-
8The Works of Agency (review)Philosophical Review 109 (4): 632-635. 2000.This book comprises eleven essays in the philosophy of action, six of which were previously published. The book has a fairly extensive index. The essays are arranged in four groups. The first group contains two essays on the individuation of action. The second contains four essays that argue for the view that what makes an event an action is, not how it is caused, but that it is, or begins with, a volition, “an intrinsically actional” mental event. The third contains three essays that defend the…Read more
-
8Self-EvidenceVeritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 54 (2): 9-31. 2009.Este estudo desenvolve uma abordagem do que significa para uma proposição ser autoevidente para alguém, baseado na ideia de que certas proposições são tais que plenamente entendê-las significa crer nelas. Argumenta-se que, quando uma proposição p é autoevidente para alguém, tem-se justificação a priori não-inferencial para crer que p e, eis um traço bem-vindo, uma justificação que não envolve exercer qualquer tipo especial de faculdade intuitiva; se, em adição, é verdade que p e não existe nenhu…Read more
-
6Reasons explanations of action: Causalist versus noncausalist accountsIn Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, Oxford University Press. pp. 386-405. 2001.
-
5CommentsIn Calvin Dwight Rollins (ed.), Knowledge and experience, University of Pittsburgh Press. 1962.
-
3The General Conditions of Knowledge: Justification Carl GinetIn Alcoff Linda (ed.), Epistemology: The Big Questions, Blackwell. pp. 79. 1998.
-
2Infinitism is Not the Answer to the Regress ProblemIn Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Blackwell. 2013.
-
2Comments on Plantinga’s two-volume work on warrantPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (2): 403-408. 1995.
-
1Res Cogitans: An Essay in Rational Psychology (review)Philosophical Review 85 (2): 216-224. 1976.
-
LibertarianismIn Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford handbook of metaphysics, Oxford University Press. 2003.
-
Reason's explanation of actionIn Timothy O'Connor (ed.), Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will, Oxford University Press. 1995.
-
On Wittgenstein's Claim that There Could Not Be Just One Occasion of Obeying a RuleActa Philosophica Fennica 28 154-165. 1976.
-
Norman Malcolm (1911–1990)In A. P. Martinich & David Sosa (eds.), A Companion to Analytic Philosophy, Blackwell. 2001.This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Knowledge Mind Memory Philosophy of religion.
-
Can an Indeterministic Cause Leave a Choice Up to the Agent?In David Palmer (ed.), Libertarian Free Will: Contemporary Debates, Oxford University Press. pp. 14-26. 2014.This chapter argues for a noncausal libertarian account of free will. According to this account, a person’s free actions cannot be caused at all. The chapter compares its libertarian view to Kane’s event-causal libertarian view. It critiques Kane’s proposals concerning self-forming actions and indeterministic causation. The chapter explains why it thinks that its non-causal view is to be preferred over Kane’s event-causal view. The chapter also discusses the luck objection to libertarianism. The…Read more
-
LibertarianismIn Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 587-612. 2003.
-
Reasons explanation of action : an incompatibilist accountIn Alfred R. Mele (ed.), The philosophy of action, Oxford University Press. 1997.
Ithaca, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Action |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |