•  21
    There is more to mathematics than proofs; there are also arguments, which means that mathematicians are human arguers complete with their biases. Among those biases is a preference for beauty, It is a bias insofar as it is a deaprture from objectivity, but it is benign, accounting for the popularity of Cantor's "Paradise" of non-denumerable infinities as a travel destination for mathematicians and the relatively little interest in Robinson's infinitesimals.
  •  21
    On What Cannot Be
    In J. Dunn & A. Gupta (eds.), Truth or Consequences: Essays in Honor of Nuel Belnap, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 123--132. 1990.
  •  18
    Traduction des textes sur la doctrine stoïcienne du mélange total
    with Nicolette Brout, Michèle Broze, Bernard Collette, Lambros Couloubaritsis, Sylvain Delcomminette, Sabrina Inowlocki, Joachim Lacrosse, Mihaïl Nasta, and Annick Stevens
    Revue de Philosophie Ancienne 24 (2): 61-92. 2006.
  •  18
    Seperating the intrinsic complexity and the derivational complexity of the word problem for finitely presented groups
    with Klaus Madlener and Friedrich Otto
    Mathematical Logic Quarterly 39 (1): 143-157. 1993.
    A pseudo-natural algorithm for the word problem of a finitely presented group is an algorithm which not only tells us whether or not a word w equals 1 in the group but also gives a derivation of 1 from w when w equals 1. In [13], [14] Madlener and Otto show that, if we measure complexity of a primitive recursive algorithm by its level in the Grzegorczyk hierarchy, there are groups in which a pseudo-natural algorithm is arbitrarily more complicated than an algorithm which simply solves the word p…Read more
  •  18
    The rhetoric of logic reveals, we claim, that arguments are about force, ending only when one side submits. Rhetoricians, it is countered, are content to persuade, settling for agreement when truth is wanted—and all is fair in pursuit of consent. The choice between conceptual rape and seduction is a false choice. It is time to cut against the grain. We are distracted by the rhetoric of logic and gloss the logic of rhetoric. Rhetorical models for pluralistic discourses are vital, but fail as regu…Read more
  •  18
    Although Michael Yong-Set's proposal to approach argumentation theory from a ludological perspective is not yet sufficiently developed to warrant adopting it, there is enough to warrant exploring it further – which is all the reception it needs at this point.
  •  17
    Psychological and neuroscientific data suggest that a great deal, perhaps even most, of our reasoning turns out to be rationalizing. The reasons we give for our positions are seldom either the real reasons or the effective causes of why we have those positions. We are not as rational as we like to think. A second, no less disheartening observation is that while we may be very effective when it comes to giving reasons, we are not that good at getting reasons. We are not as reasons-responsive as w…Read more
  •  16
    Justice publique et justice privée
    Archives de Philosophie du Droit 41 149-162. 1997.
    Notion de justice. Définitions justice publique, justice privée. Place et diversité de la justice privée. Dualisme ou unité de la justice publique et de la justice privée? I. Dissemblances. A. - Rapports d'antagonisme. B. - Raisons historiques. C. - Origines différentes de la fonction juridictionnelle exercée. II. - Convergences. A. - Influence du privé sur la justice publique. B. - Influence du public sur la justice privée. C. - Perspectives communes. Juridicité. Finalité poursuivie
  •  15
    It is a virtue of virtue theory approaches to argumentation that they integrate many of the different factors that make arguments good arguments. The insights of virtue argumentation are brought to bear on a variety of versions of the requirement that good arguments must have good premises, concluding that a sincerity condition serves better than truth or assertability conditions, despite apparently counterintuitive consequences for arguments involving heterogeneous coalitions.
  •  14
    A complex network of reciprocal relations connect arguments and stories. Arguments can occur in stories and stories can be parts of arguments. Further, stories can themselves be arguments. Whether a text or exchange serves as an argument partly depe nds on how we read it, i.e., on the story we tell about it and how well we argue for that story, but the circle is not as vicious as it appears. Or at least, that is the story we present and the argument we tell in this dialogue revisiting the ancien…Read more
  •  14
    Psychological and neuroscientific data suggest that a great deal, perhaps even most, of our reasoning turns out to be rationalizing. The reasons we give for our positions are seldom either the real reasons or the effective causes of why we have those positions. We are not as rational as we like to think. A second, no less disheartening observation is that while we may be very effective when it comes to giving reasons, we are not that good at getting reasons. We are not as reasons-responsive as w…Read more
  •  14
    As a rule, there is nothing in the words themselves to mark off metaphors from literal language. If a boundary could somehow be drawn, it would be in constant need of re‐adjustment as metaphors become entrenched, idiomatic, and finally literal, and literal phrases are put to figurative or hyperbolic, and then metaphorical uses. Further, there is no algorithmic recovery of the intended meaning of a metaphor from the meanings of its components, no function that takes literal meanings as its argume…Read more
  •  14
    A Reply to Steven M Cahn on Divestiture
    Analysis 48 (2): 109-110. 1988.
    Steven m cahn, In the june 1987 issue of "analysis", Asks how a principled divesture of stocks is possible. Selling stock requires a buyer, So no net reduction of objectionable economic behavior results. Is divestiture merely self-Righteous cleansing of one's own hands? not necessarily. It is argued that divesture as a means to influence corporate behavior, And not just as a means to a clean portfolio, Can be justified
  •  13
    Stalking the wild paradox
    Metaphilosophy 19 (1). 1988.
  •  7
    You Cannot Judge an Argument by its Closure
    Informal Logic 43 (4): 669-684. 2022.
    he best arguments are distinguished by more than logical validity, successful rhetorical persuasion, or satisfactory dialectical closure. Argument appraisal has to look beyond the premises, inferences, and conclusions; it must consider more than just the objections and replies, and resolutions that satisfy the arguers might not satisfy outside critics. Arguers and their contexts can be important factors for assessing arguments. This conclusion is reached by considering several scenarios in which…Read more
  •  6
    The Word as Will and Idea
    Philosophical Studies (Dublin) 32 126-140. 1988.
  •  6
    Agency and Responsibility: A Common-Sense Moral Psychology
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3): 444-445. 2003.
    Book Information Agency and Responsibility: A Common-Sense Moral Psychology. Agency and Responsibility: A Common-Sense Moral Psychology Jeanette Kennett New York Oxford University Press 2001 viii + 229 Hardback US$45 By Jeanette Kennett. Oxford University Press. New York. Pp. viii + 229. Hardback:US$45
  •  6
    D'une Science Résistante, l'Autre
    Journal of Ancient Philosophy 173-177. forthcoming.
  •  6
    You Cannot Judge an Argument by its Closure
    Informal Logic 43 (4): 669-684. 2022.
    he best arguments are distinguished by more than logical validity, successful rhetorical persuasion, or satisfactory dialectical closure. Argument appraisal has to look beyond the premises, inferences, and conclusions; it must consider more than just the objections and replies, and resolutions that satisfy the arguers might not satisfy outside critics. Arguers and their contexts can be important factors for assessing arguments. This conclusion is reached by considering several scenarios in which…Read more