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Alex Blum

New York University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    79
    • Most Recent
    • Most Downloaded
    • Topics
  •  Recommended
    27
  •  News and Updates
    53

 More details
New York University
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1968
Homepage
Ramat Gan, Tel Aviv District, Israel
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics and Epistemology
Logic and Philosophy of Logic
  • All publications (79)
  •  83
    Isomorphism Between C1 and C2
    Zeitschrift fur mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik 18 (13-15): 237-240. 1972.
    Model Theory
  •  61
    A Version of the Frege ‐ Quine Argument
    Dialectica 42 (4): 307-312. 1988.
    Frege: Philosophy of Language, Misc
  •  137
    Analyticity and truth in all possible worlds
    Noûs 17 (2): 281-289. 1983.
    Analyticity, Misc
  •  43
    A correction in Copi's account of Boolean normal forms
    Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 14 (2): 288-288. 1973.
    Logic and Philosophy of LogicNonclassical Logics
  •  43
    Two Observations About S5
    Mathematical Logic Quarterly 23 (36): 485-486. 1976.
  •  75
    On the cannot of infallibility
    Sophia 44 (1): 125-127. 2005.
    We content that a very seductive argument for theological fatalism fails. In the course of our discussion we point out that theological fatalism is incompatible with the existence of a being who is omnipotent, omniscient and infallible. We end by suggesting that ‘possible’ formalized as ‘◊’ is to be understood as ‘can or could have been’ and not simply as ‘can’. The argument we discuss conflates the two.
    Philosophy of ReligionDivine Omniscience
  • Cidd: 168 impossible premises and correct argument
    Manuscrito 20. 1997.
  •  108
    A note on pleasure
    Journal of Value Inquiry 25 (4): 367-70. 1991.
    Pleasure, MiscTheories of Value
  •  103
    Nozick on indeterministic free will
    with Stanley Malinovich
    Journal of Chinese Philosophy 13 (4): 471-473. 1986.
    Libertarianism about Free WillChinese Philosophy
  •  93
    Arithmetic and Logic Incompleteness: the Link
    with Laureano Luna
    The Reasoner 2 (3): 6. 2008.
    We show how second order logic incompleteness follows from incompleteness of arithmetic, as proved by Gödel
    Model TheoryMetaphysics and EpistemologyMathematical Proof
  •  125
    The agony of pain
    Philosophical Inquiry 18 (3-4): 117-120. 1996.
    Pleasure and Pain
  •  51
    Notes and Discussions Notes et Discussions — Notizen und Diskussionen Convention T And Natural Languages
    Dialectica 32 (1): 77-80. 1978.
  •  107
    Belief in the Tractatus
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 51 (1): 259-260. 1996.
    Ludwig Wittgenstein
  • ⊃” and “If... then..
    Logique Et Analyse 29 (13): 111. 1986.
  •  60
    A logic of belief
    Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 17 (3): 344-348. 1976.
    Doxastic and Epistemic Logic
  •  55
    Two Observations About S5
    Zeitschrift fur mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik 23 (36): 485-486. 1977.
  •  60
    Sortals and paradox
    Philosophical Studies 22 (3): 33-34. 1971.
  •  68
    Comment on Yehuda Gellman's “the intelligibility of God's simplicity in rational theology”
    Philosophia 4 (4): 560-560. 1974.
    Divine Simplicity
  •  75
    A note on theological fatalism1
    Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 14 (2): 143-147. 2007.
    We contend that a very seductive argument for theological fatalism fails. In the course of our discussion we point out that theological fatalism is incompatible with the existence of a being who is omnipotent, omniscient and infallible. We suggest that ‘possible’ formalized as ‘◊’ is to be understood as ‘can or could have been’ and not simply as ‘can’. The argument we discuss conflates the two. We end by rounding out, hope-fully, some left over corners of serious concern to the theist.
    Fatalism
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