John-Michael Kuczynski

In the first part of this two-part work, the economics of higher education are explained. It is made clear how a university’s business model differs from that of a company that has to compete on the open market. On this basis, it is explained: (i)Why universities are in no way threatened by low retention-rates and graduation-rates; (ii)Why universities cannot significantly improve or otherwise alter the quality of their educational services without imperiling their very existences; (iii)Why universities do not have to improve the quality of their educational services; (iv)Why universities couldn’t improve the quality of their services even if they wanted to; (v)Why the fact that many universities have low retention- and graduation-rates does not a represent a business opportunity, or opportunity of any other kind, for anyone, whether inside or outside of academia; and (vi)Why principles of Knowledge Management (KM) that are so useful when it comes to helping businesses that compete on the open market are completely useless, and indeed of negative utility, when it comes to helping universities solve their problems. In the second part of this work, it is explained how to construct an online university that is both lucrative and also provides instruction that is faster, better, cheaper, and more useful than the instruction provided by any existing (or possible) brick-and-mortar university. Finally, it is explained how the principles of KM can be used to optimize such a university, once it is up and running.

Do I know that my chair won’t sprout wings and fly away? I know that it would be needlessly anomaly-generative to believe that it will. Setting aside limiting-cases, such as my knowledge that I am conscious, what we refer to as knowing that such-and-such is really knowledge that it would be needlessly anomaly-generative to believe otherwise. Consequently, what we typically refer to knowing that such-and-such is the case is really meta-knowledge to the effect that granting such-and-such eliminates mysteries and denying it creates them.

According to a popular doctrine known as "intentionalism," two experiences must have different representational contents if they have different phenomenological contents, in other words, what they represent must differ if what they feel like differs. Were this position correct, the representational significance of a given affect (or 'quale'---plural 'qualia'--to use the preferred term), e.g. a tickle, would be fixed: what it represented would not be a function of the subject's beliefs, past experiences, or other facts about his past or present psychological condition. To be sure, many a quale has a significance; but it is never a quale's intrinsic properties that assign it that significance, it being quale-external facts about the subject's psychological composition that do so. (An example of such a fact would be a belief on the subject's part to the effect that relevantly similar qualia are consistent with arthritis.)

Ontologically, brains are more basic than mental representations. Epistemologically, mental representations are more basic than brains and, indeed, all other non-mental entities: it is, and must be, on the basis of mental representations that we know anything about non-mental entities. Since, consequently, mental representations are epistemically more fundamental than brains, the former cannot possibly be explained in terms of the latter, notwithstanding that the latter are ontologically more fundamental than the former. There is thus an explanatory gap, notwithstanding the presumptive truth of materialism.

This paper puts forth two reasons to hold that at least some mental entities are not physical entities. First argument: Some mental entities (namely, pains and other qualia) cannot possibly differ from how they seem to be, and since this cannot possibly be true of any non-mental entity, it follows that some mental entities are not physical. Second argument: It is necessarily on theoretical grounds, as opposed to strictly experiential grounds, that mental entities are identified with physical entities. Water is legitimately believed to consist of microparticles of a certain kind because there is independent reason to believe that entities relevantly similar to such particles, supposing them to exist, are relevantly similar to water, so far as the latter can be directly observed. It is not, nor could it possibly be, on the basis of some directly observed concomitance between molecule-activity and water-activity that we believe the former to constitute the latter. It obviously isn't on the basis of any directly observed concomitance between brain-activity and mental-activity that the former is believed to mediate the latter. At the same time, there cannot possibly be any other legitimate basis for that belief. The reason for this is that nothing relevantly similar to mental activity can possibly be observed to accompany anything relevantly similar to brain activity. And the reason for the latter fact is that, even if brain-activity and mental-activity occur in the same physical space, they occur in different data-spaces: when you experience a pain, it is not given to you as occurring in the same spatial manifold as the falling of a stone or any other physical event. In general, mental events, whether or not they in fact have spatial coordinates, cannot possibly be observed (experienced) as having such coordinates, and for this reason they cannot be observed as having the same coordinates as brain-events. Thus, there can be no reason to grant the existence of the concomitances whose existence is needed to legitimate the bridge principles on the basis of which the mental could legitimately be identified with the physical. Note on the second argument: This argument doesn't show that the mental is non-physical; it shows only that there cannot possibly be any justification for the belief that the mental to be physical or, at any rate, that, if there is such a justification, it isn't comparable to the justification for the belief that water consists of molecules.

Intended for philosophically minded psychologists and psychologically minded philosophers, this book identifies the ways that psychology has hobbled itself by adhering too strictly to empiricism, this being the doctrine that all knowledge is observation-based. In the first part of this two-part work, it is shown that empiricism is false. In the second part, the psychology-relevant consequences of this fact are identified. Five of these are of special importance. First, whereas some psychopathologies (e.g. obsessive-compulsive disorder) corrupt the activity mediated by one’s psychological architecture, others (e.g. sociopathy) corrupt that architecture itself. Second, the basic tenets of psychoanalysis are coherent. Third, all propositional attitudes are beliefs. Fourth, selves are minds that self-evaluate. Fifth, it is by giving our thoughts a perceptible form that we enable ourselves to evaluate them, and it is by expressing ourselves in language and art that we give our thoughts a perceptible form.

Alan Turing advocated a kind of functionalism: A machine M is a thinker provided that it responds in certain ways to certain inputs. Davidson argues that Turing’s functionalism is inconsistent with a cer-tain kind of epistemic externalism, and is therefore false. In Davidson’s view, concepts consist of causal liasons of a certain kind between subject and object. Turing’s machine doesn’t have the right kinds of causal li-asons to its environment. Therefore it doesn’t have concepts. Therefore it doesn’t think. I argue that this reasoning is entirely fallacious. It is true that, in some cases, a causal liason between subject and object is part of one’s concept of that object. Consequently, to grasp certain propositions, one must have certain kids of causal ties to one’s environment. But this means that we must rethink some old views on what rationality is. It does not mean, pace Davidson, that a precondition for being rational is being causally embedded in one’s environment in a certain way. If Tur-ing’s machine isn’t capable of thinking (I leave it open whether it is or is not), that has nothing to do with its lacking certain kinds of causal con-nections to the environment. The larger significance of our discussion is this: rationality consists either in one’s ability to see the bearing of purely existential propositions on one another or rationality is simply not to be understood as the ability see the bearing that propositions have on one another.

It is often said that (M) "mind is an emergent property of matter." M is ambiguous, the reason being that, for all x and y, "x is an emergent property of y" has two distinct and mutually opposed meanings, namely: (i) x is a product of y (in the sense in which a chair is the product of the activity of a furniture-maker); and (ii) y is either identical or constitutive of x, but, relative to the information available at a given time t, x-statements are not analytic consequences of y-statements. If M is taken to mean that matter produces mind, then M is false, since biological activity obviously mediates mental activity and is therefore either identical with it or constitutive of it. If M is taken to mean that statements about mind are not analytic consequences of statements about matter, then M, though true with respect to the ontological relationship with between physical objects and the mental objects mediated thereby, says nothing about how statements about the physical bear on statements about the mental. This is a consequence of the fact that it is truths that are explained, not objects. (It is truths about trees, and not the tree per se, that are explained: one explains why the tree is tall, why the tree can't survive if the drought continues, etc.) So supposing that M is taken to mean that, relative to the information available at a given time, psychological truths are not derivable from non-psychological truths, then M is to the effect that, at that time, it isn't known how, or even whether, truths of the first kind bear on those of the second, in which case M is to the effect that it isn't known how to explain the mental in terms of the physical. Thus, depending on how it is disambiguated, M is either false or devoid of content. Further, as Hempel (1965) made clear, if M is taken to mean that, at a given time, statements about the mental cannot be deduced from statements about the physical, then it is ipso facto being left open whether, at some later time, relative to a more comprehensive data-set, statements about the mental are deducible from statements about the physical. A consequence of this, as Hempel stated, is that, if M is disambiguated in the second way, it is not to the effect that statements about the mental are incapable of being deduced from statements about the physical, and is instead to the effect that, at the time M is affirmed, it simply isn't known whether, or therefore how, such a deduction can be carried. And this establishes---what has already been established on independent grounds---that M is devoid of content if interpreted as a thesis concerning the way in which statements about the physical bear on---or, a fortiori, are explanatory of---statements about the mental. Thus, the statement that "mind is an emergent property of matter" is vacuous, so far as it isn't false.

