Tim Henning

This article attempts to do justice to two conflicting positions in current public debates. On the one hand, it defends a strong version of scientific freedom, according to which science should be free, not only from external obstacles and pressures but also from criticism that is based on reasons “of the wrong kind.” The only admissible criterion in debates about scientific claims, I argue, is whether there is sufficient evidence for their truth. Furthermore, I accept the anti-moralistic view that (non-)conformity with moral ideals is never itself evidence. On the other hand, the article nevertheless argues that there is a possibility of legitimate moral criticism of moral claims. This argument relies on the popular (if controversial) idea that there is pragmatic encroachment – specifically, the idea that the standard of sufficiency for evidence is in part determined by pragmatic factors like the costs of error. This opens up the door for a certain type of legitimate moral criticism. For the costs that determine a standard of sufficiency for epistemic justification can also plausibly count as morally significant. There is thus a con-contingent connection between epistemic and moral defects of certain scientific claims. The resulting view is applied to concrete debates, most importantly about race, genetics and IQ.

Suppose we can save either a larger group of persons or a distinct, smaller group from some harm. Many people think that, all else equal, we ought to save the greater number. This article defends this view (with qualifications). But unlike earlier theories, it does not rely on the idea that several people's interests or claims receive greater aggregate weight. The argument starts from the idea that due to their stakes, the affected people have claims to have a say in the rescue decision. As rescuers, our primary duty is to respect these procedural claims, which we must do by doing what these people would decide, in a process where each is given an equal vote on the matter. So in cases where each votes in their own self-interest, respect for their equal right to decide, or their autonomy, will lead us to save the greater number. The argument is explained in detail, with special attention to the questions of how, exactly, it avoids aggregation, and of why majority rule is superior to lottery procedures. The view has further advantages. Especially, it explains the “partial” relevance of numbers in cases involving unequal harms, and it does so in a way that dissolves the appearance of paradox that besets theories of “partial aggregation.”

Harry Frankfurt has claimed that some of our desires are ‘internal’, i.e., our own in a special sense. I defend the idea that a desire's being internal matters in a normative, reasons-involving sense, and offer an explanation for this fact. The explanation is Kantian in spirit. We have reason to respect the desires of persons in so far as respecting them is a way to respect the persons who have them (in some cases, ourselves). But if desires matter normatively in so far as they belong to persons, then it matters whether they really do belong to the persons who have them. Thus Kantian considerations explain why identification (or internality) is a normatively relevant category. This account is superior to others, and does not lead to reasons bootstrapping or a self-centred conception of deliberation

Definition of the problem The creation and selection of children as tissue donors is ethically controversial. Critics often appeal to Kant’s Formula of Humanity, i.e. the requirement that people be treated not merely as means but as ends in themselves. As many defenders of the procedure point out, these appeals usually do not explain the sense of the requirement and hence remain obscure. Arguments This article proposes an interpretation of Kant’s principle, and it proposes that two different instrumental stances be distinguished. I argue that the creation of “saviour children” is a form of instrumentalization that I dub “preemptive instrumentalization” and that it is categorically different from earlier forms of instrumental attitudes concerning human reproduction. Conclusion Critics are wrong to claim that Kant’s principle is either compatible with the selection of saviour siblings or too vague to serve as an ethical principle.

This monograph develops an argument for the following view: In leading an autonomous life, persons make choices and adopt attitudes of a distinctive kind. To justify these choices and attitudes, they need to draw on knowledge about their biographies. More specifically, their biographies are a source of a distinctive type of practical reasons. These reasons are typically such that their adequate articulation will have a narrative structure. Along the way, the book develops what has been called "the best analysis of the concept of narrativity currently on offer" (Journal of Literary Theory 2011). This monograph has received the Wolfgang Stegmüller award of the German Society for Analytic Philosophy (GAP) in 2009.

Personen erz hlen ihr Leben - eine These dieser Art ist vielerorts popul r. Aber es fehlt bislang an ausgearbeiteten Argumenten f r sie, ebenso wie an einer strengen Definition des Begriffs der Narrativit t. Das vorliegende Buch bietet Abhilfe. Zun chst stellt es einen Beitrag zur Theorie personaler Autonomie dar. Eine Analyse des zentralen Begriffs der Identifikation wird vorgeschlagen; ebenso wird eine anspruchsvolle biographische Bedingung der Autonomie formuliert und begr ndet. Ob wir das tun, was wir wirklich wollen, k nnen wir nur vor dem Hintergrund unseres Wissens ber bestimmte biographische Zusammenh nge entscheiden. Weiter wird eine detaillierte Theorie der Syntax, Semantik und Pragmatik narrativer Sprache entwickelt. Narrativit t basiert nicht nur auf der Form und der Bedeutung von S tzen, sondern hat eine essentielle pragmatische Dimension. Erst vor dem Hintergrund der subjektiven Wahrscheinlichkeiten und der empathischen Verm gen von Teilnehmern in Kontexten sind u erungen Geschichten. Vor diesem Hintergrund wird gezeigt, dass die biographischen Zusammenh nge, die relevant f r Autonomie sind, gerade solche sind, von denen wir erz hlen k nnen. Geschichten artikulieren praktische Gr nde, und es zeichnet Personen als autonome Wesen aus, f r diese narrativen Gr nde empf nglich zu sein. Das Buch wurde 2009 mit dem Wolfgang-Stegm ller-Preis der Gesellschaft f r Analytische Philosophie ausgezeichnet.

This paper discusses an autobiographical approach to Critical Theory, an approach which, as I argue, can be found in Walter Benjamin′s work. The core idea is that remembering one′s own life within a certain culture provides a productive method for a differentiated critique of this culture. In order to explain and defend this I idea, I draw on resources from both analytic philosophy and Benjamin′s work. Along the way, I describe Benjamin′s distinctive mode of ideology critique, a mode of critique that Habermas calls “rettende Kritik.” What is attractive about autobiographical recollection is that it provides precisely the kind of epistemic and evaluative perspective that is suitable for this subtle form of social criticism. Remembering one′s past can allow us to criticize past ideologies while simultaneously acknowledging that they may articulate valid ideals of the good life

This volume brings together recent work by leading and up-and-coming philosophers on the topic of virtue epistemology. The prospects of virtue-theoretic analyses of knowledge depend crucially on our ability to give some independent account of what epistemic virtues are and what they are _for_. The contributions here ask how epistemic virtues matter apart from any narrow concern with defining knowledge; they show how epistemic virtues figure in accounts of various aspects of our lives, with a special emphasis on our practical lives. In essence, the essays here put epistemic virtues to work.

When are you in a position to rely on p in practical reasoning? Existing accounts say that you must know that p, or be in a position to know that p, or be justified in believing that p, or be in a position to justifiably believe it, and so on. This paper argues that all of these proposals face important problems, which I call the Problems of Negative Bootstrapping and of Level Confusions. I offer a diagnosis of these problems, and I argue that an adequate epistemic norm must be transparent in the following sense: According to the correct epistemic norm, a consideration counts in favor of (or against) relying on p in practical reasoning iff, and to the extent that, this consideration also counts in favor of (or against) p being true. I introduce a candidate epistemic norm that satisfies this condition. According to this norm, one should rely on p in practical reasoning only if it must be that p. If we adopt a non-factualist account of “must”, this amounts to a novel and attractive proposal, a proposal that satisfies the transparency condition.