Pierre Steiner

This paper aims at answering the question “When is informational content explicitly represented in a cognitive system?”. I first distinguish the explicitness this question is about from other kinds of explicitness that are currently investigated in philosophy of mind, and situate the components of the question within the various conceptual frameworks that are used to study mental representations. I then present and criticize, on conceptual and empirical grounds, two basic ways of answering the question, the first one coming from the classical computational theory of mind, the latter one issued from a procedural conception of informational contents. I then argue for a new answer to the initial question, an answer that retains some valuable insights of the criticized theories, but which underlines the importance and the interpretational source of the distinctiveness proper to explicitly represented contents

Ce texte se propose de revenir sur la manière dont les Principles of Psychology ont été compris et discutés par Husserl et par Wittgenstein. Pour ce faire, on se focalisera ici sur le sens et l’importance stratégique de la dénonciation effectuée par James de l’ erreur du psychologue dans le chapitre VII de l’ouvrage, antérieur au chapitre « The Stream of Thought » qui a retenu toute l’attention de Husserl et de Wittgenstein. Il est suggéré qu’une des sources permettant de déterminer ce qui est en jeu dans les usages divergents des Principles par Husserl et Wittgenstein se situe crucialement dans la manière dont cette dénonciation de l’erreur du psychologue peut être comprise à partir des perspectives respectives des deux auteurs. Un rappel des tensions principales entre, d’une part, le travail de James dans les Principles et, d’autre part, les critiques husserliennes et wittgensteiniennes de la psychologie, permet de comprendre l’importance, la radicalité, mais aussi les insuffisances de cette dénonciation jamesienne de l’erreur du psychologue.

I propose a systematic survey of the various attitudes proponents of enaction (or enactivism) entertained or are entertaining towards representationalism and towards the use of the concept “mental representation” in cognitive science. For the sake of clarity, a set of distinctions between different varieties of representationalism and anti-representationalism are presented. I also recapitulate and discuss some anti-representationalist trends and strategies one can find the enactive literature, before focusing on some possible limitations of eliminativist versions of enactive anti-representationalism. These limitations are here taken as opportunities for reflecting on the fate of enactivism in its relations with representationalism and anti-representationalism.

This paper is a discussion of Claire Petitmengin and Michel Bitbol's article 'The validity of first-person descriptions as authenticity and coherence' . In section I, I present what I take as being the main points they defend in that article, and put them in relation with the global purpose of the special issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies in which their article is included. In section II, I start discussing the paper by comparing the conception of description they defend with a constructivist/pragmatist account of description and knowledge. This leads me, in section III, to introduce very briefly the pragmatist conception of experience that underlies that latter account. As that pragmatist conception of experience insists on the fact that lived experience goes beyond the subjective/objective duality, and as it therefore calls for a redefinition of what lived experience is, I naturally wonder whether B&P might endorse that pragmatist conception of experience, somehow standing in tension with the importance of subjectivity in the definition of what lived experience is for many first-person approaches to lived experience

Based on an endorsement of the hypothesis of extended cognition , this paper proposes a criticism of the representationalist assumptions that still pertain to these contemporary models of cognition. I first rehearse some basic problems akin to any representationalist model of cognition, before proposing some more specific arguments directed against the necessity, the plausibility, and the coherence of the marriage between extended cognition and contemporary representationalism . Extended and distributed models of cognition have the resources to get rid of representationalism, and they should better do it. Their adherence to representationalism might be an by-product of the extended character of the scientific study of cognition