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1053The Midlife CrisisPhilosophers' Imprint 14. 2014.Argues that philosophy can solve the midlife crisis, at least in one of its forms. This crisis turns on the exhaustibility of our ends. The solution is to value ends that are ‘atelic,’ so inexhaustible. Topics include: John Stuart Mill's nervous breakdown; Aristotle on the finality of the highest good; and Schopenhauer on the futility of desire.
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231Transparency and InferenceProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (2pt2): 263-268. 2012.Argues that doubts about the inference from 'p' to 'I believe that p' do not support reflective theories of self-knowledge over an inferential or rule-following view. (This note is a reply to Matthew Boyle, "Transparent Self-Knowledge," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 85: 223-241.)
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430Other PeopleIn Sarah Buss & Nandi Theunissen (eds.) https://philpapers.org/rec/BUSRTV, Oup Usa. 2023.Argues for the role of personal acquaintance in both love and concern for individuals, as such. The challenge is to say what personal acquaintance is and why it matters in the way it does. These questions are addressed through the work of Emmanuel Levinas. Topics include: the ethics of aggregation, the basis of moral standing, and the value of human life.
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450Cognitivism about Instrumental ReasonEthics 117 (4): 649-673. 2007.Argues for a "cognitivist" account of the instrumental principle, on which it is the application of theoretical reason to the beliefs that figure in our intentions. This doctrine is put to work in solving a puzzle about instrumental reason that plagues alternative views.
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147Parfit on direct self-defeatPhilosophical Quarterly 49 (195): 239-242. 1999.In the first part of Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit argues that common‐sense morality, or M, is self‐defeating, so that it must be rejected or revised. I defend M. We can rebut Parfit’s argument if we make an assumption about the moral importance of doing what is morally right. We need to assume that this end has sufficient weight in M
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134Is efficiency a vice?American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (4). 2005.Argues against the form of instrumentalism on which being practically rational is being efficient in the pursuit of one's ends. The trait of means-end efficiency turns out to be a defect of character, and therefore cannot be identified with practical reason at its best.
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352Believing at WillMidwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1): 36-52. 2008.Argues that we cannot form beliefs at will without failure of attention or logical confusion. The explanation builds on Williams' argument in "Deciding to Believe," attempting to resolve some well-known difficulties. The paper ends with tentative doubts about the idea of judgement as intentional action.
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212Reply to Bratman and SmithAnalysis 69 (3): 531-540. 2009.To begin with, I am deeply grateful to Michael Bratman and Michael Smith for their generosity in responding to my book, for the care with which they have read it, and for the challenge of meeting their objections. I am also grateful for their support and encouragement over the years. It is a pleasure to engage with them here.Because their comments raise many related difficulties, this reply will treat them together, beginning with brief consideration of issues in action theory before turning to …Read more
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353Knowing Right From WrongOxford University Press. 2012.Can we have objective knowledge of right and wrong, of how we should live and what there is reason to do? Can it be anything but luck when our moral beliefs are true? Kieran Setiya confronts these questions in their most compelling and articulate forms, and argues that if there is objective ethical knowledge, human nature is its source.
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779Explaining actionPhilosophical Review 112 (3): 339-393. 2003.Argues that, in acting for a reason, one takes that reason to explain one's action, not to justify it: reasons for acting need not be seen "under the guise of the good". The argument turns on the need to explain the place of "practical knowledge" - knowing what one is doing - in intentional action. A revised and expanded version of this material appears in Part One of "Reasons without Rationalism" (Princeton, 2007).
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737What is a Reason to Act?Philosophical Studies 167 (2): 221-235. 2014.Argues for a conception of reasons as premises of practical reasoning. This conception is applied to questions about ignorance, advice, enabling conditions, "ought," and evidence.
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446Practical Knowledge RevisitedEthics 120 (1): 128-137. 2009.Argues that the view propounded in "Practical Knowledge" (Ethics 118: 388-409) survives objections made by Sarah Paul ("Intention, Belief, and Wishful Thinking," Ethics 119: 546-557). The response gives more explicit treatment to the nature and epistemology of knowing how.
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544Epistemic agency: Some doubtsPhilosophical Issues 23 (1): 179-198. 2013.Argues for a deflationary account of epistemic agency. We believe things for reasons and our beliefs change over time, but there is no further sense in which we are active in judgement, inference, or belief.
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64Review of Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson, eds., 'Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge' (review)Mind 118 (472): 834-840. 2009.
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100Review of Justin Broackes, ed., 'Iris Murdoch, Philosopher' (review)Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249): 878-881. 2012.
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258Selfish ReasonsErgo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2. 2015.Argues against the rationality of self-concern. Non-instrumental interest in my own well-being is not justified by the fact that it is mine. This follows from the metaphysics of first-person thought, as thought about the object of immediate knowledge. The argument leaves room for rational self-interest as a form of self-love that is justified, like love for others, by the fact of our shared humanity.
Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
| Epistemology |
| Philosophy of Action |
| Meta-Ethics |
| Normative Ethics |
Areas of Interest
| Philosophy of Mind |
| Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy |
| 17th/18th Century Philosophy |