Lorenzo Magnani

Taking advantage of Denis Noble’s description, in “The Illusions of the Modern Synthesis” of the first illusion, related to the concept of natural selection itself, I will further strengthen the criticism by adding three groups of considerations mainly concerning human cognition: 1) how semiotic brains build cognitive niches; 2) the role of abduction – and in particular of manipulative abduction – in building a semiotic artificial world; 3) the biosemiotics of the so-called disembodiment of the mind. Human semiotic brains are engaged in a continuous process of delegation and distribution of cognitive functions to the environment to lessen cognitive limitations, also and especially taking advantage of what I have called “manipulative abduction”. These design semiotic activities are closely related to the process of cognitive niche construction, which should be regarded as the second major participant, after natural selection, in evolution. An important effect of this semiotic brain activity is a continuous process of disembodiment of the mind that exhibits a new cognitive perspective on the mechanisms underlying the semiotic emergence of meaning processes.

In my opinion, it is only in the framework of a research dealing with abductive cognition that we can analyze important cognitive aspects of human and machine capacities. From the point of view of human capacities the phenomenological concept of anticipation, which is related to the problem of the spontaneous generation of spatiality and its three-dimensionality, will be central. I will describe that anticipations can be seen as types of visual and manipulative abduction and also fruitful to illustrate, in the case of human and machine capacities, the respective role of two kinds of strategic reasoning: locked and unlocked abductive strategies, which characterize the basic cognitive pro- cedure of “reading ahead”. The specificity of these contrasting inferential strategies is also related to their potentiality in producing different kinds of hypothetical outcomes, which in turn represent dissimilar levels of knowledge creativity. This diversity is also fundamental to depict the special character, the kind of creativity, and the limits of current computational deep learning AI systems, such as AlphaGo, which realize abductive cognitive processes.

Research on autonomy exhibits a constellation of variegated perspectives, from the problem of the crude deprivation of it to the study of the distinction between personal and moral autonomy, and from the problem of the role of a “self as narrator”, who classifies its own actions as autonomous or not, to the importance of the political side and, finally, to the need of defending and enhancing human autonomy. My precise concern in this article will be the examination of the role of the human cognitive processes that give rise to the most important ways of tracking the external world and human behavior in their relationship to some central aspects of human autonomy, also to the aim of clarifying the link between autonomy and the ownership of our own destinies. I will also focus on the preservation of human autonomy as an important component of human dignity, seeing it as strictly associated with knowledge and, even more significantly, with the constant production of new and pertinent knowledge of various kinds. I will also describe the important _paradox of autonomy_, which resorts to the fact that, on one side, cognitions (from science to morality, from common knowledge to philosophy, etc.) are necessary to be able to perform autonomous actions and decisions because we need believe in rules that justify and identify our choices, but, on the other side, these same rules can become (for example, as a result of contrasting with other internalized and approved moral rules or knowledge contents) oppressive norms that diminish autonomy and can thus, paradoxically, defeat agents’ autonomous capacity “to take ownership”.

My book Abductive Cognition. The Epistemological and Eco-Cognitive Dimensions of Hypothetical Reasoning basically refers to all kinds of human hypothetical cognition, also of creative kind. During the research related to the preparation of that book I soon had the opportunity to examine the studies regarding the human process of continuous delegation and distribution of cognitive functions to the environment to lessen cognitive limitations, also and especially in the case of what has been called ‘manipulative abduction’. These design activities are closely related to the process of cognitive niche construction, which I will specifically address in this article. Niche construction should be regarded as a second major participant, after natural selection, in evolution. Indeed, by altering their environment and partly controlling some of the energy and matter fluxes in their ecosystems, organisms are capable of changing some of the natural selective pressures in their local environments. The question I plan to answer is the following: we need to hypothesize a fundamental role of non-genetic information in the evolution, but what kind of evolution could we obtain in this case? I will illustrate that in building various mediating structures, humans transform the environment and create cognitive niches. Thus, humans and other non-human animals become ecological engineers and chance seekers, involved in the processing, the alteration, and even the creation of external structures to reduce or suppress their cognitive limitations. Hence, this article will address a detailed analysis of the role of extragenetic information in evolution and what this process of selection selects for purposeful organisms, so niche-constructing ones.

