Vincent Luizzi

In this journal Professor Norman E. Bowie simplified considerably, and laid to rest much confusion surrounding, the debate between natural law philosophers and legal positivists with his observation that “the chief issue dividing the two camps is a semantic one, viz., whether or not the passing of some moral test is to be included as part of the meaning of law.” In developing and illustrating this thesis, Professor Bowie reconstructs aspects of Hart’s positivism, sets aside parts of Fuller’s natural law theory as irrelevant to the debate, and distills the contribution of Aquinas and Augustine to the natural law position. In an attempt to reorient the debate, he traces out some of the consequences of the two competing definitions of “law.” This is to provide the ground for choosing between the definitions and ultimately between natural law philosophy and legal positivism.

This essay investigates the possibility of veering from an approach of doing bad to the offender as the primary response to crime to one of requiring the offender to do good. This approach, in effect, has us offset the evil which the offender has placed on the scales of justice with good which the offender is required to produce; hence the conception of New Balance. The specific focus here is to identify important deficiencies in the major approaches of retributivism and utilitarian-deterrence theory to pave the way for New Balance.