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26Context, Vagueness, and OntologyIn Patrick Greenough & Michael P. Lynch (eds.), Truth and Realism, Oxford University Press. pp. 162. 2006.
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181Relativistic content and disagreement (review)Philosophical Studies 156 (3): 421-431. 2011.Herman Cappelen and John Hawthorne’s Relativism and Monadic Truth presses a number of worries about relativistic content. It forces one to think carefully about what a relativist should mean by saying that speakers disagree or contradict one another in asserting such content. My focus is on this question, though at points (in particular in Sect. 4) I touch on other issues Cappelen and Hawthorne (CH) raise.
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27OpacityIn Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press. 2006.There seems to be a lot of opacity in our language. Quotation is opaque. The modal idioms are apparently opaque. Propositional attitude ascriptions seem opaque, as do the environments created by verbs such as ‘seeks’ and ‘fears’. Opacity raises a number of issues — first and foremost, whether there is such a thing. This article concentrates on the question of whether there is any opacity to be found in natural language, examining various reasons one might have for denying that apparent opacity i…Read more
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175When Truth Gives OutOxford University Press. 2008.Is the point of belief and assertion invariably to think or say something true? Is the truth of a belief or assertion absolute, or is it only relative to human interests? Most philosophers think it incoherent to profess to believe something but not think it true, or to say that some of the things we believe are only relatively true. Common sense disagrees. It sees many opinions, such as those about matters of taste, as neither true nor false; it takes it as obvious that some of the truth is rela…Read more
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73Quantification and Leibniz's lawPhilosophical Review 96 (4): 555-578. 1987.The Philosophical Review, Vol. XCVI, No. 4 (October 1987). Categorically proves that Leibniz's Law (the principle that any instance of _for any x and y, if x=y, then if ...x..., then ..y..._ is true) is not a principle of which is true of natural language objectual quantification.
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Indeterminacy and Truth Value GapsIn Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Cuts and Clouds: Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic, Oxford University Press. 2010.
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61Defective Contexts, Accommodation, and NormalizationCanadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (4). 1995.Propositional Attitudes defends an account of ‘believes’ on which the verb is contextually sensitive. x believes that S says that x has a belief which is ‘well rendered’ or acceptably translated by S; since contextually variable information about what makes for a good translation helps determine the extension of ‘believes,’ the verb is contextually sensitive. Sider and Soames criticize this account. They say it has unacceptable consequences in cases in which we make multiple ascriptions of belie…Read more
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50Explaining Attitudes: A Practical Approach to the MindPhilosophical Review 106 (4): 614. 1997.When I started the book, I thought that if there are beliefs, then they are brain states. I still believe that. I express three caveats about the book.
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46XIV*—Attitude Ascriptions, Semantic Theory, and Pragmatic EvidenceProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 87 (1): 243-262. 1987.Mark Richard; XIV*—Attitude Ascriptions, Semantic Theory, and Pragmatic Evidence, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 87, Issue 1, 1 June 1987, Page.
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114Meaning (edited book)Wiley-Blackwell. 2003._ Meaning_ brings together some of the most significant philosophical work on linguistic representation and understanding, presenting canonical essays on core questions in the philosophy of language. Brings together essential readings which define and advance the literature on linguistic representation and understanding. Examines key topics in philosophy of language, including analyticity; translational indeterminacy; theories of reference; meaning as use; the nature of linguistic competence; tr…Read more
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162Direct reference and ascriptions of beliefJournal of Philosophical Logic 12 (4): 425--52. 1983.
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21Taking the Fregean seriouslyIn D. F. Austin (ed.), Philosophical Analysis, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 219--239. 1988.
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39Reply to Lynch, Miščević, and StojanovićCroatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (2): 197-208. 2011.This paper responds to discussions of my book When Truth Gives Out by Michael Lynch, Nenad Miščević, and Isidora Stojanović. Among the topics discussed are: whether relativism is incoherent (because it requires one to think that certain of one’s views are and are not epistemically superior to views one denies); whether and when sentences in which one slurs an individual or group are truth valued; whether relativism about matters of taste gives an account of “faultless disagreement” superior to c…Read more
Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Language |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |