Donald A. Landes

ABSTRACT Whether explicitly or implicitly, Kant's critical project weighs heavily upon Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception. This article argues that we can understand Merleau-Ponty's text as a phenomenological rewriting of the Critique of Pure Reason from within the paradoxical structures of lived experience, effectively merging Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic and Transcendental Analytic. Although he was influenced by Husserl's and Heidegger's interpretations of Kant's first version of the Transcendental Deduction, Merleau-Ponty develops a unique position between Kant, Husserl, and Heidegger via an embodied and lived synthesis that collapses Kant's distinction between sensibility and the understanding, and that makes sense of temporality and subjectivity as a paradoxical trajectory.

From his initial writings on imagination and memory, to his recent studies of the glance and the edge, the work of American philosopher Edward S. Casey continues to shape 20th-century philosophy. In this first study dedicated to his rich body of work, distinguished scholars from philosophy, urban studies and architecture as well as artists engage with Casey's research and ideas to explore the key themes and variations of his contribution to the humanities. Structured into three major parts, the volume reflects the central concerns of Casey's writings: an evolving phenomenology of imagination, memory, and place; representation and landscape painting and art; and edges, glances, and voice. Each part begins with an extended interview that defines and explains the topics, concepts, and stakes of each of area of research. Readers are thus offered an introduction to Casey’s fascinating body of work, and will gain a new insight into particular aspects and applications of Casey's research. With a complete bibliography and an introduction that at once stresses each of Casey’s areas of research while putting into perspective their overarching themes, this authoritative volume identifies the overall coherence and interconnections of Edward S. Casey's work and his impact in contemporary thought.

Winner of the 2014 Edward Goodwin Ballard Award for an Outstanding Book in Phenomenology, awarded by the Center for Advance Research in Phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty and the Paradoxes of Expression offers a comprehensive reading of the philosophical work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, a central figure in 20th-century continental philosophy. By establishing that the paradoxical logic of expression is Merleau-Ponty's fundamental philosophical gesture, this book ties together his diverse work on perception, language, aesthetics, politics and history in order to establish the ontological position he was developing at the time of his sudden death in 1961. Donald A. Landes explores the paradoxical logic of expression as it appears in both Merleau-Ponty’s explicit reflections on expression and his non-explicit uses of this logic in his philosophical reflection on other topics, and thus establishes a continuity and a trajectory of his thought that allows for his work to be placed into conversation with contemporary developments in continental philosophy. The book offers the reader a key to understanding Merleau-Ponty's subtle methodology and highlights the urgency and relevance of his research into the ontological significance of expression for today's work in art and cultural theory.

Two key themes structure the work of French philosopher of science Gilbert Simondon: the processes of individuation and the nature of technical objects. Moreover, these two themes are also at the heart of contemporary debates within Ethics and Bioethics. Indeed, the question of the individual is a key concern in both Virtue Ethics and Feminist Ethics of Care, while the hyper-technical reality of the present stage of medical technology is a key reason for both the urgency for and the success of the field of Bioethics. And yet, despite its potential for thinking about these issues, Simondon’s philosophy remains largely unknown. Rather than exploring Simondon’s complex ontology for itself, the aim of this paper is to establish what contribution his work can make in Ethics and Bioethics on two essential questions: the relational structure of the self and the nature of the human-technology relation. I argue that Simondon’s re-conceptualization of the individual harmonizes with perspectives in Feminist Bioethics and points toward what I call an “open” Virtue Ethics that takes relations to be essential. In order to establish this connection, I explore at length the relational approach to Feminist Bioethics offered by Susan Sherwin’s work. I argue that a Simondonian account of technology and of the individual furthers the relational understanding of the self, offers a characterization of Virtue Ethics that is in harmony with the Ethics of Care, and clarifies a notion of responsibility that is implicated in the complex reality of the modern technological milieu.

_ Source: _Volume 45, Issue 3, pp 369 - 385 In “The Vestige of Art,” Jean-Luc Nancy argues that art is neither representation nor inscription, but rather _exscription_. The figure is the vestige of an expressive gesture; it represents neither a separable idea nor the one who traced it but, rather _exscribes_ their presence and their world in the event of expression. As such, Nancy’s aesthetics in _The Muses_ deploys a certain logic of expression best understood in the tradition of Merleau-Pontian phenomenology. Echoing Merleau-Ponty’s notion of speech accomplishing, rather than translating, thought, Nancy’s understanding of the expressive gesture suggests an event that brings forth a self that does not pre-exist its expression and that is paradoxically always already past, always already fallen into material vestiges. By connecting Merleau-Ponty’s notion of a “past that has never been present” to Nancy’s concept of _exscription_, I argue that reading Nancy’s _The Muses_ and Merleau-Ponty’s “Eye and Mind” together suggests an importantly restructured “phenomenology” of painting that is in fact more of an ontology of intercorporeality

In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle places the art of medicine alongside other examples of technē. According to Gadamer, however, medicine is different because in medicine the physician does not, properly speaking, produce anything. In The Enigma of Health, rather than introducing Aristotle’s intellectual virtue of phronēsis (practical wisdom) as a way of understanding medical practice, Gadamer focuses on how medicine is a technē “with a difference”. In this paper, I argue that, despite the richness of his insights, this focus prevents Gadamer from reaching an adequate account of health and the practice of medicine, and I demonstrate how making phronēsis central via a phenomenological description furthers our understanding of the art of healing in important ways. The paper begins with an exploration of Gadamer’s understanding of phronēsis and technē (via Heidegger) to provide a foundation for a phenomenological analysis of the art of healing. After considering the shortcomings of Gadamer’s analyses, I introduce a working definition of “health” that both captures the spirit of Gadamer’s insights and prepares the ground for a phenomenological description. Finally, I introduce concepts from Merleau-Ponty in order to establish an adequate account of the relation between technē and phronēsis and a more nuanced understanding of experience as unfolding within the expressive trajectories forged by bodies that are subject to the weight of the past and the weight of the ideal. The art of medicine, I argue, needs to be understood as expressive behavior in the context of historically and socially situated individuals, institutions, and open trajectories of sense.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) is one of the central figures of 20th-century Continental philosophy, and his work has been hugely influential in a wide range of fields. His writings engage in the study of perception, language, politics, aesthetics, history and ontology, and represent a rich and complex network of exciting ideas. The Merleau-Ponty Dictionary provides the reader and student of Merleau-Ponty with all the tools necessary to engage with this key thinker: a comprehensive A to Z that provides summaries of all his major texts and articles, clear and straightforward explanations of his terminology and innovative concepts, and detailed discussions of the figures and philosophies that influenced his work. The book also includes a philosophical introduction, a chronology of Merleau-Ponty's life and works, and suggestions for further reading. This dictionary is the ideal reading and research companion for students at all levels.

Jessica Wiskus’s book The Rhythm of Thought: Art, Literature, and Music (University of Chicago Press, 2013) is a fascinating study of Merleau-Ponty’s late philosophy inrelation to the artistic expression of Mallarmé, Cézanne, Proust, and Debussy. By invoking examples from across the arts and citations from across Merleau-Ponty’soeuvre, Wiskus provides us with a style for reading some of Merleau-Ponty’s difficult late concepts, including noncoincidence, institution, essence, and transcendence.In this review, we explore some of the key concepts and insights of Wiskus’s rich, interdisciplinary book and offer some places where the depth that it opens up perhapsinvites further exploration.

Although Merleau-Ponty and Blanchot both seek to undermine the classical subject of philosophical discourse as embodied in the self-transparent “I think,” their methodologies appear to be worlds apart. In his early work, Merleau-Ponty is engaged in a phenomenological rethinking of subjectivity via an elaboration of Husserl’s “I can,” whereas Blanchot seems to defer all subjectivity in his nomadic exploration of the space between literature, criticism, and theory. Rather than seeking to avoid this tension by focusing on Merleau-Ponty’s later work, this paper demonstrates the philosophical significance of reading Blanchot alongside Merleau-Ponty’s early work. This, I argue, reveals the radical nature of Merleau-Ponty’s early account of subjectivity (from the “I can” to the “I speak” to the violence of perception) as well as a certain phenomenological and ethical significance in Blanchot’s readings of the myths of the Sirens and of Orpheus and Eurydice.Bien que Merleau-Ponty et Blanchot cherchent tout deux à ébranler le sujet classique du discours philosophique tel qu’il est incarné dans la transparence à soi du “je pense”, leur méthodologies semblent être très éloignées. Dans ses premiers travaux, Merleau-Ponty s’engage dans une reformulation phénoménologique de la subjectivité à travers une élaboration du “je peux” husserlien, tandis que Blanchot paraît reporter toute subjectivité dans son exploration nomade de l’espace, entre littérature, critique et théorie. Plutôt que d’échapper à cette tension en se concentrant sur les travaux tardifs de Merleau-Ponty, cet article vise à montrer l’intérêt d’une lecture de Blanchot au fil des premiers travaux de Merleau-Ponty. Cela révèle la nature radicale des premières considérations de Merleau-Ponty sur la subjectivité (du “je peux” au “je parle”, jusqu’à la violence de la perception), tout autant qu’une certaine signification phénoménologique et éthique de la lecture par Blanchot du mythe des Sirênes, ou de celui d’Orphée et Eurydice. Nonostante Merleau-Ponty e Blanchot cerchino entrambi di minare il soggetto classico del discorso filosofico, incarnato da un “io penso” trasparente a se stesso, le loro rispettive metodologie appaiono diametralmente opposte. Nei suoi primi scritti, Merleau-Ponty è impegnato in un ripensamento fenomenologico della soggettività attraverso una rielaborazione dell’“io posso” di Husserl, mentre Blanchot sembra rinviare l’intera sfera della soggettività alla sua esplorazione nomadica dello spazio tra letteratura, critica e teoria. Anziché cercare di aggirare questa tensione concentrandosi sugli scritti più tardi di Merleau-Ponty, questo articolo mette in luce la rilevanza filosofica di una lettura di Blanchot condotta a fianco dei primi scritti di Merleau-Ponty. Come intendo sostenere, questo rivela la natura radicale delle prime considerazioni di Merleau-Ponty sulla soggettività (dall’“io posso” all’“io parlo” alla violenza della percezione) e al contempo un significato fenomenologico ed etico della lettura di Blanchot del mito delle Sirene e di quello di Orfeo ed Euridice.