Hume's attempt to show that deduction is the only legitimate form of inference presupposes that enumerative induction is the only non-deductive form of inference. In actuality, enumerative induction is not even a form of inference: all supposed cases of enumerative induction are disguised cases of Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE), so far as they aren't simply cases of mentation of a purely associative kind and, consequently, of a kind that is non-inductive and otherwise non-inferential. The justification for IBE lies in two truths, each analytic, viz. that good explanations eliminate anomalies and, second, that anomaly-elimination is identical with discontinuity-elimination. Given these truisms, along with the empirical data to which even skeptics must grant that we have access, it follows that induction is truth-conducive, a corrollary being that skepticism with regard to the veridicality of our senses is indefensible. Hume's erroneous beliefs about non-deductive inference are consequences of his belief that the world has a digital, as opposed to an analogue, structure--of, in other words, his belief that the spatiotemporal manifold decomposes into minimal units. This belief of his is not only false, but analytically so, and its negation has the consequence--for reasons additional to the one already given---that many forms of skepticism are non-starters. It also has the consequence, later given empirical confirmation by the (apparent) truth of Relativity Theory, that spatiotemporal relations are causal relations. Finally, it has the consequence that, contrary to what Hume argues, there are instances of causation. Additional reinforcemet for this claim is shown to lie in a fact first identified by Kant, viz. that we couldn't even ask whether or not there were instances of causation unless there were in fact such instances. Other, similarly 'transcendental' arguments of Kant's are put forth, sometimes in a modified form, so as to buttress the anti-skeptical positions advocated in thsi paper.

Kripke made a good case that “…the phi…“ is not semantically ambiguous between referential and attributive meanings. Russell says that “…the phi…“ is always to be analyzed attributively. Many semanticists, agreeing with Kripke that “…the phi…“ is not ambiguous, have tried to give a Russellian analysis of the referential-attributive distinction: the gross deviations between what is communicated by “…the phi..“, on the one hand, and what Russell's theory says it literally means, on the other, are chalked up to implicature. This paper shows that, when the phenomenon of implicature is scrutinized, there is overwhelming reason to doubt that a Russellian analysis can succeed. A positive, non-Russellian analysis is proposed: it is shown that, if definite descriptions are treated as referring expressions, it is easy to deal with the referential-attributive distinction. When “…the phi…“ is functioning attributively, the definite description is seen as referring to some object described in an understood, antecedent existence claim.

According to Russell, '... the phi ...' means: 'exactly one object has phi and ... that object ...'. Strawson pointed out that, if somebody asked how many kings of France there were, it would be deeply inappropriate to respond by saying '... the king of France ...': the respondent appears to be presupposing the very thing that, under the circumstances, he ought to be asserting. But it would seem that if Russell's theory were correct, the respondent would be asserting exactly what he was asked to assert. So Russell's theory wrongly predicts that the respondent's answer will be appropriate. Russellians deal with this by saying that this anti-Russellian intuition embodies our reaction not to what is semantically encoded in the respondent's words, but to what is pragmatically imparted by them. So Russell's theory is correct: the fact that it appears wrong is due to the distorting effects of pragmatics. In this paper I show that pragmatic phenomena cannot possibly be responsible for the just mentioned anti-Russellian intuition. No matter how hard we try to put the blame on pragmatics, Russell's theory still falls short. It follows that defi nite descriptions really are what they appear to be: referring expressions. I argue that defi nite descriptions are complex demonstratives; and, within that framework, I deal with cases where defi nite descriptions appear to be functioning non-referentially. I also solve Frege's puzzle within the framework defi ned by my treatment of defi nite descriptions taken in conjunction with Kripke-Kaplan semantics.

According to one point of view, emotions are recognitions of truths of a certain kind -- most probably valuative truths (truths to the effect that something is good or bad). After giving the standard arguments for this view, and also providing a new argument of my own for it, I set forth two arguments against it. First, this position makes all emotions be epistemically right or wrong. But this view is hard to sustain where certain emotions (especially desire) are concerned. Second, this position is guilty of presupposing what it is meant to explain; for it makes emotions be a pre-requisite for the very value judgments with which emotions are supposed, according to that theory, to be identical.

This paper shows that Russell’s theory of descriptions gives the wrong semantics for definite descriptions occurring in questions and imperatives. Depending on how that theory is applied, it either assigns nonsense to perfectly meaningful questions and assertions or it assigns meanings that diverge from the actual semantics of such sentences, even after all pragmatic and contextual variables are allowed for. Given that Russell’s theory is wrong for questions and assertions, it must be wrong for assertoric statements; for the semantics of ‘the phi’ obviously doesn’t vary depending on whether it occurs in a question or an assertion or a command

Even though the world is governed by laws, human beings are able to be free. In fact, there is no difference between being genuinely free and having a distinctively human psychological architecture. But self-deception and rationalization can result in the replacement of actual beliefs with operational pseudo-beliefs. When this happens, the result is a sociopathic pseudo-person. The difference between a sociopath and a psychopath is that, whereas the sociopath once had a distinctively human psychological architecture, the psychopath never developed such an architecture to begin with. Thus, whereas the sociopath's personality is that of an ossified human, the psychopath has no real personality to speak of. What the psychopath lacks in the way of an actual identity, he replaces with narratives, the primary function of which is to give a semblance of cohesiveness to his otherwise gelatinous psyche, and a secondary function of which is to defraud others. But the psychopath's tendency to defraud others is merely a way of providing external reinforcement for his flimsy narrative-based faux-identity.

We are aware of truths (e.g. the truth that the shoes I'm now wearing are uncomfortably tight) and also of states of affairs (e.g. the uncomfortable tightness of said shoes). My awareness of the tightness of my shoes---not, be it emphasized, of the corresponding truth, but of the shoe-related mass-energy-distribution underlying that truth---is an instance, not of truth-awareness, but of fact-awareness or, as I prefer to put, object-awareness. The aforementioned truth-awareness corresponding to that object-awareness is the result of my conceptualizing that object-awareness. The distinction between truth-awareness, which is conceptual, and object-awareness, which is non-conceptual, is often overlooked. Because self-knowledge originally consists of object-awarenesses, only later taking the form of truth-awarenesses, a failure to distinguish between object- and truth-awareness has led many to advocate the false contention that self-conscious creatures, such as ourselves, can be categorically mistaken as to what it is that they are consciously experiencing. In this paper, it is argued that, once the distinction between object- and truth-awareness is taken into account, the mistaken judgments that people make as to their conscious conditions embody erroneous conceptualizations of veridical awarenesses of said conditions.

This essay attempts to solve the so‐called paradox of analysis: if one is to have any questions about x, one must know x; but if one knows x, one has no questions about x. The obvious solution is this: one can inquire into x if one knows some, but not all, of x's parts. But this solution is erroneous. Let x′ be those parts of x with which one is acquainted, and let S be the percipient in question. As with x, either S knows x′, in which case he has no questions about it; or S does not know x′, in which case he has no questions about it. My solution is this. Perception and cognition give us, not the thing‐in‐itself, but a certain analogue of the thing‐in‐itself. To inquire into x, it is necessary to know not x, but only some analogue of x; and to learn more about x is to become acquainted with increasingly precise analogues of x.

It is made clear what discursive knowledge is and how we acquire it, and some age-old skeptical views are shown to be incoherent. It is shown that all knowledge is to some degree inferential. At the same time, it is shown that there are three quite distinct senses in which empirical knowledge can be inferential. It is proved that we have a priori knowledge, and also that knowledge of non-empirical truths is needed to acquire empirical knowledge. Finally, it is clearly explained what prediction is, what explanation is, how the two differ, and how they are similar.

Empiricism is the doctrine that all knowledge has a strictly observational basis. Rationalism is the doctrine that least some knowledge has non-observational, purely conceptual basis. In the present work, empiricism is carefully considered and found to have four dire shortcomings: (1) Empiricism cannot account for our knowledge of what doesn't exist, let alone what cannot exist. (2) Empiricism cannot account for our knowledge of dependence-relations, given (1), coupled with the fact that 'P depends on Q' is equivalent with 'not-Q either necessitates or is dispositive of not-P.' (3) Empiricism cannot account for our knowledge of the past, the future, or the possible, given (2), coupled with the fact knowledge of any of these domains requires knowledge of conditional truths (truths of the form "if P, then Q") and therefore of dependence-relations. (4) Empiricism cannot by itself apprise us of any truths, given (3), coupled with the fact that knowledge of conditional truths is necessary to recognize the truths implicit in any body of sensory data. The arguments of key empiricists are closely examined. Special attention is paid to George Berkeley's arguments for idealism ('to be is to be perceive/conceived'). It is shown that, although Berkeley's arguments fail, profound insights are embedded in the very sophisms that vitiate those same arguments, the three most important ones being: (i) That data-modelling and truth-identification at least sometimes coalesce, (ii) That scientific theories are at least sometimes capable of being represented as interpreted formal calculi, and (iii) That when theoretical terms are defined contextually, as opposed to directly, otherwise unintelligible assertions acquire scientific significance. Further, it is shown that, even though Berkeley's arguments for idealism fall through, he himself deserves credit for identifying the principle in terms of which the fallacies in those arguments are to be understood, namely: (*) It is not sensory experience alone that yields awareness of the outside world, but sensory experience coupled with awareness on the subject's part of relational invariances holding among the objects of those awareness. Thus, perceptual knowledge is knowledge of invariances. And, to make a point hinted at in Berkeley's work, knowledge of laws is meta-perceptual knowledge, given that laws of nature are invariances holding among the invariances holding among the objects of perception.