-
55Comments on Alfred Mele, Motivation and Agency – DiscussionPhilosophical Studies 123 (3): 261-272. 2005.
-
54The Works of Agency: On Human Action, Will, and FreedomPhilosophical Review 109 (4): 632. 2000.This book comprises eleven essays in the philosophy of action, six of which were previously published. The book has a fairly extensive index. The essays are arranged in four groups. The first group contains two essays on the individuation of action. The second contains four essays that argue for the view that what makes an event an action is, not how it is caused, but that it is, or begins with, a volition, “an intrinsically actional” mental event. The third contains three essays that defend the…Read more
-
50The Significance of Free WillPhilosophical Review 107 (2): 312. 1998.If among the spate of books on free will in recent years there are any that a philosopher concerned with that topic should have handy, this is one of them. Its coverage of the free-will issues debated in the philosophical literature of the last twenty years or so is penetrating, instructive, and by far the most thorough I’ve seen. Kane defends his own positions, but he is unusually fair, even generous, in expounding opposing views. And, while the book is not a popular treatment, it is written in…Read more
-
45On Action.Explaining Human Action.The Philosophy of Action: An IntroductionPhilosophical Quarterly 41 (165): 498. 1991.
-
35
-
33Causal Theories in EpistemologyIn Jonathan Dancy & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Blackwell's A Companion to Epistemology, Blackwell. 1992.
-
32Four Difficulties with Dretske's Theory of KnowledgeBehavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1): 69-70. 1983.Four difficulties with Dretske's theory of knowledge
-
29Castaneda on Private LanguageIn Tomberlin (ed.), Agent, Language, and the Structure of the World: Essays Presented to Hector-Neri Castaneda, Hackett. 1983.
-
28Review of Richard Holton, Willing, Wanting, Waiting (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (11). 2009.
-
28Review of Carl Ginet and Sydney Shoemaker: Knowledge and Mind: Philosophical Essays (review)Ethics 95 (2): 357-358. 1985.
-
26An Incoherence in the TractatusCanadian Journal of Philosophy 3 (2): 143-151. 1973.In rejecting, In 1929-30, The complete independence of the elementary propositions--According to which any combination of truth-Values for any set of elementary propositions is logically possible--Wittgenstein did not reject an essential element of the "tractatus" system but rather one that fails to cohere with the central picture-Theory of propositions, According to which a method of truth-Valued representation must be capable of presenting 'competing alternative' representations, The false one…Read more
-
25Book Review. The Significance of Free Will. Robert Kane. (review)Philosophical Review 107 (2): 312-315. 1998.If among the spate of books on free will in recent years there are any that a philosopher concerned with that topic should have handy, this is one of them. Its coverage of the free-will issues debated in the philosophical literature of the last twenty years or so is penetrating, instructive, and by far the most thorough I’ve seen. Kane defends his own positions, but he is unusually fair, even generous, in expounding opposing views. And, while the book is not a popular treatment, it is written in…Read more
-
17Plantinga and the Philosophy of MindIn James Tomberlin & Peter van Inwagen (eds.), Alvin Plantinga (Profiles, Vol. 5), D. Reidel Publishing Company. pp. 199-224. 1985.
-
14The Justification of Belief: A PrimerIn Carl Ginet & Sydney Shoemaker (eds.), Knowledge and Mind, . 1985.
-
12Deciding to BelieveIn Matthias Steup (ed.), Knowledge, Truth and Duty, Oxford University Press. pp. 63-76. 2001.
-
11JustificationJournal of Philosophical Research 15 93-107. 1990.This paper argues that a fact which constitutes part of a subject’s being justified in adopting an action or a belief at a particular time need not be part of what induced the subject to adopt that action or belief but it must be something to which the subject had immediate access. It argues that similar points hold for justification of the involuntary acquisition of a belief and for the justification of continuing a belief (actively or dispositionally.)
Ithaca, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Action |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |