•  53
    Parenthood and Procreation
    with Avery Kolers
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. forthcoming.
  •  142
    How to read minds
    In Sarah Richmond, Geraint Rees & Sarah J. L. Edwards (eds.), I Know What You're Thinking: Brain Imaging and Mental Privacy, Oxford University Press. pp. 41. 2012.
    Most animals have mental states of one sort or another, but few species share our capacity for self-awareness. We are aware of our own mental states via introspection, and we are aware of the mental states of our fellow human beings on the basis of what they do and say. This chapter is not concerned with these traditional forms of mind-reading—forms whose origins predate the beginnings of recorded history—but with the prospects of a rather different and significantly more recent form of ‘mind-re…Read more
  •  224
    After being sorely neglected for some time, consciousness is well and truly back on the philosophical and scientific agenda. This entry provides a whistle-stop tour of some recent debates surrounding consciousness, with a particular focus on issues relevant to the scientific study of consciousness. The first half of this entry (the first to fourth sections) focuses on clarifying the explanandum of a science of consciousness and identifying constraints on an adequate account of consciousness; the…Read more
  •  296
    Consciousness as a guide to personal persistence
    with Barry Dainton
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4): 549-571. 2005.
    Mentalistic (or Lockean) accounts of personal identity are normally formulated in terms of causal relations between psychological states such as beliefs, memories, and intentions. In this paper we develop an alternative (but still Lockean) account of personal identity, based on phenomenal relations between experiences. We begin by examining a notorious puzzle case due to Bernard Williams, and extract two lessons from it: first, that Williams's puzzle can be defused by distinguishing between the …Read more
  •  60
    Thought: A Very Short Introduction
    Oxford University Press. 2013.
    In this lively Very Short Introduction, Tim Bayne looks at the nature of thought. Exploring questions such as 'What are thoughts?' and 'How is thought realized in the brain?', he draws on research in philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, and anthropology to look at what we know - and don't know - about the capacity for thought
  •  169
    Resisting ruthless reductionism: A commentary on Bickle
    with Jordi FernÁndez
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (3): 239-48. 2005.
    Philosophy and Neuroscience is an unabashed apologetic for reductionism in philosophy of mind. Bickle chides his fellow philosophers for their ignorance of mainstream neuroscience, and promises them that a subscription to Cell, Neuron, or any other journal in mainstream neuroscience will be amply rewarded. Rather than being bogged down in the intricacies of two-dimensional semantics or the ontology of properties, philosophers of mind need to get neuroscientifically informed and ruthlessly reduct…Read more
  •  89
    Most animals have mental states of one sort or another, but few species share our capacity for self-awareness. We are aware of our own mental states via introspection, and we are aware of the mental states of our fellow human beings on the basis of what they do and say. This chapter is not concerned with these traditional forms of mind-reading—forms whose origins predate the beginnings of recorded history—but with the prospects of a rather different and significantly more recent form of ‘mind-re…Read more
  •  339
    In _Consciousness and persons_, Michael Tye. Consciousness and persons. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.) develops and defends a novel approach to the unity of consciousness. Rather than thinking of the unity of consciousness as involving phenomenal relations between distinct experiences, as standard accounts do, Tye argues that we should regard the unity of consciousness as involving relations between the contents of consciousness. Having developed an account of what it is for consciousness to be unif…Read more
  •  541
    Representationalism and the problem of vagueness
    Philosophical Studies 162 (1): 71-86. 2013.
    This paper develops a novel problem for representationalism (also known as "intentionalism"), a popular contemporary account of perception. We argue that representationalism is incompatible with supervaluationism, the leading contemporary account of vagueness. The problem generalizes to naive realism and related views, which are also incompatible with supervaluationism
  •  245
    Where in cognitive architecture do experiences of agency lie? This chapter defends the claim that such states qualify as a species of perception. Reference to ‘the sense of agency’ should not be taken as a mere façon de parler but picks out a genuinely perceptual system. The chapter begins by outlining the perceptual model of agentive experience before turning to its two main rivals: the doxastic model, according to which agentive experience is really a species of belief, and the telic model, ac…Read more
  •  1
    Co-consciousness
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (3): 79-92. 2001.
    This is a review of Barry Dainton's ‘Stream of Consciousness’. While much that is written about the unity of consciousness does, as Dainton says, traffic in vague metaphors and exaggerated claims, Dainton's book is a superb example of sober thinking and meticulous attention to detail. Stream of Consciousness can be roughly divided into three projects, projects that are bound together by co-consciousness. In the present context ‘co-consciousness’ refers to the relation that experiences have when…Read more
  •  976
    Perception and the reach of phenomenal content
    Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236): 385-404. 2009.
    The phenomenal character of perceptual experience involves the representation of colour, shape and motion. Does it also involve the representation of high-level categories? Is the recognition of a tomato as a tomato contained within perceptual phenomenality? Proponents of a conservative view of the reach of phenomenal content say ’No’, whereas those who take a liberal view of perceptual phenomenality say ’Yes’. I clarify the debate between conservatives and liberals, and argue in favour of the l…Read more
  •  53
    Inclusion and Incarnation: a reply to Sturch
    Religious Studies 39 (1): 107-109. 2003.
