•  27
    Agency is realized by subpersonal mechanisms too
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 41. 2018.
  •  68
    You meta believe it
    European Journal of Philosophy 26 (2): 814-826. 2018.
  •  25
    Nudges to reason: not guilty
    Journal of Medical Ethics 44 (10): 723-723. 2018.
    I am to grateful to Geoff Keeling for his perceptive response1 to my paper.2 In this brief reply, I will argue that he does not succeed in his goal of showing that nudges to reason do not respect autonomy. At most, he establishes only that such nudges may threaten autonomy when used in certain ways and in certain circumstances. As I will show, this is not a conclusion that should give us grounds for particular concerns about nudges. Before turning to this issue, let me correct some small issues …Read more
  •  2
    Love is a central preoccupation of art and literature, of popular culture and autobiography. This book is an attempt to understand its central themes, to discover why love is so important to most of us, why we seek it, and why we so frequently fail to hold on to it. John Armstrong is a philosopher whose primary interest is aesthetics. Accordingly, his meditations on love often proceed by way of reflection upon works of art and literature.
  •  1
    Handbook on Neuroethics (edited book)
    with Jens Clausen
    Springer. 2014.
  •  30
    Strong hermeneutics: Contingency and moral identity
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2). 2001.
    Book Information Strong Hermeneutics: Contingency and Moral Identity. By Nicholas H. Smith. Routledge. London. 1997. Pp. x + 197. Paperback, £14.99.
  •  23
    What Is Wrong with Bestiality?
    Journal of Social Philosophy 34 (3): 444-456. 2003.
  •  56
    Stepping Into the Present: MacIntyre’s Modernity
    Social Theory and Practice 25 (3): 471-490. 1999.
  •  59
    Obsessive–compulsive disorder as a disorder of attention
    Mind and Language 33 (1): 3-16. 2018.
    An influential model holds that obsessive–compulsive disorder is caused by distinctive personality traits and belief biases. But a substantial number of sufferers do not manifest these traits. I propose a predictive coding account of the disorder, which explains both the symptoms and the cognitive traits. On this account, OCD centrally involves heightened and dysfunctionally focused attention to normally unattended sensory and motor representations. As these representations have contents that pr…Read more
  •  49
    Nudges in a post-truth world
    Journal of Medical Ethics 43 (8): 495-500. 2017.
  •  122
    Luck and history‐sensitive compatibilism
    Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235): 237-251. 2009.
    Libertarianism seems vulnerable to a serious problem concerning present luck, because it requires indeterminism somewhere in the causal chain leading to directly free action. Compatibilism, in contrast, is thought to be free of this problem, as not requiring indeterminism in the causal chain. I argue that this view is false: compatibilism is subject to a problem of present luck. This is less of a problem for compatibilism than for libertarianism. However, its effects are just as devastating for …Read more
  •  9
    Conspiracy Theories: The Philosophical Debate (review)
    Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 24 (1/2): 47-48. 2004.
  •  6
    Contrastive Explanations: A Dilemma for Libertarians
    Dialectica 59 (1): 51-61. 2005.
    To the extent that indeterminacy intervenes between our reasons for action and our decisions, intentions and actions, our freedom seems to be reduced, not enhanced. Free will becomes nothing more than the power to choose irrationally. In recognition of this problem, some recent libertarians have suggested that free will is paradigmatically manifested only in actions for which we have reasons for both or all the alternatives. In these circumstances, however we choose, we choose rationally. Agains…Read more
  •  173
    Am I a Racist? Implicit Bias and the Ascription of Racism
    Philosophical Quarterly 67 (268): 534-551. 2017.
    There is good evidence that many people harbour attitudes that conflict with those they endorse. In the language of social psychology, they seem to have implicit attitudes that conflict with their explicit beliefs. There has been a great deal of attention paid to the question whether agents like this are responsible for actions caused by their implicit attitudes, but much less to the question whether they can rightly be described as racist in virtue of harbouring them. In this paper, I attempt t…Read more
  •  7
    The case for physician assisted suicide: how can it possibly be proven?
    with E. Dahl
    Journal of Medical Ethics 32 (6): 335-338. 2006.
