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Boris Hennig

Toronto Metropolitan University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    66
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    40

 More details
  • Toronto Metropolitan University
    Department of Philosophy
    Associate Professor
Homepage
Toronto, Ontario, Canada
Areas of Specialization
Self-Knowledge
Metaphysics
Plato
Aristotle
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Social Science
Philosophy of Biology
Meta-Ethics
Metaphilosophy
History: Self-Knowledge
Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy
Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy
Social and Political Philosophy
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Action
17th/18th Century Philosophy
Self-Knowledge
Plato
Aristotle
René Descartes
11 more
  • All publications (66)
  •  43
    Stephan Schmid. Finalursachen in der frühen Neuzeit: Eine Untersuchung der Transformation teleologischer Erklärungen. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2011. Pp. xii+410. $165.00 (review)
    Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 3 (1): 179-182. 2013.
    Book review.
    Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy, Miscellaneous
  •  10
    Occurrents
    In Katherine Munn & Barry Smith (eds.), Applied Ontology: An Introduction, Ontos. pp. 255-284. 2008.
    Persistence
  •  125
    Holistic arguments for individualism
    In Georg Meggle (ed.), Social Facts and Collective Intentionality. Philosophische Forschung / Philosophical research, Dr. Haensel-hohenhausen. 2002.
    In this essay, I will sketch my view of the connections between some methodological assumptions in social philosophy, namely those of individualism, holism, and collectivism. My interest in doing so is to outline a rough conceptual landscape, into which an approach of collective actions and intentions can be placed.
    Holism and Individualism in Social ScienceCollective Intentionality
  •  154
    Doing and Being. An Interpretation of Aristotle's Metaphysics Theta
    Philosophical Quarterly 66 (263): 411-414. 2016.
    Review of Jonathan Beere's book.
    Aristotle: Metaphysics
  •  19
    What is formal ontology?
    In Katherine Munn & Barry Smith (eds.), Applied Ontology: An Introduction, Ontos. pp. 39-56. 2008.
    Ontology
  •  110
    Science, conscience, consciousness
    History of the Human Sciences 23 (3): 15-28. 2010.
    Descartes’ metaphysics lays the foundation for the special sciences, and the notion of consciousness (conscientia) belongs to metaphysics rather than to psychology. I argue that as a metaphysical notion, ‘consciousness’ refers to an epistemic version of moral conscience. As a consequence, the activity on which science is based turns out to be conscientious thought. The consciousness that makes science possible is a double awareness: the awareness of what one is thinking, of what one should be do…Read more
    Descartes’ metaphysics lays the foundation for the special sciences, and the notion of consciousness (conscientia) belongs to metaphysics rather than to psychology. I argue that as a metaphysical notion, ‘consciousness’ refers to an epistemic version of moral conscience. As a consequence, the activity on which science is based turns out to be conscientious thought. The consciousness that makes science possible is a double awareness: the awareness of what one is thinking, of what one should be doing, and of the possibility of a gap between the two
    Philosophy of ConsciousnessRené Descartes
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