The present collection of essays honours John Woods on the occasion of his eightieth birthday from contributors who wish to pay homage to this remarkable researcher whom they see not only as a scholar of prodigious energy and insight, but as a friend, colleague, collaborator, or former teacher. All of the essays touch upon topics Woods has taken a direct or indirect interest in, ranging from technical problems of mathematical logic and applications of formal methods through philosophical logic, philosophy of language, epistemology and history of ancient and modern logic. The sections themselves of the book cover relevance, paradoxes, inconsistency, fallacies, abduction, fictions, logic naturalized, law, argumentation and narratives, and many other topics: and represent the main research areas which have profited from Woods' reflections.

I will analyse three fundamental ways of governing ignorance though abduction, which are essential from an eco-cognitive and eco-logical point of view, in which the central role in human cognition of natural and artefactual environment is taken into account. First of all, according to the so-called GW-schema, proposed by Gabbay and Woods, abduction presents an ignorance-preserving or (ignorance-mitigating) character: given the fact that the abduced hypotheses aim at becoming truths, the basic ignorance is neither solved nor left untouched. Second, I will contend that abduction is not always ignorance preserving but also knowledge enhancing. Indeed, according to the eco-cognitive model of abduction, I myself have recently proposed, we can easily see that, occasionally, knowledge can be immediately increased (and ignorance ‘killed’) through abduction: in this perspective, abduction does not have to be rigidly conceptualized as an inference to the best explanation in the received sense, which is as an inference that, to grant truth, also takes advantage of an empirical evaluation phase or an inductive phase, as Peirce classified it. Finally, it is important to stress that abductive cognition is at the roots of two fundamental cognitive processes. On one side, abductive cognition constructs (and/or takes advantage of the exploitation of) embodiments, external representations, enactions, artefacts and props, which involve ignorant entities suitably transformed in cognitive representations and/or devices. On the other side, abductive cognition dominates those ‘special’ cognitive creative processes that lead to what I call the disseminated ‘computational domestication of ignorant entities’: I will illustrate the example of the recent unconventional computational domestication of ignorant entities, which creates novel cognitive embodiments (morphological computation).

Le sentenze che oggi vengono pronunciate contro i criminali psicopatici evitano accuratamente di far leva su considerazioni “morali”. Solitamente l’attribuzione di responsabilità morale ai criminali si basa spesso sul concetto cognitivo di infermità mentale, in maniera tale che il giudizio morale sulla condotta morale dei “criminali psicopatici” in questi casi venga tendenzialmente sterilizzato. La posizione che qui vorrei proporre individua oscurità e limiti epistemici nelle teorie e nei metodi correntemente impiegati nelle società occidentali per alleggerire le responsabilità morali, le quali, pertanto, risultano in parte inaffidabili. Per supportare questa conclusione intendo far leva sui miei più recenti studi di carattere cognitivo, vertenti sulla dimensione plurale dei contesti morali, sulla co-evoluzione geni/nicchia cognitiva e sul concetto di libero arbitrio.

Many important concepts of the calculus are difficult to grasp, and they may appear epistemologically unjustified. For example, how does a real function appear in “small” neighborhoods of its points? How does it appear at infinity? Diagrams allow us to overcome the difficulty in constructing representations of mathematical critical situations and objects. For example, they actually reveal the behavior of a real function not “close to” a point but “in” the point. We are interested in our research in the diagrams which play an optical role –microscopes and “microscopes within microscopes”, telescopes, windows, a mirror role, and an unveiling role. In this paper we describe some examples of optical diagrams as a particular kind of epistemic mediator able to perform the explanatory abductive task of providing a better understanding of the calculus, through a non-standard model of analysis. We also maintain they can be used in many other different epistemological and cognitive situations.