    In her paper, The case for physician assisted suicide: not proven, Bonnie Steinbock argues that the experience with Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act fails to demonstrate that the benefits of legalising physician assisted suicide outweigh its risks. Given that her verdict is based on a small number of highly controversial cases that will most likely occur under any regime of legally implemented safeguards, she renders it virtually impossible to prove the case for physician assisted suicide. In thi…Read more
  • Preface
    In James J. Giordano & Bert Gordijn (eds.), Scientific and Philosophical Perspectives in Neuroethics, Cambridge University Press. 2010.
  •  22
    This Article does not have an abstract
  • The prehistory of archaeology: Heidegger and the early Foucault
    Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 27 (2): 157-175. 1996.
  •  96
    There is a robust scientific consensus concerning climate change and evolution. But many people reject these expert views, in favour of beliefs that are strongly at variance with the evidence. It is tempting to try to explain these beliefs by reference to ignorance or irrationality, but those who reject the expert view seem often to be no worse informed or any less rational than the majority of those who accept it. It is also tempting to try to explain these beliefs by reference to epistemic ove…Read more
  •  283
    Doing without Deliberation: Automatism, Automaticity, and Moral Accountability,
    with Tim Bayne
    International Review of Psychiatry 16 (4): 209-15. 2004.
    Actions performed in a state of automatism are not subject to moral evaluation, while automatic actions often are. Is the asymmetry between automatistic and automatic agency justified? In order to answer this question we need a model or moral accountability that does justice to our intuitions about a range of modes of agency, both pathological and non-pathological. Our aim in this paper is to lay the foundations for such an account.
  •  88
    The Powers that bind : doxastic voluntarism and epistemic obligation
    In Jonathan Matheson (ed.), The Ethics of Belief, Oxford University Press. pp. 12-33. 2014.
    In this chapter, we argue for three theses: (1) we lack the power to form beliefs at will (i.e., directly); at very least, we lack the power to form at will beliefs of the kind that proponents of doxastic voluntarism have in mind; but (2) we possess a propensity to form beliefs for non-epistemic reasons; and (3) these propensities—once we come to know we have them—entail that we have obligations similar to those we would have were doxastic voluntarism true. Specifically, we will argue that we ha…Read more
  •  137
    Cognitive scientific challenges to morality
    Philosophical Psychology 19 (5). 2006.
    Recent findings in neuroscience, evolutionary biology and psychology seem to threaten the existence or the objectivity of morality. Moral theory and practice is founded, ultimately, upon moral intuition, but these empirical findings seem to show that our intuitions are responses to nonmoral features of the world, not to moral properties. They therefore might be taken to show that our moral intuitions are systematically unreliable. I examine three cognitive scientific challenges to morality, and …Read more
  •  749
    Recent work on free will and moral responsibility
    with Michael McKenna
    Philosophy Compass 4 (1): 96-133. 2009.
    In this article we survey six recent developments in the philosophical literature on free will and moral responsibility: (1) Harry Frankfurt's argument that moral responsibility does not require the freedom to do otherwise; (2) the heightened focus upon the source of free actions; (3) the debate over whether moral responsibility is an essentially historical concept; (4) recent compatibilist attempts to resurrect the thesis that moral responsibility requires the freedom to do otherwise; (5) the r…Read more
  •  19
    George Graham, The Abraham Dilemma: A Divine Delusion. Reviewed by
    Philosophy in Review 36 (1): 11-13. 2016.
  •  423
    Autonomy and addiction
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (3): 427-447. 2006.
    Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics University of Melbourne, Parkville, 3010, Australia and.
  •  236
    Libertarianism in all its varieties is widely taken to be vulnerable to a serious problem of present luck, inasmuch as it requires indeterminism somewhere in the causal chain leading to action. Genuine indeterminism entails luck, and lack of control over the ensuing action. Compatibilism, by contrast, is generally taken to be free of the problem of present luck, inasmuch as it does not require indeterminism in the causal chain. I argue that this view is false: compatibilism is subject to a probl…Read more
  •  124
    Contrastive explanations: A dilemma for libertarians
    Dialectica 59 (1): 51-61. 2005.
    To the extent that indeterminacy intervenes between our reasons for action and our decisions, intentions and actions, our freedom seems to be reduced, not enhanced. Free will becomes nothing more than the power to choose irrationally. In recognition of this problem, some recent libertarians have suggested that free will is paradigmatically manifested only in actions for which we have reasons for both or all the alternatives. In these circumstances, however we choose, we choose rationally. Agains…Read more