of ActionInformation-Based Accounts of Mental ContentThe Structure of ActionReasons an…Read more
    Causal Theory of ActionInformation-Based Accounts of Mental ContentThe Structure of ActionReasons and CausesExplanatory Role of ContentMental Causation, Misc
  •  146
    Challenging Closure: Is It A Way To Answer The Skeptic?
    The Harvard Review of Philosophy 19 61-68. 2013.
    Replies to Skepticism, MiscBrains in Vats
  •  74
    The Fragility of Reason
    Dialogue 31 (2): 311. 1992.
  • Knowledge and the Flow of Information
    Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 175 (1): 69-70. 1981.
    Continental Philosophy
  •  2
    About self-knowledge
    In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, Routledge. pp. 425. 2013.
  •  148
    Simple seeing
    In Donald F. Gustafson & Bangs L. Tapscott (eds.), Body, Mind, and Method: Essays in Honor of Virgil C. Aldrich, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 1--15. 1979.
  •  371
    Introspection
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94 263-278. 19934.
    Fred Dretske; XI*—Introspection, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 94, Issue 1, 1 June 1994, Pages 263–278, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/9.
    Introspection and IntrospectionismExternalism and Self-Knowledge
  •  161
    Particulars and the relational theory of time
    Philosophical Review 70 (4): 447-469. 1961.
    Physics of TimeOntologyObjects and Properties
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