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15Science, Belief and Behaviour: Essays in Honour of R B Braithwaite (edited book)Cambridge University Press. 1980.This volume is a collection of original essays by eminent philosophers written for R. B. Braithwaite's eightieth birthday to celebrate his work and teaching.
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12How much of the mind is a computerIn Peter Slezak (ed.), Computers, Brains and Minds, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 47--69. 1989.
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12Science, Belief, and Behaviour: Essays in Honour of R. B. BraithwaitePhilosophical Review 91 (4): 609. 1982.
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12The Facts of CausationRoutledge. 1995.Everything we do relies on causation. We eat and drink because this causes us to stay alive. Courts tell us who causes crimes, criminology tell us what causes people to commit them. D.H. Mellor shows us that to understand the world and our lives we must understand causation. _The Facts of Causation_, now available in paperback, is essential reading for students and for anyone interested in reading one of the ground-breaking theories in metaphysics. We cannot understand the world and our place in…Read more
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11We do not know whether there are other universes. Perhaps we never shall. But I want to argue that 'do other universes exist?' can be posed in a form that makes it a genuine scientific question. Moreover, I shall outline why it is an interesting question; and why, indeed, I already suspect that the answer may be 'yes'.
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11VI*—I and NowProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 89 (1): 79-94. 1989.D. H. Mellor; VI*—I and Now, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 89, Issue 1, 1 June 1989, Pages 79–94, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/89.1.79.
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10Properties and PredicatesIn D. H. Mellor & Alex Oliver (eds.), Properties, Oxford University Press. 1997.
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8Some Problems about Solving ProblemsPSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1978. 1978.
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6Review of Henry Ely Kyburg: Epistemology and Inference (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (2): 175-179. 1984.
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6Nature's joints: a realistic defence of natural propertiesIn David S. Oderberg (ed.), Classifying Reality, Wiley-blackwell. 2013.This paper attacks two contrary views. One denies that nature has joints, taking the properties we call natural to be merely artefacts of our theories. The other accepts real natural properties but takes their naturalness to come by degrees. I argue that both are wrong: natural properties are real, and their naturalness no more comes by degrees than does the naturalness of the things that havethem.
Hugh Mellor
(1938 - 2020)
Cambridge, Cambridgeshire, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Physical Science |
Philosophy of Probability |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Probability |
Philosophy of Physical Science |