Starting from the analysis of Marx’s Chapter 26 of the first volume of Capital, this article describes Marxian emphasis on the extremely violent aspects—a list of the main cases is also provided—of the so-called “enclosures” as fundamental procedures that favored the “primitive accumulation”, that is, the first social and economic step that led to capitalism. The “enclosures” that characterized the primitive accumulation process, violently expropriating peasants, razing their cottages and dwellings, are illustrated in detail. At the same time, we will describe what we call the “moral bubble”, created by the narratives—morally edifying—about enclosures, only devoted to the emphasis on the positive economic and social outcomes: the moral bubble acts as a powerful conceptual device capable of concealing the violence that accompanies enclosures. The second part of the article stresses the fact that the mechanism of enclosures can be traced back not only to violently expropriating common lands in which the peasants flourished but also to the violent processes against women to have them basically reduced to machines for the production of new workers, in the framework of the new “patriarchy of the wage”. The importance of the so-called “new enclosures” is further delineated after having shown how enclosures express the historical and general tendency of capitalistic accumulation and not only of the primitive one. The violent aspects of primitive accumulation, and so of primitive enclosures, are described as the main characters of every phase of the recent capitalist globalization, marked by continuous and unprecedented assault on the commons, perpetrated by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, coronavirus lockdown and, currently, also by the paradoxical economic effects of the interplay between the green era and Ukraine war–global food and energy crisis. Finally, the last section provides insight on what we called the “terminal enclosure” related to the aggression of the ultimate common good: water.

The study of creative, diagnostic, visual, spatial, analogical, and temporal reasoning has demonstrated that there are many ways of performing intelligent and creative reasoning that cannot be described with the help only of traditional notions of reasoning such as classical logic. Understanding the contribution of modeling practices to discovery and conceptual change in science requires expanding scientific reasoning to include complex forms of creative reasoning that are not always successful and can lead to incorrect solutions. The study of these heuristic ways of reasoning is situated at the crossroads of philosophy, artificial intelligence, cognitive psychology, and logic; that is, at the heart of cognitive science. There are several key ingredients common to the various forms of model-based reasoning. The term "model" comprises both internal and external representations. The models are intended as interpretations of target physical systems, processes, phenomena, or situations. The models are retrieved or constructed on the basis of potentially satisfying salient constraints of the target domain. Moreover, in the modeling process, various forms of abstraction are used. Evaluation and adaptation take place in light of structural, causal, and/or functional constraints. Model simulation can be used to produce new states and enable evaluation of behaviors and other factors. Several of the papers in this volume aim at increasing epistemological knowledge about the role of model-based reasoning in various scientific tasks, other papers address fundamental cognitive issues related to model-based reasoning and illustrate novel analyses of cognitive "logical" models of model-based reasoning and of the interplay abduction/model-based reasoning/creative inferences. The volume is based on the papers that were presented at the International Conference Model-Based Reasoning in Science and Engineering: Abduction, Visualization, Simulation, held at the Collegio Ghislieri, University of Pavia, Pavia, Italy, in December 2004.

Philosophers have studied geometry since ancient times. Geometrical knowledge has often played the role of a laboratory for the philosopher's conceptual experiments dedicated to the ideation of powerful theories of knowledge. Lorenzo Magnani's new book Philosophy and Geometry illustrates the rich intrigue of this fascinating story of human knowledge, providing a new analysis of the ideas of many scholars (including Plato, Proclus, Kant, and Poincaré), and discussing conventionalist and neopositivist perspectives and the problem of the origins of geometry. The book also ties together the concerns of philosophers of science and cognitive scientists, showing, for example, the connections between geometrical reasoning and cognition as well as the results of recent logical and computational models of geometrical reasoning. All the topics are dealt with using a novel combination of both historical and contemporary perspectives. Philosophy and Geometry is a valuable contribution to the renaissance of research in the field.

