Parkville, Victoria, Australia
Areas of Interest
Meta-Ethics
  •  10
    Wieviele moralische Wahrheiten gibt es?
    Conceptus: Zeitschrift Fur Philosophie 37 (92): 83-104. 2008.
  •  5
    The many moral rationalisms (edited book)
    with Karen Jones
    Oxford University Press. 2018.
    Moral rationalism takes human reason and human rationality to be the key elements in an explanation of the nature of morality, moral judgment, and moral knowledge. This volume explores the resources of this rich philosophical tradition. Thirteen original essays, framed by the editors' introduction, critically examine the four core theses of moral rationalism: (i) the psychological thesis that reason is the source of moral judgment, (ii) the metaphysical thesis that moral requirements are constit…Read more
  •  2
    Moral Expertise
    In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, Routledge. pp. 459-471. 2017.
  •  1
    The Many Moral Rationalisms (edited book)
    Oxford Univerisity Press. 2018.
    Moral rationalism takes human reason and human rationality to be the key elements in an explanation of the nature of morality, moral judgment, and moral knowledge. This volume explores the resources of this rich philosophical tradition. Thirteen original essays, framed by the editors' introduction, critically examine the four core theses of moral rationalism: (i) the psychological thesis that reason is the source of moral judgment, (ii) the metaphysical thesis that moral requirements are constit…Read more
  • Faut-il craindre le relativisme moral?
    Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie Und Theologie 55 (2): 324-333. 2008.
  • Introduction
    In Karen Jones & François Schroeter (eds.), The Many Moral Rationalisms, Oxford Univerisity Press. 2018.
  • Un kantisme orthodoxe est-il viable en éthique?
    Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie Und Theologie 52 (1-2): 216-236. 2005.
  • Reasons and justifiability
    In Karen Jones & François Schroeter (eds.), The Many Moral Rationalisms, Oxford Univerisity Press. 2018.
    Traditional normative realists are committed to the idea that different individuals manage to pick out on the very same property with terms like ‘morally right’, despite variations in their understanding and use of the term. How is this possible? In this chapter, we sketch a metasemantic account that promises to vindicate traditional normative realism within a broadly rationalist framework. We will first introduce a metasemantic principle that ties reference determination to what is justifiable…Read more