-
189To structure, or not to structure?Synthese 139 (1): 55-80. 2004.Some accounts of mental content represent the objects of belief as structured, using entities that formally resemble the sentences used to express and report attitudes in natural language; others adopt a relatively unstructured approach, typically using sets or functions. Currently popular variants of the latter include classical and neo-classical propositionalism, which represent belief contents as sets of possible worlds and sets of centered possible worlds, respectively; and property self-asc…Read more
-
SystematicityIn Alex Barber (ed.), Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics, Elsevier. pp. 12--440. 2005.
-
38Guilt by dissociation: Why mindreading may not be prior to metacognition after allBehavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2): 159-160. 2009.Carruthers argues that there is no developmental or clinical evidence that metacognition is dissociable from mindreading, and hence there is no reason to think that metacognition is prior to mindreading. A closer look at the evidence, however, reveals that these conclusions are premature at best
-
137The Phenomenal Stance RevisitedReview of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (3): 383-403. 2012.In this article, we present evidence of a bidirectional coupling between moral concern and the attribution of properties and states that are associated with experience (e.g., conscious awareness, feelings). This coupling is also shown to be stronger with experience than for the attribution of properties and states more closely associated with agency (e.g., free will, thoughts). We report the results of four studies. In the first two studies, we vary the description of the mental capacities of a …Read more
-
18Modularity and Mental ArchitectureWIREs Cognitive Science 4 (6): 641-648. 2013.Debates about the modularity of cognitive architecture have been ongoing for at least the past three decades, since the publication of Fodor’s landmark book The Modularity of Mind (1983). According to Fodor, modularity is essentially tied to informational encapsulation, and as such is only found in the relatively low-level cognitive systems responsible for perception and language. According to Fodor’s critics in the evolutionary psychology camp, modularity simply reflects the fine-grained functi…Read more
-
45The paradox of self-consciousness revisitedPacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (4): 424-443. 2003.
-
1Minimalism and modularityIn Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Context-Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism, Oxford University Press. pp. 303--319. 2008.
-
1More than a feeling: counterintuitive effects of compassion on moral judgmentIn Justin Sytsma (ed.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Mind, Bloomsbury. pp. 125-179. 2014.Seminal work in moral neuroscience by Joshua Greene and colleagues employed variants of the well-known trolley problems to identify two brain networks which compete with each other to determine moral judgments. Greene interprets the tension between these brain networks using a dual process account which pits deliberative reason against automatic emotion-driven intuitions: reason versus passion. Recent neuroscientific evidence suggests, however, that the critical tension that Greene identifies as…Read more
-
78What compositionality still can doPhilosophical Quarterly 51 (204): 328-336. 2001.Proponents of deflationism about meaning often claim that the principle of compositionality, when properly understood, places no constraint whatsoever on the nature of lexical meaning. This deflationary thesis admits of both strong and weak readings. On the strong reading, the principle does not rule out any theory of lexical meaning either alone or in conjunction with other independently plausible semantic assumptions. On the weak reading, the principle alone does not rule out any such theory. …Read more
-
73The ins and outs of introspectionPhilosophy Compass 1 (6). 2006.Introspection admits of several varieties, depending on which types of mental events are introspected. I distinguish three kinds of introspection (primary, secondary, and tertiary) and three explanations of the general capacity: the inside access view, the outside access view, and the hybrid view. Drawing on recent evidence from clinical and developmental psychology, I argue that the inside view offers the most promising account of primary and secondary introspection.
-
434Experimental PhilosophyAnnual Review of Psychology 63 (1): 81-99. 2012.Experimental philosophy is a new interdisciplinary field that uses methods normally associated with psychology to investigate questions normally associated with philosophy. The present review focuses on research in experimental philosophy on four central questions. First, why is it that people's moral judgments appear to influence their intuitions about seemingly nonmoral questions? Second, do people think that moral questions have objective answers, or do they see morality as fundamentally rela…Read more
Columbia, Missouri, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Psychology |