John F. Crosby

Central to the Cowdin-Tuohey paper is the concept of a moral authority proper to medical practitioners. Much as I agree with the authors in refusing to degrade doctors to the status of mere technicians, I argue that one does not succeed in retrieving the moral dimension of medical practice by investing doctors with moral authority. I show that none of the cases brought forth by Cowdin-Tuohey really amounts to a case of moral authority. Then I try to explain why no such cases can be found. Developing an insight that is common to all the major moral thinkers in the philosophia perennis, I show that doctors are professionally competent with respect only to a part of the human good; morally wise persons are competent with respect to that which makes man good as man. I try to show why it follows that a) professional expertise has no natural tendency to pass over into moral understanding, and that b) doctor and non-doctor alike start from the same point in developing their understanding of medical morality. It follows that the authors fail in their attempt to de-center the moral magisterium of the Church by setting up centers of moral authority outside of the Church.

Theology and religious beliefs, including issues dealing with theism, deism, creedal statements, dogma, and spiritualism are considered to be constructed reality. They are herein identified as first order truth. First order truth is personal truth and, as such, it becomes part of the reality of the believer. Constructed theological and religious belief is considered to be a legitimate part of radical constructivism irrespective of the validity and viability of the constructed reality. Second order truth, truth that is beyond the limits of human verification, is herein introduced as the term for ultimate ontological and metaphysical reality. As such, reality is neither denied nor is it attributed to a solipsistic mind. Ultimate and so-called metaphysical reality is unknowable in the epistemological sense of having the capability of being known in any empirical and verifiable manner. To the degree that ultimate and metaphysical reality is known, it is known only via the constructs of the human mind. Perceptions of reality that arise from rigorous empirical research, including experimental and observational data, are certainly to be considered valid, reliable, and viable, but never irreplaceable. In the practice of science and the scientific method there is always the possibility of new hypotheses and theories based on new experimentation and new data, and thus, a case may be made that all knowledge, even scientific and empirical knowledge, is tentative.

The authority of humanism is emphatically not an authority based on intuition, spiritual awakening, personal revelation or epiphanies, scriptural witness of whatever faith, pseudo science, astrology, consensus, endorsements, testimony of enlightened gurus, swamis, pastors, priests, ayatollahs, Buddhist monks, or even justices of the Supreme Court of the United States. The central thesis of this essay is to identify the specific authority underlying the humanist claim which states that “Humanism is a progressive philosophy of life that, without supernaturalism, affirms our ability and responsibility to lead ethical lives of personal fulfillment that aspire to the greater good of humanity.” This essay addresses the question: By what authority do humanists make this claim? The answer is based on consideration of the impossibility of a-priori premises and assumptions except for mathematics and logic. Rather than a priori assumptions and premises, the authority underlying humanism is based on the legitimacy of the a-posteriori, in short, empirical and scientific processes and methodologies.

This new edition of The Heart is the flagship volume in a series of Dietrich von Hildebrand's works to be published by St. Augustine's Press in collaboration with the Dietrich von Hildebrand Legacy Project. Founded in 2004, the Legacy Project exists in the first place to translate the many German writings of von Hildebrand into English. While many revere von Hildebrand as a religious author, few realize that he was a philosopher of great stature and importance. Those who knew von Hildebrand as philosopher held him in the highest esteem. Louis Bouyer, for example, once said that "von Hildebrand was the most important Catholic philosopher in Europe between the two world wars." Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger expressed even greater esteem when he said: "I am personally convinced that, when, at some time in the future, the intellectual history of the Catholic Church in the twentieth century is written, the name of Dietrich von Hildebrand will be most prominent among the figures of our time." The Heart is an accessible yet important philosophical contribution to the understanding of the human person. In this work von Hildebrand is concerned with rehabilitating the affective life of the human person. He thinks that for too long philosophers have held it in suspicion and thought of it as embedded in the body and hence as being much inferior to intellect and will. In reality, he argues, the heart, the center of affectivity, has many different levels, including an eminently personal level; at this level affectivity is just as important a form of personal life as intellect and will. Von Hildebrand develops the idea that properly personal affectivity, far than tending away from an objective relation to being, is in fact one major way in which we transcend ourselves and give being its due. Von Hildebrand also developed the important idea that the heart "in many respects is more the real self of the person than his intellect or will." At the same time, the author shows full realism about the possible deformities of affective life; he offers rich analyses of what he calls affective atrophy and affective hypertrophy. The second half of The Heart offers a remarkable analysis of the affectivity of the God-Man.