•  96
    Possibility, chance and necessity
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (1). 2000.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  10
    Properties and Predicates
    In D. H. Mellor & Alex Oliver (eds.), Properties, Oxford University Press. 1997.
  • On Raising the Chances of Effects
    In J. H. Fetzer (ed.), Probability and Causality, D. Reidel. pp. 229-239. 1988.
    I show that the connotations of causation - temporal, explanatory, predictive and means-end - are preserved in indeterministic causation only to the extent that effects have a greater chance of occurring in the circumstances if their causes do than if they don’t.
  • Physics and furniture
    In Peter Achinstein (ed.), Studies in the philosophy of science, Published By Basil Blackwell With the Cooperation of the University of Pittsburg. pp. 171--187. 1969.
  •  14
    Other Times (review)
    Philosophical Review 108 (3): 428-430. 1999.
  •  19
    Other Times: Philosophical Perspectives on Past, Present and Future (review)
    Philosophical Review 108 (3): 428-430. 1999.
    The content and style of this book differ from those of most recent works on the topics listed in its title. In its first part, Cockburn does indeed address the current debate between advocates of tensed and tenseless views of time. Not however to try and settle it—God and Wittgenstein forbid!—but to argue that we who do try mistake for a metaphysical issue what is really an ethical one, namely the “place which tense should occupy in our justifications of action and feeling”. In part 2 he provid…Read more
  •  20
    Obituary: R. B. Braithwaite (1900-1990)
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (4): 579-580. 1990.
  •  11
    We do not know whether there are other universes. Perhaps we never shall. But I want to argue that 'do other universes exist?' can be posed in a form that makes it a genuine scientific question. Moreover, I shall outline why it is an interesting question; and why, indeed, I already suspect that the answer may be 'yes'.
  •  72
    This paper attacks two contrary views. One denies that nature has joints, taking the properties we call natural to be merely artefacts of our theories. The other accepts real natural properties but takes their naturalness to come by degrees. I argue that both are wrong: natural properties are real, and their naturalness no more comes by degrees than does the naturalness of the things that have them.1
  •  3
    The Philosophy of A. J. Ayer
    Philosophy 69 (267): 107-110. 1994.
  •  4
    Mctaggart's proof
    In L. Nathan Oaklander (ed.), The Philosophy of Time, Routledge. pp. 1--81. 2008.
  •  46
    Mind, Meaning, and Reality: Essays in Philosophy
    Oxford University Press. 2012.
    Mind, Meaning, and Reality presents fifteen philosophical papers in which D. H. Mellor explores some of the most intriguing questions in philosophy. These include: what determines what we think, and what we use language to mean; how that depends on what there is in the world and why there is only one universe; and the nature of time
  •  8
    Naming, Necessity and Natural Kinds
    Philosophy 53 (203): 126-127. 1978.
  •  245
    Natural kinds
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 28 (4): 299-312. 1977.
  • Matters of Metaphysics
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43 (4): 555-559. 1992.
  •  17
    I_– _D.H. Mellor
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 72 (1): 29-43. 1998.
  •  92
    I *—The Presidential Address: Nothing Like Experience
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 93 (1): 1-16. 1993.
    D. H. Mellor; I *—The Presidential Address: Nothing Like Experience, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 93, Issue 1, 1 June 1993, Pages 1–16, https.
  •  55
    This article is the text of an interview with D. H. Mellor conducted by Andrew Pyle and first published in the Spring 1993 issue of the philosophical journal Cogito.
  •  5
    Review of Henry Ely Kyburg: Epistemology and Inference (review)
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (2): 175-179. 1984.
  •  24
    History without the Flow of Time
    Neue Zeitschrift für Systematicsche Theologie Und Religionsphilosophie 28 (1): 68-76. 1986.
  •  77
    This lecture will last less than twenty four hours. I know that, and so do you. And you knew it before I said so. How? Because you knew that lectures don't last twenty four hours. How do you know that? You haven't heard this one, and 'for all you know' (as the saying is) I could go on all night. But you know I won't. And the 'all you know' which tells you that, without entailing it, is the fact that none, or almost none, of the many lectures, on all subjects, which you've heard or heard of, have…Read more
  •  47
    Imprecision and explanation
    Philosophy of Science 34 (1): 1-9. 1967.
    The paper, analyses the role of measurable concepts in deductive explanation. It is shown that such concepts are, although imprecise in a defined sense, exact in that neutral candidates to them do not arise. An analysis is given of the way in which imprecision is related to generalisation, and it is shown how imprecise concepts are incorporated in testable deductive explanations
  •  5
    Levi's Chances
    In Erik J. Olsson (ed.), Knowledge and Inquiry: Essays on the Pragmatism of Isaac Levi, Cambridge University Press. pp. 111. 2006.
  •  58
    I and Now
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 89. 1989.
    D. H. Mellor; VI*—I and Now, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 89, Issue 1, 1 June 1989, Pages 79–94, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/89.1.79.
  •  68
    Micro-composition
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 62 65-80. 2008.
    Entities of many kinds, not just material things, have been credited with parts. Armstrong , for example, has taken propositions and properties to be parts of their conjunctions, sets to be parts of sets that include them, and geographical regions and events to be parts of regions and events that contain them. The justification for bringing all these diverse relations under a single ‘part–whole’ concept is that they share all or most of the formal features articulated in mereology . But the conc…Read more