    I make three points in response to Richard Sturch's comments on my paper: I defend my interpretation of the Morris–Swinburne (M–S) account of the Incarnation; I argue that the M–S model appears to undercut the view that the unity of consciousness can be explained in terms of the self; and third, I argue that M–S model seems to entail that God has false beliefs.
  •  266
    Delusions as Doxastic States: Contexts, Compartments, and Commitments
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (4): 329-336. 2010.
    Although delusions are typically regarded as beliefs of a certain kind, there have been worries about the doxastic conception of delusions since at least Bleuler’s time. ‘Anti-doxasticists,’ as we might call them, do not merely worry about the claim that delusions are beliefs, they reject it. Reimer’s paper weighs into the debate between ‘doxasticists’ and ‘anti-doxasticists’ by suggesting that one of the main arguments given against the doxastic conception of delusions—what we might call the fu…Read more
  •  89
    Review of Attention is Cognitive Unison: An Essay in Philosophical Psychology, by Christopher Mole (review)
    with Aaron Henry
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1). 2013.
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 0, Issue 0, Page 1-4, Ahead of Print
  •  251
    The grounds of worship
    Religious Studies 42 (3): 299-313. 2006.
    Although worship has a pivotal place in religious thought and practice, philosophers of religion have had remarkably little to say about it. In this paper we examine some of the many questions surrounding the notion of worship, focusing on the claim that human beings have obligations to worship God. We explore a number of attempts to ground our supposed duty to worship God, and argue that each is problematic. We conclude by examining the implications of this result, and suggest that it might be …Read more
  •  260
    One of the central problems in the study of consciousness concerns the ascription of consciousness. We want to know whether certain kinds of creatures—such as non-human animals, artificially created organisms, and even members of our own species who have suffered severe brain-damage—are conscious, and we want to know what kinds of conscious states these creatures might be in if indeed they are conscious. The identification of accurate markers of consciousness is essential if the science of consc…Read more
  •  31
    Response to Commentators (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1): 223-229. 2013.
  •  1
    Monothematic delusions, empiricism, and framework beliefs
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (1): 1. 2004.
  •  211
    Experience, belief, and the interpretive fold
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (1): 81-86. 2004.
    Elisabeth Pacherie is a research fellow in philosophy at Institut Jean Nicod, Paris. Her main research and publications are in the areas of philosophy of mind, psychopathology and action theory. Her publications include a book on intentionality (_Naturaliser_ _l'intentionnalité_, Paris, PUF, 1993) and she is currently preparing a book on action and agency
  •  318
    The Vegetative State and the Science of Consciousness
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (3): 459. 2010.
    Consciousness in experimental subjects is typically inferred from reports and other forms of voluntary behaviour. A wealth of everyday experience confirms that healthy subjects do not ordinarily behave in these ways unless they are conscious. Investigation of consciousness in vegetative state patients has been based on the search for neural evidence that such broad functional capacities are preserved in some vegetative state patients. We call this the standard approach. To date, the results of t…Read more
  •  203
    Chalmers on the Justification of Phenomenal Judgments
    Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (2): 407-419. 2001.
    We seem to enjoy a very special kind of epistemic relation to our own conscious states. In The Conscious Mind, David Chalmers argues that our phenomenal judgments are fully-justified or certain because we are acquainted with the phenomenal states that are the objects of such judgments. Chalmers holds that the acquaintance account of phenomenal justification is superior to reliabilist accounts of how it is that our PJs are justified, because it alone can underwrite the certainty of our phenomenal…Read more
  •  1297
    The unity of consciousness and the split-brain syndrome
    Journal of Philosophy 105 (6): 277-300. 2008.
    According to conventional wisdom, the split-brain syndrome puts paid to the thesis that consciousness is necessarily unified. The aim of this paper is to challenge that view. I argue both that disunity models of the split-brain are highly problematic, and that there is much to recommend a model of the split-brain—the switch model—according to which split-brain patients retain a fully unified consciousness at all times. Although the task of examining the unity of consciousness through the lens of…Read more
  •  55
    Summary
    Analysis 74 (3): 488-490. 2014.
  •  69
    Précis of The Unity of Consciousness (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1): 200-208. 2013.
  •  130
    In defence of genethical parity
    In David Archard & David Benatar (eds.), Procreation and Parenthood: The Ethics of Bearing and Rearing Children, Oxford University Press. 2010.
    Can a person be harmed or wronged by being brought into existence? Can a person be benefited by being brought into existence? Following David Heyd, I refer to these questions as “genethical questions”. This chapter examines three broad approaches to genethics: the no-faults model, the dual-benchmark model, and the parity model. The no-faults model holds that coming into existence is not properly subject to moral evaluation, at least so far as the interests of the person that is to be brought int…Read more
  •  202
    The papers in this volume are drawn from a workshop on delusion and self-deception, held at Macquarie University in November of 2004. Our aim was to bring together theorists working on delusions and self-deception with an eye towards identifying and fostering connections—at both empirical and conceptual levels—between these domains. As the contributions to this volume testify, there are multiple points of contact between delusion and self-deception. This introduction charts the conceptual space …Read more