Jonathan Wolff

Innovation in basic science is often a cause for won­der and excitement. Those associated with a new development are quick to point out the anticipated benefits: a cure for cancer or dementia, an end to unsafe water or hunger. These advocates are slower to draw at­tention to the possible costs, which may become known only much later. It is always hard to have an accurate overview, as it is almost impossible to predict the total effects of the widespread adoption of any new technology and, especially, its longer‐term or cumulative effects, as as­bestos and CFCs demonstrate. For this reason, some policy‐makers or members of the public hope that we can apply “the precautionary principle” to innovation. Unfortunately, if one is looking for a principle that can guide action, then, strictly speaking, there is no pre­cautionary principle. One might better speak of a “pre­cautionary approach,” although even this needs to be unpacked.

One important argument for the free market is that of the ‘invisible hand’ or ‘private vices, public virtues’. That is, individual profit-seeking behaviour by suppliers will lead to better quality, lower priced goods for consumers than could be achieved by other means. Where this is so the market may be to the benefit of all, including the worst off. However, reflection on a range of cases – including what is here called the Titanic Puzzle, introduced by Thomas Schelling - shows that this is not always so. Where there are important market failures which may not be correctable within the market, the goal of helping the worst off and vulnerable can sometimes be best served by setting up structures which generate common interests between supplier and consumer. The goods considered here are termed ‘high-fidelity slow-release’ goods. They are those where consumption of the good is a lengthy or deferred process, ‘escape costs’ are high, and the quality of the good may vary over the life of the exchange, subject to the influence of the supplier even after purchase. Many long term financial products, and other goods such as education, plausibly have such character. An unregulated market for such goods is highly problematic.

A persistent right-wing discourse on poverty insists that, in many cases, poverty is the result of domestic incompetence, improvidence, or male irresponsibility. Poverty is, on this view, to some significant degree, the result of poor management and irresponsible choices. Poverty researchers, by contrast, typically argue that there is very little evidence to support this diagnosis, and that poverty is largely simply a matter of lack of financial resources to live the type of life that is regarded as normal or socially expected, at a minimal level, in the affected person or family’s society. Nevertheless, for people on very low incomes there are normally difficult choices to be made, especially in terms of provision for children, particularly in the light of social expectations. Here I draw on a framework inspired by Sen’s capability approach, coupled with Rowntree’s distinction between primary and secondary poverty, and Townsend’s distinction between absolute and relative poverty. It allows us to see that even though the role of choice and behaviour in the causation and persistence of poverty is far less significant than structural factors, nevertheless individual choices will shape the type of poverty a family may face. In sum, I argue that a significant proportion of parents place themselves in secondary poverty in order to avoid a form of relative poverty for their children, especially so that they can meet the social expectations of their peers.

The concept of the ‘benefit cheat’ plays a critical role in political rhetoric and public policy and it has been deployed to justify changes to the benefit system that have had a very negative impact on well being and justice. The authors argue that the concept is dangerous, adding to the existing burdens of poverty and exclusion and that it must be eradicated by a reorganisation of the welfare system. Dignity and a spirit of equality must be the starting point for any system of welfare that aims to promote universal well being.

In the aftermath of WW2, nationalism was regarded by many political philosophers as an afront to civilized values. Yet at the same time nationalism has been an important means by which former colonies have attained and protected their independence. Once this distinction is made, it is clear that there are different types of nationalism, used in different circumstances, and for different purposes, and many political theorists have attempted to distinguish acceptable and unacceptable forms of nationalism. In this paper, I contribute to this debate by distinguishing four functions of nationalism: purification, privilege, pride, and protection. These functions can be mixed together in different ways, and I claim that purification and privilege are both highly problematic, while pride, and especially protection, are far more defensible.

Recurrent microdeletions and microduplications of a 600-kb genomic region of chromosome 16p11.2 have been implicated in childhood-onset developmental disorders. We report the association of 16p11.2 microduplications with schizophrenia in two large cohorts. The microduplication was detected in 12/1,906 cases and 1/3,971 controls from the initial cohort, and in 9/2,645 cases and 1/2,420 controls of the replication cohort. The 16p11.2 microduplication was associated with a 14.5-fold increased risk of schizophrenia ) in the combined sample. A meta-analysis of datasets for multiple psychiatric disorders showed a significant association of the microduplication with schizophrenia, bipolar disorder and autism. In contrast, the reciprocal microdeletion was associated only with autism and developmental disorders. Head circumference was larger in patients with the microdeletion than in patients with the microduplication. © 2009 Nature America, Inc. All rights reserved.