•  5
    On What Matters, 2 Bände by Derek Parfit (review)
    Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 66 (2): 335-339. 2012.
  •  49
    From A Rational Point Of View
    Oxford University Press. 2018.
    When we discuss normative reasons, oughts, requirements of rationality, hypothetical imperatives (or “anankastic conditionals”), motivating reasons and so on, we often use verbs like “believe” and “want” to capture a relevant subject’s perspective. According to the received view about sentences involving these verbs, what they do is describe the subject’s mental states. Many puzzles concerning normative discourse have to do with the role that mental states consequently appear to play in this dis…Read more
  •  41
    Strukturelle Entfremdung als Kategorie der Wirtschaftsethik
    Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 60 (2): 213-226. 2012.
    This paper argues that a certain kind of alienation from labour can be analyzed and explained in the theoretical framework that is dominant in current economics. Given a neoclassical model of a labour market, the intrinsic value that different kinds of labour may have for people can be represented as a source of utility (in the technical sense). It can then be shown that in capitalist economies, basing one’s supply decisions on this intrinsic value is predictably costly. So in the long run, rati…Read more
  •  77
    Kant und die Logik des "Ich denke"
    Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 64 (3): 331-356. 2010.
    This paper explores Kant’s views about the logical form of “I think”-judgments. It is shown that according to Kant, in an important class of cases the prefix “I think” does not contribute to the assertoric, truth-conditional content of judgments of the form “I think that P.” Thus, judgments of this type are often merely judgments that P. The prefix “I think” does mention the subject and his thought, but it does not make the complex judgment a judgment about the subject and his or her thought. Ka…Read more
  •  129
    Normative Reasons Contextualism
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3): 593-624. 2014.
    This article argues for the view that statements about normative reasons are context-sensitive. Specifically, they are sensitive to a contextual parameter specifying a relevant person's or group's body of information. The argument for normative reasons contextualism starts from the context-sensitivity of the normative “ought” and the further premise that reasons must be aligned with oughts. It is incoherent, I maintain, to suppose that someone normatively ought to φ but has most reason not to φ.…Read more