Although the suggestion that Kant offers a significant contribution to Virtue Ethics might be a surprising one, in The Metaphysics of Morals Kant makes virtue central to his ethics. In this paper, I introduce a Merleau-Pontian phenomenological perspective into the ongoing study of the convergence between Kant and Virtue Ethics, and argue that such a perspective promises to illuminate the continuity of Kant’s thought through an emphasis on the implicit structure of moral experience, revealing the insights his perspective contains for establishing an embodied phenomenology of virtue. These two aims are accomplished by exploring Kant’s ‘proto-phenomenological’ descriptions of the weight of the moral law, his implicit ‘existential’ account of human nature, and his notion of the art of navigating the complex moral terrain that involves a certain Spielraum. When thus viewed, Kant’s virtue ethics sketches out a subtle understanding of embodiment and temporality

Pour Merleau-Ponty et Nancy, le sujet et son monde co-naissent ensemble dans le mouvement paradoxal du sentir. Dans cette perspective, le sentir serait alors un point de départ privilégié afin de déconstruire les théories classiques de la subjectivité et pour construire une nouvelle compréhension décentrée du sujet. Même si ces deux philosophes divergent sur la question du sujet, il est possible de les rapprocher sur la question du sentir et en particulier à propos de l’expérience de l’écoute. De cette façon, nous ferons ressortir un ton radical chez le premier Merleau-Ponty et un timbre (ou une tonalité) phénoménologique chez Nancy. Pour ce faire, nous démontrons que l’écoute révèle la subjectivité comme activité de « coexistence » (et non pas de « coïncidence »), comme « co-naissance » (et non pas connaissance), et comme « trajectoire » (et non pas présence statique). En d’autres termes, c’est par la voie de l’écoute qu’on retrouve une théorie radicale de la subjectivité déjà présente dans la Phénoménologie de la perception, ainsi qu’une tonalité phénoménologique chez Nancy. For Merleau-Ponty and for Nancy, the subject and his or her world are born together (co-naissent) in the paradoxical movement of sensing. From this perspective, sensing is thus a privileged point of departure for the deconstruction of classical theories of subjectivity and for the construction of a new notion of a decentered subjectivity. Even though it may appear that these two thinkers diverge precisely with regard to the definition of the subject to be theorized, by bringing them together on the topic of sensing (and “listening” in particular), we are able to bring out a radical tone in Merleau-Ponty’s early work as well as a phenomenological timbre in Nancy’s thought. In this paper I demonstrate that listening reveals how subjectivity is an activity of “co-existence” rather than “co-incidence,” of “co-birth” (co-naissance) rather than “knowledge” (connaissance), and is a trajectory rather than a static presence. In other words, by listening to listening we rediscover a radical theory of subjectivity already at work in Phenomenology of Perception and a phenomenological tonality in the work of Nancy. Per Merleau-Ponty e Nancy, il soggetto e il suo mondo co-nascono nel movimento paradossale del sentire. In questa prospettiva, il sentire sarebbe allora un punto di partenza privilegiato per decostruire le teorie classiche della soggettività e costruire una nuova comprensione decentrata del soggetto. Anche se i due filosofi divergono sulla questione del soggetto, è possibile avvicinarli circa la questione del sentire e in particolare a proposito dell’esperienza dell’ascolto. In questo modo, cercheremo di far emergere un tono radicale nel primo Merleau-Ponty e un timbro (o una tonalità) fenomenologica in Nancy. Per farlo, mostreremo come l’ascolto riveli la soggettività come attività di “coesistenza” (e non di “coincidenza”), come “co-nascenza” (e non conoscenza), e come “traiettoria” (e non presenza statica). In altri termini, è attraverso l’ascolto che ritroviamo una teoria radicale della soggettività già presente in Fenomenologia della percezione, così come una tonalità fenomenologica in Nancy.

As a descriptive philosophy, it might seem that the ethical nowhere has its place in phenomenology. And yet, phenomenology is every-where shot through with normative concerns. This section includes articles from the 2018 conference Toward a Phenomenological Ethics, where two themes emerged regarding the elusive place of the ethical in phenomenology: first, research demonstrates that early phenomenology was indeed oriented by the ethical; second, Critical Phenomenology examines ethical questions in terms of intersubjectivity and oppression. In this introduction, I suggest that the place of the ethical in phenomenology implies a certain paradoxical logic of expression, and I consider the relationship between expression and encroachment. This points to a double responsibility for the cultivation of our own virtual and the virtual that we collectively sustain. I conclude with a brief re????lection on how these ideas might help us to rethink our responsibilities in the age of COVID-19.