Eco-cognitive computationalism explores computing in context, adhering to some of the key ideas presented by modern cognitive science perspectives on embodied, situated, and distributed cognition. First of all, when physical computation is seen from the perspective of the ecology of cognition it is possible to clearly understand the role Turing assigned to the process of “education” of the machine, paralleling it to the education of human brains, in the invention of the Logical Universal Machine. It is this Turing’s emphasis on education that furnishes the justification of the conceptualization of machines as “domesticated ignorant entities”, that is proposed in this article. I will show that conceptualizing machines as dynamically active in distributed physical entities of various kinds suitably transformed so that data can be encoded and decoded to obtain appropriate results sheds further light on my eco-cognitive perspective. Furthermore, it is within this intellectual framework that I will usefully analyze the recent attention in computer science devoted to the importance of the simplification of cognitive and motor tasks caused in organic entities thanks to morphological features: ignorant bodies can be computationally domesticated to make an intertwined computation simpler, relying on the “simplexity” of animal embodied cognition, which represents one of the main qualities of organic agents. Finally, eco-cognitive computationalism allows us to clearly acknowledge that the concept of computation evolves over time as a result of historical and contextual factors, and we can construct an epistemological view that depicts the “emergence” of new types of computations that exploit new substrates. This new viewpoint demonstrates how the computational domestication of ignorant entities might result in the emergence of novel unconventional cognitive embodiments.

This article explores the issue of discoverability and abductive creativity in scientific cognition, focusing on the challenges faced by biopharmaceutical companies in their R&D organization. The author argues that these companies are generating “impoverished epistemic niches”, which threaten fundamental aspects of modern science. The author proposes the concept of epistemic irresponsibility, emphasizing the importance of “knowledge in motion” in multidisciplinary, interdisciplinary, and transdisciplinary scientific research. The increasing expansion of commodification and commercialization of science, marketing of technoscientific products, and the impoverishment of epistemic niches seem to already threaten the flourishing of human creativity and successful abductive creative cognition in science.

En el presente artículo se sostiene que, a través de la tecnología, las personas podemos simplificar y resolver tareas morales incluso en presencia de información incompleta o de una capacidad insuficiente para la acción moral. Muchas cosas externas, normalmente concebidas como inertes desde un punto de vista moral, pueden considerarse lo que aquí se denominarán mediadores morales. Por lo tanto, no todas las herramientas morales están en el interior de nuestra cabeza, sino que muchas están distribuidas en objetos y estructuras externas que funcionan como dispositivos éticos. Con el objeto de investigar con detalle este conflicto ético entre los seres humanos y las cosas, consideraremos el papel que desempeñan los objetos, las estructuras y los artefactos tecnológicos mostrándolos como delegados y mediadores morales

This paper introduces an epistemological model of scientific reasoning which can be described in terms of abduction, deduction and induction. The aim is to emphasize the significance of abduction in order to illustrate the problem-solving process and to propose a unified epistemological model of scientific discovery. The model first describes the different meanings of the word abduction in order to clarify their significance for epistemology and artificial intelligence. In different theoretical changes in theoretical systems we witness different kinds of discovery processes operating. Discovery methods are "data-driven," "explanation-driven", and "coherence-driven". Sometimes there is a mixture of such methods: for example, an hypothesis devoted to overcome a contradiction is found by abduction. Contradiction, far from damaging a system, help to indicate regions in which it can be changed and improved. I will also consider a kind of "weak" hypothesis that is hard to negate and the ways for making it easy. In these cases the subject can "rationally" decide to withdraw his or her hypotheses even in contexts where it is "impossible" to find "explicit" contradictions and anomalies. Here, the use of negation as failure is illuminating.