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8Will the real philosopher behind the last logicist please stand up?Southern Journal of Philosophy 36 (2): 265-287. 1998.
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7The Cambridge Handbook of Moral Psychology (edited book)Cambridge University Press. 2021.Moral psychology—broadly speaking, the study of how people reason and act morally—has a long and productive history. Initially a subfield of philosophy, it posed groundbreaking questions about the nature of values and virtues, the balance of reason and emotion, and the gap between “is” and “ought.” In the twentieth century, the rise of psychology expanded the a priori philosophical enterprise into an empirical science. In psychology, perspectives of development, social interaction, cognition, an…Read more
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1Minimalism and modularityIn Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Context-Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism, Oxford University Press. pp. 303--319. 2008.
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1More than a feeling: counterintuitive effects of compassion on moral judgmentIn Justin Sytsma (ed.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Mind, Bloomsbury. pp. 125-179. 2014.Seminal work in moral neuroscience by Joshua Greene and colleagues employed variants of the well-known trolley problems to identify two brain networks which compete with each other to determine moral judgments. Greene interprets the tension between these brain networks using a dual process account which pits deliberative reason against automatic emotion-driven intuitions: reason versus passion. Recent neuroscientific evidence suggests, however, that the critical tension that Greene identifies as…Read more
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Moral categorization and mind perceptionIn Bertram Malle & Philip Robbins (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Moral Psychology, Cambridge University Press. forthcoming.In this chapter I discuss the role of mind perception in the categorization of individuals as moral agents and moral patients. Moral agents are defined as individuals that can commit morally wrong actions and deserve to be held accountable for those actions; moral patients are defined as individuals that can be morally wronged and whose interests are worthy of moral consideration. It is generally agreed that the attribution of moral agency and moral patiency is linked to the attribution of menta…Read more
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Minimalism and ModularityIn Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Context-Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism: New Essays on Semantics and Pragmatics, Oxford University Press Uk. 2007.
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Review of Peter Gardenfors' Conceptual spaces (review)Philosophical Psychology 15 (2): 200-202. 2002.
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Crime, Punishment, and CausationPsychology, Public Policy, and Law 24 (1): 118-127. 2018.Moral judgments about a situation are profoundly shaped by the perception of individuals in that situation as either moral agents or moral patients (Gray & Wegner, 2009; Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012), Specifically, the more we see someone as a moral agent, the less we see them as a moral patient, and vice versa. As a result, casting the perpetrator of a transgression as a victim tends to have the effect of making them seem less blameworthy (Gray & Wegner, 2011). Based on this theoretical framework…Read more
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Modern moral psychology: An introduction to the terrainIn Bertram Malle & Philip Robbins (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Moral Psychology, Cambridge University Press. forthcoming.
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SystematicityIn Alex Barber (ed.), Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics, Elsevier. pp. 12--440. 2005.
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Those who are optimistic about the prospects of a science of consciousness, and those who believe that it lies beyond the reach of standard scientific methods, have something in common: both groups view consciousness as posing a special challenge for science. In this paper, we take a close look at the nature of this challenge. We show that popular conceptions of the problem of consciousness, epitomized by David Chalmers’ formulation of the ‘hard problem’, can be best explained as a cognitive ill…Read more
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Content and Self-ConsciousnessDissertation, The University of Chicago. 2000.A naturalistic account of self-consciousness is developed within a general framework in which thought contents are structured by concepts but conceptual content need not be exhausted at the level of reference. To motivate the first feature of this framework, possible-worlds- and property-based theories of thought content, which eschew structure, are criticized for overestimating and/or underestimating the attitude stock of ordinary agents. To motivate the second feature, it is argued that neo-Ru…Read more
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Knowing Me, Knowing You: Theory of Mind and the Machinery of IntrospectionJournal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7-8): 129-143. 2004.Does the ability to know one's own mind depend on the ability to know the minds of others? According to the 'theory theory' of first-person mentalizing, the answer is yes. Recent alternative accounts of this ability, such as the 'monitoring theory', suggest otherwise. Focusing on the issue of introspective access to propositional attitudes, I argue that a better account of first-person mentalizing can be devised by combining these two theories. After sketching a hybrid account, I show how it can…Read more
Columbia, Missouri, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Psychology |