•  641
    Higher-Order Awareness, Misrepresentation, and Function
    Higher-Order Awareness, Misrepresentation and Function 367 (1594): 1424-1438. 2012.
    Conscious mental states are states we are in some way aware of. I compare higher-order theories of consciousness, which explain consciousness by appeal to such higher-order awareness (HOA), and first-order theories, which do not, and I argue that higher-order theories have substantial explanatory advantages. The higher-order nature of our awareness of our conscious states suggests an analogy with the metacognition that figures in the regulation of psychological processes and behaviour. I argue…Read more
  •  150
    Consciousness and the mind
    Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly 51 (July): 227-251. 2002.
    Everyone — or almost everyone — was agreed that what is [mental] … has a common quality in which its essence is expressed: namely the quality of being conscious — unique, indescribable, but needing no description. All that is conscious … is [mental], and conversely all that is [mental] is conscious; that is self-evident and to contradict it is nonsense
  •  108
    Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem (edited book)
    Prentice-Hall. 1971.
    An expanded and updated edition of this classic collection
  •  608
    Two concepts of consciousness
    Philosophical Studies 49 (May): 329-59. 1986.
    No mental phenomenon is more central than consciousness to an adequate understanding of the mind. Nor does any mental phenomenon seem more stubbornly to resist theoretical treatment. Consciousness is so basic to the way we think about the mind that it can be tempting to suppose that no mental states exist that are not conscious states. Indeed, it may even seem mysterious what sort of thing a mental state might be if it is not a conscious state. On this way of looking at things, if any mental sta…Read more
  •  686
    in Encyclopedia of Consciousness, ed. William P. Banks, Amsterdam: Elsevier, forthcoming in 2009
  •  11
    Introspection and Self-Interpretation
    Philosophical Topics 28 (2): 201-233. 2000.
  •  412
    How many kinds of consciousness?
    Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4): 653-665. 2002.
    Ned BlockÕs influential distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness has become a staple of current discussions of consciousness. It is not often noted, however, that his distinction tacitly embodies unargued theoretical assumptions that favor some theoretical treatments at the expense of others. This is equally so for his less widely discussed distinction between phenomenal consciousness and what he calls reflexive consciousness. I argue that the distinction between phenomenal and acce…Read more
  •  155
    (not intended for publication), Replies to Strawson and Block in Colloquium at the CUNY Graduate Center, December 13, 2006.
  •  198
    The main goal of Deborah Modrak's penetrating and compelling discussion is to show that Aristotle subscribed "to an integrated model of perceptual and noetic functions" (268). Using Aristotle's phrase (Γ4, 429b13, 21), Modrak describes the integrated model as the view that "the noetic faculty is the perceptual faculty differently disposed" (283). She notes that this interpretation faces certain difficulties, but argues forcefully and incisively that it can nonetheless be sustained.
  •  1
    Persons, minds, and consciousness
    In R. E. Auxier & L. E. Hahn (eds.), The Philosophy of Marjorie Grene, La Salle, Illinois: Open Court. pp. 199-220. 2002.
  •  2
    Descartes's Meditations: Critical Essays (edited book)
    with John P. Carriero, Peter J. Markie, Stephen Schiffer, Robert Delahunty, Frederick J. O'Toole, Fred Feldman, Anthony Kenny, Margaret D. Wilson, John Cottingham, and Jonathan Bennett
    Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 1997.
    This collection of recent articles by leading scholars is designed to illuminate one of the greatest and most influential philosophical books of all time. It includes incisive commentary on every major theme and argument in the Meditations, and will be valuable not only to philosophers but to historians, theologians, literary scholars, and interested general readers
  •  6
    The identity theory
    In Samuel D. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell. 1994.
    In Descartes's time the issue between materialists and their opponents was framed in terms of substances. Materialists such as Thomas Hobbes and Pierre Gassendi maintained that people are physical systems with abilities that no other physical systems have; people, therefore, are special kinds of physical substance. Descartes's DUALISM, by contrast, claimed that people consist of two distinct substances that interact causally: a physical body and a nonphysical, unextended substance. The tradition…Read more
  •  41
    Content, interpretation, and consciousness
    ProtoSociology 14 67-84. 2000.
    According to Dennett, the facts about consciousness are wholly fixed by the effects consciousness has on other things. But if a mental state's being conscious consists in one's having a higher-order thought about that state, we will in principle have an independent way to fix those facts. Dennett also holds that our speech acts sometimes determine what our thoughts are, since speech acts often outrun in content the thoughts they express.I argue that what thoughts we have is independent of how we…Read more
  •  4
    Being Conscious of Ourselves
    The Monist 87 (2): 159-181. 2004.
    What is it that we are conscious of when we are conscious of ourselves? Hume famously despaired of finding self, as against simply finding various impressions and ideas, when, as he put it, “I enter most intimately into what I call myself.” “When I turn my reflexion on myself, I never can perceive this self without some one or more perceptions; nor can I ever perceive any thing but the perceptions.”
  •  32
    Subjective Character and Reflexive Content
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1): 191-198. 2004.
    John Perry’s splendid book, Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness, sets out to dispel the three main objections currently lodged against mind-body materialism. These are the objection from the alleged possibility of zombies, the knowledge argument made famous by Frank Jackson, and the modal objections due principally to Saul A. Kripke and David Chalmers. The discussion is penetrating throughout, and it develops many points in illuminating detail.
  •  129
    Few contemporary researchers in psychology, philosophy, and the cognitive sciences have any doubt about whether mental phenomena occur without being conscious. There is extensive and convincing clinical and experimental evidence for the existence of thoughts, desires, and related mental states that aren’t conscious. We characterize thoughts, desires, intentions, expectations, hopes, and many other mental states in terms of the things they are about and, more fully, in terms of their content, as …Read more
  •  82
    René Descartes’s Meditations on First Philosophy
    Topoi 34 (2): 541-548. 2015.
    The major goal of René Descartes’s rich and penetrating recent book, Meditations on First Philosophy, is to develop a methodology for the discovery of the truth, more specifically, a methodology that accommodates the dictates of a mathematical physics for our view of physical reality. Such a methodology must accordingly deal with and seek to defuse the apparent conflict between a mathematical physics and our commonsense picture of things, a conflict that continues to pose difficult challenges. T…Read more
  •  33
    The Nature of Consciousness
    Mind 113 (451): 581-588. 2004.