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972The uneasy heirs of acquaintancePhilosophical Issues 29 (1): 348-365. 2019.My contribution to the first round of a tetralog with Bill Brewer, Anil Gupta, and John McDowell. Each of us has written a response to the writings of the other three philosophers on the topic "Empirical Reason". My initial contribution focuses on what we know a priori about perception. In the second round, we will each respond to the each writer's first-round contributions.
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1122The Problem of Culturally Normal BeliefIn Robin Celikates, Sally Haslanger & Jason Stanley (eds.), Ideology: New Essays, Oxford University Press. forthcoming.This paper defends an analysis of the epistemic contours of the interface between individuals and their cultural milieu.
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1692Bias and PerceptionIn Erin Beeghly & Alex Madva (eds.), An Introduction to Implicit Bias: Knowledge, Justice, and the Social Mind, Routledge. pp. 99-115. 2020.chapter on perception and bias including implicit bias.
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305This handout contains my replies to comments on the Rationality of Perception by Jennifer Nagel, Adam Pautz, and Peter Railton from a symposium at the 2018 Eastern APA in Savannah.
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23Reflections on the use of English and Spanish in analytic philosophyInformes Del Observatorio, Harvard University. 2014.
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1322Perception as Guessing Versus Perception as Knowing: Replies to Clark and PeacockeRes Philosophica 95 (4): 761-784. 2018.A summary of The Rationality of Perception, and my replies to symposium papers on it by Andy Clark and Christopher Peacocke.
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52Replies to Begby, Ghijsen and SamoilovaAnalysis 78 (3): 523-536. 2018.I’m grateful to Endre Begby, Harmen Ghijsen, and Katia Samoilova for engaging with The Rationality of Perception and for writing such interesting and productive commentaries. Taken together, the three commentaries cover a diverse range of topics.
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38SummaryAnalysis 78 (3): 487-489. 2018.The Rationality of PerceptionBy SiegelSusannaOxford University Press, 2017. xxvi + 222 pp.
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134Discussion of Susanna Siegel's “Can perceptual experiences be rational?”Analytic Philosophy 59 (1): 175-190. 2018.
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1784Attention and perceptual adaptationBehavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (3): 205-206. 2013.Commentary on Andy Clark's target article on predictive coding.
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Perception and Demonstrative ReferenceDissertation, Cornell University. 2000.Using certain bits of language, we seem to be able to refer to particular middle-sized dry goods. How is this possible? In this essay, I address this question with respect to uses of demonstrative expressions. I argue that perception makes demonstrative reference possible, and I try to explain how it does so. I argue that the reference of uses of demonstrative expressions, such as "these" in utterances of "these are my keys," is fixed by a demonstrative mental state: more exactly, by an intentio…Read more
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662The Rationality of Perception: Reply to Begby, Ghijsen, and SamoilovaAnalysis (Reviews). 2018.Includes a summary of my book *The Rationality of Perception* (Oxford, 2017) and replies to commentaries on it by Endre Begby, Harmen Ghijsen, and Katia Samoilova. These commentaries and my summary and replies will be published soon in Analysis Reviews. Begby focuses on my analysis of the epistemic features of the interface between individual minds and their cultural milieu (discussed in chapter 10 of *The Rationality of Perception*), Ghijsen focuses on the notion of inference and reliabilism (c…Read more
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717The Epistemology of Perception (short version)In Mohan Matthen (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception, Oxford University Press. 2015.This is a much shorter version of our entry on the Epistemology of Perception, which will be published in the Oxford Handbook for the Philosophy of Perception in 2013. The longer version has far more references in it, whereas this version is pared down to the essentials.
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1217Inference Without ReckoningIn Brendan Balcerak Jackson & Magdalena Balcerak Jackson (eds.), Reasoning: New Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking, Oxford University Press. pp. 15-31. 2019.I argue that inference can tolerate forms of self-ignorance and that these cases of inference undermine canonical models of inference on which inferrers have to appreciate (or purport to appreciate) the support provided by the premises for the conclusion. I propose an alternative model of inference that belongs to a family of rational responses in which the subject cannot pinpoint exactly what she is responding to or why, where this kind of self-ignorance does nothing to undermine the intelligen…Read more
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283Replies to Beck, Chirimuuta, Rosenhagen, Smithies, and SpringleAnalytic Philosophy 59 (1): 175-190. 2018.Replies to commentaries on "Can experiences be rational?", forthcoming in Analytic Philosophy.
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55Michael Madary, Visual Phenomenology (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. 2017.Review of Michael Madary's book *Visual Phenomenology* MIT Press, 2016.
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918The Structure of Episodic Memory: Ganeri's ‘Mental Time Travel and Attention’Australasian Philosophical Review 1 (4): 374-394. 2017.We offer a framework for assessing what the structure of episodic memory might be, if one accepts the Buddhist denial of persisting selves. This paper is a response to Jonardon Ganeri's paper "Mental time travel and attention", which explores Buddhaghosa's ideas about memory. (It will eventually be published with a reply by Ganeri).
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51Reference and ConsciousnessPhilosophical Review 113 (3): 427-431. 2004.What is the role of conscious experience in action and cognition? John Campbell’s answer in Reference and Consciousness begins from ideas he thinks are part of common sense: When our actions are directed toward particular things—as when we grab our keys, or lift forks from plates—these actions are guided by visual experience. We see where to reach for keys or fork, and only then are able to do it. Similarly for the case of cognition: in cases where experience is limited, such as blindsight, cogn…Read more
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264How does visual phenomenology constrain object-seeing?Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3): 429-441. 2006.I argue that there are phenomenological constraints on what it is to see an object, and that these are overlooked by some theories that offer allegedly sufficient causal and counterfactual conditions on object-seeing.
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449Direct realism and perceptual consciousnessPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2): 378-410. 2006.In The Problem of Perception, A.D. Smith’s central aim is to defend the view that we can directly perceive ordinary objects, such as cups, keys and the like.1 The book is organized around the two arguments that Smith considers to be serious threats to the possibility of direct perception: the argument from illusion, and the argument from hallucination. The argument from illusion threatens this possibility because it concludes that indirect realism is true. Indirect realism is the view that we pe…Read more
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173The elements of philosophy: readings from past and present (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2008.The Elements of Philosophy: Readings from Past and Present is a comprehensive collection of historical and contemporary readings across the major fields of philosophy. With depth and quality, this introductory anthology offers a selection of readings that is both extensive and expansive; the readings span twenty-five centuries. They are organized topically into five parts: Religion and Belief, Moral and Political Philosophy, Metaphysics and Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind and Language, and Life…Read more
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325The Contents of Visual ExperienceOxford University Press USA. 2010.What do we see? We are visually conscious of colors and shapes, but are we also visually conscious of complex properties such as being John Malkovich? In this book, Susanna Siegel develops a framework for understanding the contents of visual experience, and argues that these contents involve all sorts of complex properties. Siegel starts by analyzing the notion of the contents of experience, and by arguing that theorists of all stripes should accept that experiences have contents. She then intro…Read more
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724Reply to Fumerton, Huemer, and McGrathPhilosophical Studies 162 (3): 749-757. 2013.Fumerton, Huemer, and McGrath each contributed to a symposium on "The Epistemic Impact of the Etiology of Experience" in Philosophical Studies. These are my replies their contributions.
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46Erratum to: Precis of The Contents of Visual ExperiencePhilosophical Studies 163 (3): 817-817. 2013.
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