Hugh LaFollette

Contemporary moral philosophers entertain theories about human nature, explore the nature of value, discuss competing accounts of the best ways to live, ponder the connections between ethics and human psychology, and discuss practical ethical quandaries. Broadly conceived, these are the same issues ancient philosophers discussed. However, the precise questions contemporary philosophers ask, the distinctions we make, the methods we employ, and the knowledge of the world and of human psychology we use in framing and evaluating ethical theories, often only faintly resemble those of our philosophical predecessors.

To varying degrees, many of us think we are “self-made.” Some explicitly state—while others imply—that our accomplishments resulted (almost) entirely from our intelligence, ingenuity, and hard work There is qualified truth in this supposition, even although it is commonly overstated. Others think they are pawns in the chess game of life. However, although some have less control than those more privileged, few are devoid of control. This tandem of judgments is akin to our propensity to make asymmetrical judgments about our actions (and those we like) relative to judgments of those we dislike. We often blame our failures on something other than our ill-advised choices, limited abilities, or lack of persistence. If we receive a poor grade, do not land a desired job or coveted promotion, or are spurned by a potential lover, we often blame another, bad luck, or unfortunate circumstances. We scrounge for ways to excuse or mitigate our responsibility when things turn out badly, while taking credit when actions turn out well. We do not do same for negative traits or actions of those we dislike. The phenomenon I discuss in this paper, however, is more pervasive than blame-deflection or inappropriate pride. Even some who think the notion of the “self-made person” borders on a straw person, also think that we have considerable direct control of our lives. We do not. Although we are not leaves tossed by winds of circumstance, we are shaped by complex causal chains largely beyond our control. After seeing this broadly and in detail, we understand the limits on control and why it is not direct By understanding that and how we are shaped by cultures, governments, businesses, and others, we can isolate levers that help us maximize control we do have.

Unmatched in scholarship and scope, The International Encyclopedia of Ethics is the definitive single-source reference work on Ethics, available both in print and online. Comprises over 700 entries, ranging from 1000 to 10,000 words in length, written by an international cast of subject experts Is arranged across 9 fully cross-referenced volumes including a comprehensive index Provides clear definitions and explanations of all areas of ethics including the topics, movements, arguments, and key figures in Normative Ethics, Metaethics, and Practical Ethics Covers the major philosophical and religious traditions Offers an unprecedented level of authority, accuracy and balance with all entries being blind peer-reviewed.

The Oxford Handbooks series is a major new initiative in academic publishing. Each volume offers an authoritative and up-to-date survey of original research in a particular subject area. Specially commissioned essays from leading figures in the discipline give critical examinations of the progress and direction of debates. Oxford Handbooks provide scholars and graduate students with compelling new perspectives upon a wide range of subjects in the humanities and social sciences. The Oxford Handbook of Practical Ethics is a lively and authoritative guide to current thought about ethical issues in all areas of human activity--personal, medical, sexual, social, political, judicial, and international, from the natural world to the world of business. Twenty-eight topics are covered in specially written surveys by leading figures in their fields: each gives an authoritative map of the ethical terrain, explaining how the debate has developed in recent years, engaging critically with the most notable work in the area, and pointing directions for future work. The Handbook will be essential reading, and a fascinating resource of ideas and information, for academics and students across a wide range of disciplines.

We think about personal relationships in two distinct ways. The first focuses on relationships between blood relatives: parents and their children, siblings, and perhaps first cousins. The second focuses on intimacy: relationships where each individual is honest to and trusting of the other; each cares for the other and seeks the other’s company. In this article I ask how these two conceptions are, can be, or should be linked. Should we strive to make all relationships with kin intimate? Even if the answer is a qualified “No,” does that mean relationships with kin are not valuable? I offer some tentative answers to these questions. Despite its limitations, I hope this provides a framework from which future exploration of these issues might profitably begin.

