Cleveland, Ohio, United States of America
  •  27
    Bioethics: Legal and Clinical Case Studies
    with Gary E. Jones
    Broadview Press. 2017.
    Bioethics: Legal and Clinical Case Studies is a case-based introduction to ethical issues in health care. Through seventy-eight compelling scenarios, the authors demonstrate the practical importance of ethics, showing how the concerns at issue bear on the lives of patients, health care providers, and others. A range of central topics are covered, including informed consent, medical futility, reproductive ethics, privacy, cultural competence, and clinical trials. Each chapter includes a selection…Read more
  •  18
    Peirce's Concept of Community: Its Development & Change
    Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 7 (1). 1971.
  •  37
    Justice and Reverse Discrimination (review)
    Teaching Philosophy 5 (2): 145-149. 1982.
  •  22
    Coherence and applied ethics
    Journal of Applied Philosophy 14 (3). 1997.
    In order for a moral theory to support application it must be able to provide determinate answers to actual moral problems or, at the least, to significantly narrow acceptable options. It must also support the development of a genuine consensus, one that is disinterested, reasonable, and unbiased. I argue that theories concentrating on principles, or on rules, or on particular cases fail to meet these standards. A full coherence theory, taking into account principles, rules, practices, and judgm…Read more
  •  28
    On Making and Keeping Promises
    Journal of Applied Philosophy 13 (2): 199-208. 1996.
    Do the conditions under which promises are made determine whether they ought to be kept? Philosophers have placed a number of conditions on promising which, they hold, must be met in order to make promise‐keeping obligatory. In so doing, they have distinguished valid promises from invalid promises and justified promises from promises that are not justified. Considering such conditions, one by one, we argue that they are mistaken. In the first place, the conditions they lay down are not necessary…Read more
  •  7
    Should nonresponders dictate the use of placebos?
    IRB: Ethics & Human Research 25 (6): 11. 2003.
  •  17
    New directions in ethics: the challenge of applied ethics (edited book)
    with Richard M. Fox and Michael D. Bayles
    Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1986.
  •  20
    In defense of live kidney donation
    American Journal of Bioethics 4 (4). 2004.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  14
    The mutuality of liberty, equality, and fraternity
    Journal of Social Philosophy 17 (3): 7-12. 1986.
  •  43
    Putting pressure on promises
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (2): 45-58. 1992.
  •  18
    Competence and paternalism
    Bioethics 16 (3). 2002.
    Some bioethicists have argued in favor of a sliding scale notion of competence, paternalistically requiring greater competence in relation to more significant risk. I argue against a sliding scale notion, taking issue with the positions of Allen E. Buchanan and Dan W. Brock, Ian Wilkes, and Joel Feinberg. Rejecting arguments that a sliding scale is supported by legal cases, by ordinary usage, and by fallible judgments about competence, I argue in favor of greater evidence of competence when risk…Read more
  •  45
    An economic theory of patient decision-making
    with Douglas O. Stewart
    Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 2 (3): 153-164. 2005.
    Patient autonomy, as exercised in the informed consent process, is a central concern in bioethics. The typical bioethicist's analysis of autonomy centers on decisional capacity—finding the line between autonomy and its absence. This approach leaves unexplored the structure of reasoning behind patient treatment decisions. To counter that approach, we present a microeconomic theory of patient decision-making regarding the acceptable level of medical treatment from the patient's perspective. We sho…Read more
  •  10
    The Abuse of Casuistry
    Southwest Philosophy Review 7 (2): 17-30. 1991.
  •  15
    Philosophy and Politics (review)
    Review of Metaphysics 41 (3): 631-632. 1988.
    In this study, which is volume 113 of the International Archives of the History of Ideas, Peperzak attempts to link Hegel's declared "external and subjective" Preface to the relevant "scientifically analyzed" aspects of his philosophy. In this Peperzak insists, with Hegel, that politics and philosophy must be viewed in unity. The tension between the critical function of philosophy, the rationality of the then-current order, and the political demands of the censor dominates the commentary. Hegel …Read more
  •  18
    Is There an Ethical Obligation to Disclose Controversial Risk? A Question From the ACCORD Trial
    with Paul J. Ford, Dana J. Patton, and Douglas O. Stewart
    American Journal of Bioethics 14 (4): 4-10. 2014.
    Researchers designing a clinical trial may be aware of disputed evidence of serious risks from previous studies. These researchers must decide whether and how to describe these risks in their model informed consent document. They have an ethical obligation to provide fully informed consent, but does this obligation include notice of controversial evidence? With ACCORD as an example, we describe a framework and criteria that make clear the conditions requiring inclusion of important controversial…Read more
  •  38
    Balancing in ethical deliberation: Superior to specification and casuistry
    with Paul J. Ford
    Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 31 (5). 2006.
    Approaches to clinical ethics dilemmas that rely on basic principles or rules are difficult to apply because of vagueness and conflict among basic values. In response, casuistry rejects the use of basic values, and specification produces a large set of specified rules that are presumably easily applicable. Balancing is a method employed to weigh the relative importance of different and conflicting values in application. We argue against casuistry and specification, claiming that balancing is sup…Read more
  •  23
    A Functionalist View of Brain Death
    with Samuel LiPuma
    American Journal of Bioethics 14 (8): 19-20. 2014.
    No abstract
  •  16
    Response to the Open Peer Commentaries on “Is There an Ethical Obligation to Disclose Controversial Risk? A Question From the ACCORD Trial”
    with Paul J. Ford, Dana J. Patton, and Douglas O. Stewart
    American Journal of Bioethics 14 (4). 2014.
    No abstract
  •  6
    Justice: Simple Theories, Complex Applications
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 25 (1): 31-38. 1987.
  •  23
    Expanding autonomy; contracting informed consent
    with Douglas O. Stewart
    American Journal of Bioethics 9 (2). 2009.
    No abstract
  •  36
    Rejoinder
    with Douglas O. Stewart
    Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 3 (3): 137-138. 2006.
  •  27
    The Immorality of Limiting Growth (review)
    Teaching Philosophy 6 (4): 402-403. 1983.
  •  31
    Justice and Economic Distribution (review)
    Teaching Philosophy 3 (2): 243-244. 1979.
  •  22
    Commentary
    Hastings Center Report 39 (4): 12-12. 2009.
  •  69
    Reviving Brain Death: A Functionalist View (review)
    with Samuel H. LiPuma
    Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 10 (3): 383-392. 2013.
    Recently both whole brain death (WBD) and higher brain death (HBD) have come under attack. These attacks, we argue, are successful, leaving supporters of both views without a firm foundation. This state of affairs has been described as “the death of brain death.” Returning to a cardiopulmonary definition presents problems we also find unacceptable. Instead, we attempt to revive brain death by offering a novel and more coherent standard of death based on the permanent cessation of mental processi…Read more
  •  20
    Substantive equality: A basic value
    Journal of Social Philosophy 32 (2). 2001.
  •  72
    Neuroethics and the Ethical Parity Principle
    with Paul J. Ford
    Neuroethics 7 (3): 317-325. 2014.
    Neil Levy offers the most prominent moral principles that are specifically and exclusively designed to apply to neuroethics. His two closely related principles, labeled as versions of the ethical parity principle , are intended to resolve moral concerns about neurological modification and enhancement [1]. Though EPP is appealing and potentially illuminating, we reject the first version and substantially modify the second. Since his first principle, called EPP , is dependent on the contention tha…Read more