John-Michael Kuczynski

Selected papers on OCD, Bureaucracy, and Psychopathy. Table of Contents: What are Some Characteristics of OCD in Children? The Failure of Political Philosophy to Engage Reality OCD and Philosophy How to Get Rid of OCD What are Some Characteristics of OCD in Children? OCD: The Philosopher’s Illness The Obsessive-compulsive Must Accept his Own Sadistic Sexuality Institutional Psychopathy The Psychology of the Bureaucrat Psychopaths are Rogue Bureaucrats And Bureaucrats are Non-rogue Psychopaths How Double-think is Possible Bureaucratic Bloat Responsible for OCD-spike Submitting to Feminism Makes It More Psychopathic What is the Prognosis for People with OCD? The Way to Beat OCD is to Have a Purpose in Life Is OCD a Disease? Social Anxiety is about Rage Structural Therapy Effective Therapists Must Have and Project Inner Strength Reading-related Difficulties in People with OCD The Limitations of CBT in the Treatment of OCD Turn OCD Against Itself How do I get over my OCD? Intrusive Thoughts ​ Why People with OCD Have Them Physical vs. Mental Illness How to Treat Compulsions that are not Accompanied by Obsessions? Why Psychopaths Overachieve ​​ The Therapeutic Significance of a Healthy Sex Life Autism as Pseudo-self-containment The Two Ways in which Intellectual Activity Promotes Intelligence How Mental Illness Differs from Physical Illness Psychiatric Munchausen’s by Proxy What is the Prognosis for People with OCD? How is Rationalization Different from Auto-hypnosis?

The same person who claims to be a relativist about musical beauty—who claims that all musical works are equally ‘valid’ and beautiful---adores certain musical works while detesting others. And the same person who claims to be a relativist about personal beauty—who claims that all people are beautiful, if only ‘on the inside’---finds certain people intensely attractive and finds others equally intensely repellent. And the same person who is guilty of the one hypocrisy is almost always guilty of the other. So we are dealing with two hypocrisies---two ‘open secrets’, each of which has a social justification while lacking an alethic or logical justification---that parallel each other. And that is because the one hypocrisy is really just a proxy for the other: relativism about musical beauty—which is just an absurd purely philosophical position---is really just a proxy for relativism about female beauty—which is not an absurd philosophical position, but a deeply important social protocol that is rooted in the depths of female psychology.

The so-called ‘left’ has nothing to do with providing underprivileged groups with otherwise unavailable opportunities. The left does nothing positive for women, blacks or any other such group. And the left has no particular interest in protecting women from the supposed threat of male violence or abuse; nor does it have any particular interest in protecting blacks or latinos from the supposed threat of white violence or exploitation. The left is not the left at all; the left is not liberal. The so-called left represents bureaucratism, and its objective is to assimilate all people into an all encompassing, all-effacing bureaucracy.

The sciences are typically divided into the physical and the psychological—or, what comes to the same thing, the natural and the social. This is not the right way to divide the class of sciences. The right division is between the sciences that study entropic systems and the sciences that study counter-entropic systems. Biology and psychology study counter-entropic systems. Physics studies entropic systems. The concept of a function—not in the mathematical, but in the purpose-related sense---is completely alien to the logic of the entropic sciences, but it is central to the logic of the counter-entropic sciences.

A bureaucrat is somebody who has surrendered all of his decision-making responsibilities to the bureaucracy that employs him. So long as a given person’s decision-making protocol is capable of being in conflict with the bureaucracy that hosts him, that person is not a bureaucrat. And so long as that condition obtains, he can be internally conflicted, since, under that circumstance, he has two decision-making protocols, one corresponding to the bureaucracy in question and one that is his own. For this reason mutatis mutandis, the bureaucrat is incapable of being internally conflict. And this lack of internal conflict makes him emotionally sterile and unable to act.

Kripke made a good case that “…the phi…“ is not semantically ambiguous between referential and attributive meanings. Russell says that “…the phi…“ is always to be analyzed attributively. Many semanticists, agreeing with Kripke that “…the phi…“ is not ambiguous, have tried to give a Russellian analysis of the referential-attributive distinction: the gross deviations between what is communicated by “…the phi..“, on the one hand, and what Russell's theory says it literally means, on the other, are chalked up to implicature. This paper shows that, when the phenomenon of implicature is scrutinized, there is overwhelming reason to doubt that a Russellian analysis can succeed. A positive, non-Russellian analysis is proposed: it is shown that, if definite descriptions are treated as referring expressions, it is easy to deal with the referential-attributive distinction. When “…the phi…“ is functioning attributively, the definite description is seen as referring to some object described in an understood, antecedent existence claim.

This paper shows that Russell’s theory of descriptions gives the wrong se-mantics for definite descriptions occurring in questions and imperatives. Depending on how that theory is applied, it either assigns nonsense to per-fectly meaningful questions and assertions or it assigns meanings that di-verge from the actual semantics of such sentences, even after all pragmatic and contextual variables are allowed for. Given that Russell’s theory is wrong for questions and assertions, it must be wrong for assertoric state-ments; for the semantics of ‘the phi’ obviously doesn’t vary depending on whether it occurs in a question or an assertion or a command.

Kripke made a good case that ..... the phi....,, is not semantically ambiguous between referential and attributive meanings. Russell says that .... .the phi....,, is always to be analyzed attributively. Many semanticists, agreeing with Kripke that "...the phi....,, is not ambiguous, have tried to give a Russellian analysis of the referential-attributive distinction: the gross deviations between what is communicated by "...the phi".. on the one hand, and what Russell's theory says it literally means, on the other, are chalked up to implicature. This paper shows that, when the phenomenon of implicature is scrutinized, there is overwhelming reason to doubt that a Russellian analysis can succeed. A positive, non-Russellian analysis is proposed: it is shown that, if definite descriptions are treated as referring expressions, it is easy to deal with the referential-attributive distinction. When CC the ph....,, is functioning attributively, the definite description is seen as referring to some object described in an understood, antecedent existence claim