World Hunger and Morality contains the best current thinking about the appropriate moral response to world hunger. KEY TOPICS: The focus and content of this second edition is radically different from the first. Most of the essays are new to this volume. In fact, most of the new essays were written especially for this volume. It presents essays which helped shape the changing understanding of world hunger; includes work by some of today's pre-eminent ethicists; discusses the problem of intra-national as well as international hunger; and considers how gender differences play a part in understanding, and solving world hunger.

Wheeler, Stark, and Stell have raised many interesting briefly expand on, the proposal I offered in the original points concerning gun control that merit extended treat- paper.' ment. Here, however, I will focus only on two. I wiII then In earlier papers and also in this symposium, Wheeler argues that ov,ming arms is defensible as a means of resisting governmental assaults against indivicluals. If only governments have guns, he argues, then a gover'n- ment gone bad can easily oppress its citizens. An armed citizenry, hov ever, might be able to deflect B governmental assault. Because "governments are among the more serious threats to one's rights,... there is Bt least a p.ima facie right to v hatever means are necessary to deflect threats to rights."' Not only is this a prima I'acie right, he argues, but given the history of governmental oppression, it is an actual right — indeecl a right that should be rec ognized by any legitimate government

We think about personal relationships in two distinct ways. The first focuses on relationships between blood relatives: parents and their children, siblings, and perhaps first cousins. The second focuses on intimacy: relationships where each individual is honest to and trusting of the other; each cares for the other and seeks the other’s company. In this article I ask how these two conceptions are, can be, or should be linked. Should we strive to make all relationships with kin intimate? Even if the answer is a qualified “No,” does that mean relationships with kin are not valuable? I offer some tentative answers to these questions. Despite its limitations, I hope this provides a framework from which future exploration of these issues might profitably begin.

The gun control debate is more complex than most disputants acknowledge. We are not tasked with answering a single question: should we have gun control? There are three distinct policy questions confronting us: who should we permit to have which guns, and how should we regulate the acquisition, storage, and carrying of guns people may legitimately own? To answer these questions we must decide whether (and which) people have a right to bear arms, what kind of right they have, and how stringent it is. We must also evaluate divergent empirical claims about (a) the role of guns in causing harm, and (b) the degree to which private ownership of guns can protect innocent civilians from attacks by criminals, either in their homes or in public. This book sorts through the conceptual, moral, and empirical claims to fairly assess arguments for and against serious gun control. I argue that the US needs far more gun control than we currently have in most jurisdictions.

A number of health care professionals assert a right to be exempt from performing some actions currently designated as part of their standard professional responsibilities. Most advocates claim that they should be excused from these duties simply by averring that they are conscientiously opposed to performing them. They believe that they need not explain or justify their decisions to anyone; nor should they suffer any undesirable consequences of such refusal. Those who claim this right err by blurring or conflating three issues about the nature and role of conscience, and its significance in determining what other people should permit them to do (or not do). Many who criticize those asserting an exemption conflate the same questions and blur the same distinctions, if not expressly, by failing to acknowledge that sometimes a morally serious agent should not do what she might otherwise be expected to do. Neither side seems to acknowledge that in some cases both claims are true: a conscientious professional should not do her professional duty AND others need not permit or excuse her refusal. I identify these conflations and specify conditions in which a professional might reasonably refuse to do what she is required to do. Then I identify conditions in which the public should exempt a professional from some of her responsibilities. I argue that professionals should refuse far less often than most advocates do . . . and that they should be even less frequently exempt for that failure. Finally, there are compelling reasons why we could not implement a consistent moral policy giving advocates what they want, likely not even in qualified form.

In this article we discuss two divergent accounts of non-human animals as analog models of human biomedical phenomena. Using a classical account of analogical reasoning, toxicologists and teratologists claim that if the model and subject modeled are substantially similar, then test results in non-human animals are likely applicable to humans . However, the same toxicologists report that different species often react very differently to the same chemical stimuli . The best way to understand their findings is to abandon the classical view of analogical - i.e., linear - reasoning, and replace it with a version informed by chaos theory. We briefly outline the current understanding of chaos, and trace its implications for toxicology and teratology