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57This article is the text of an interview with D. H. Mellor conducted by Andrew Pyle and first published in the Spring 1993 issue of the philosophical journal Cogito.
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6Review of Henry Ely Kyburg: Epistemology and Inference (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (2): 175-179. 1984.
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26History without the Flow of TimeNeue Zeitschrift für Systematicsche Theologie Und Religionsphilosophie 28 (1): 68-76. 1986.
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33The article is derived from the accompanying radio portrait. It was published in 1995 in Philosophy 70, 243-262, and is reproduced here by permission of the Editor. Page numbers after quotations from Ramsey refer to F. P. Ramsey: Philosophical Papers, edited by D. H. Mellor, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
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35God and ProbabilityReligious Studies 5 (2). 1969.My object in this paper is to consider what relevance, if any, current analyses of probability have to problems of religious belief. There is no doubt that words such as ‘probable’ are used in this context; what is doubtful is that this use can be analysed as other major uses of such words can. I shall conclude that this use cannot be so analysed and hence, given the preponderance of the other uses that can, that it is misleading.
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20From Translations to TruthmakersIn Francesco Federico Calemi (ed.), Metaphysics and Scientific Realism: Essays in Honour of David Malet Armstrong, De Gruyter. pp. 219-232. 2016.
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76Connectivity, chance, and ignoranceBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 16 (63): 209-225. 1965.
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62Experimental error and deducibilityPhilosophy of Science 32 (2): 105-122. 1965.The view is advocated that to preserve a deductivist account of science against recent criticism, it is necessary to incorporate experimental error, or imprecision, in the deductive structure. The sources of imprecision in empirical variables are analyzed, and the notion of conceptual imprecision introduced and illustrated. This is then used to clarify the notion of the acceptable range of a functional law. It is further shown that imprecision may be ascribed to parameters in laws and theories w…Read more
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54Contingent facts: a reply to Cresswell and RiniAnalysis 71 (1): 62-68. 2011.(No abstract is available for this citation)
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34Connectivity, chance, and ignoranceBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 16 (63): 209-225. 1965.
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Connectivity, chance, and ignoranceBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 18 (3): 235-238. 1967.
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31Cambridge Philosophers I: F. P. RamseyPhilosophy 70 (272): 243-262. 1995.Frank Plumpton Ramsey was born in February 1903, and he died in January 1930—just before his 27th birthday. In his short life he produced an extraordinary amount of profound and original work in economics, mathematics and logic as well as in philosophy: work which in all these fields is still, over sixty years on, extremely influential.
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1Consciousness and degrees of beliefIn Prospects for Pragmatism, Cambridge University Press. 1980.
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29Cambridge Philosophers I: F. P. RamseyPhilosophy 70 (272). 1995.Frank Plumpton Ramsey was born in February 1903, and he died in January 1930—just before his 27th birthday. In his short life he produced an extraordinary amount of profound and original work in economics, mathematics and logic as well as in philosophy: work which in all these fields is still, over sixty years on, extremely influential.
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58Conscious beliefProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 78 87-101. 1978.D. H. Mellor; VI*—Conscious Belief, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 78, Issue 1, 1 June 1978, Pages 87–102, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian.
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ACHINSTEIN, P. "Law and Explanation: An essay in the philosophy of science" (review)Mind 83 (n/a): 146. 1974.
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Postscript to "There is No Question of Physicalism"In P. Moser & J. D. Trout (eds.), Contemporary Materialism: A Reader, Routledge. pp. 85-89. 1995.
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2108There is No Question of PhysicalismMind 99 (394): 185-206. 1990.Many philosophers are impressed by the progress achieved by physical sciences. This has had an especially deep effect on their ontological views: it has made many of them physicalists. Physicalists believe that everything is physical: more precisely, that all entities, properties, relations, and facts are those which are studied by physics or other physical sciences. They may not all agree with the spirit of Rutherford's quoted remark that 'there is physics; and there is stamp-collecting',' but …Read more
Hugh Mellor
(1938 - 2020)
Cambridge, Cambridgeshire, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Physical Science |
Philosophy of Probability |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Probability |
Philosophy of Physical Science |