•  86
    Teaching Mill's On Liberty
    Teaching Philosophy 20 (3): 301-310. 1997.
    Mill’s On Liberty is a seminal text in modern social/political philosophy, but there are several dimensions to this text that frequently confuse undergraduates. First, Mill’s uses of “utility” are not obviously consistent. Second, Mill offers varied formulations of his harm principle which are potentially conflicting. Third, lacking a greater context for the work, students sometimes mistake Mill’s goal for an attempt to draw a line between actions that should and should not be legal. This paper …Read more
  •  94
    The Ethics of Gossiping
    International Journal of Applied Philosophy 14 (1): 65-90. 2000.
    When is gossiping morally acceptable? In order to explore and develop a principled answer to this question, I pose the problem in a simplified, abstract form: What considerations govern what it is permissible for A to say to B about C? My approach involves first constructing a decision tree out of questions that apply general moral principles to any particular case. These principles filter out talk which, under normal circumstances, would be widely regarded as impermissible, such as breaches of …Read more
  •  64
    How not to accuse someone of prejudice
    Think 14 (41): 21-29. 2015.
    In discussions of racism, sexism, and other forms of prejudice, two kinds of fallacious reasoning sometimes appear: the and the. The first fallacy treats someone's subjective response to a comment as sufficient evidence of prejudice or insensitivity. This fails to acknowledge that the reasonableness of the response is always an open question. The second fallacy involves dismissing what people accused of prejudice say in their defence on the grounds that the privileged always speak that way. This…Read more
  •  31
    Thinking Through Philosophy: An Introduction
    with Chris Horner
    Cambridge University Press. 2000.
    Chris Horner and Emrys Westacott present a clear and accessible introduction to some of the central problems of philosophy through challenging and stimulating the reader to think beyond the conventional answers to fundamental questions. No previous knowledge is assumed, and in lively and provocative chapters the authors invite the reader to explore questions about the nature of science, religion, ethics, politics, art, the mind, the self, knowledge and truth. Each chapter includes inset boxes pr…Read more
  •  53
    The Rights and Wrongs of Rudeness
    International Journal of Applied Philosophy 20 (1): 1-22. 2006.
    Rudeness is normally viewed as a moral failing, but there are times when it is excusable or even justified. In this article I propose a definition of the concept that helps us ascertain whether, why, and to what extent a rude action is blameworthy or excusable. I consider the most common sorts of circumstance in which rudeness is morally acceptable, and I argue that the perceived increase in rudeness is, in large part, a consequence of our living in a dynamic society where egalitarian attitudes …Read more
  •  63
    Depths of the mundane
    with Robert Rowland Smith and Mark Vernon
    The Philosophers' Magazine 49 (49): 89-92. 2010.
    Why eschew luxury? The traditional arguments for frugality typically focus on what is good for the individual. Some see frugality as morally valuable because it tends to be associated with other virtues such as wisdom, honesty, or sincerity. Some find the natural, uncluttered, focused character of a simple lifestyle aesthetically appealing. The most common argument, though, is that simple living is the surest route – some even say the only route – to happiness.
  •  24
    Some Objections to an Objectivist Conception of Intrinsic Value
    Southwest Philosophy Review 10 (1): 177-186. 1994.
  •  34
    On the Motivations for Relativism
    Cogito 12 (3): 217-222. 1998.
    This article considers four reasons why a cognitive relativist might have for embracing relativism even while denying that as a theoretical position it is true in a non-relative sense.
  •  7
    Doing Philosophy (review)
    Teaching Philosophy 33 (3): 340-343. 2010.