•  1025
    Epistemic anxiety and adaptive invariantism
    Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1): 407-435. 2010.
    Do we apply higher epistemic standards to subjects with high stakes? This paper argues that we expect different outward behavior from high-stakes subjects—for example, we expect them to collect more evidence than their low-stakes counterparts—but not because of any change in epistemic standards. Rather, we naturally expect subjects in any condition to think in a roughly adaptive manner, balancing the expected costs of additional evidence collection against the expected value of gains in accura…Read more
  •  24
    Defending the Evidential Value of Epistemic Intuitions: A Reply to Stich
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1): 179-199. 2013.
    Do epistemic intuitions tell us anything about knowledge? Stich has argued that we respond to cases according to our contingent cultural programming, and not in a manner that tends to reveal anything significant about knowledge itself. I’ve argued that a cross-culturally universal capacity for mindreading produces the intuitive sense that the subject of a case has or lacks knowledge. This paper responds to Stich’s charge that mindreading is cross-culturally varied in a way that will strip epis…Read more
  •  329
    Contemporary scepticism and the cartesian God
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (3): 465-497. 2005.
    Descartes claims that God is both incomprehensible and yet clearly and distinctly understood. This paper argues that Descartes’s development of the contrast between comprehension and understanding makes the role of God in his epistemology more interesting than is commonly thought. Section one examines the historical context of sceptical arguments about the difficulty of knowing God. Descartes describes the recognition of our inability to comprehend God as itself a source of knowledge of him; sec…Read more
  •  314
    Review of Albert Casullo, A Priori Justification (review)
    Philosophical Review 115 (2): 251-255. 2006.
    At any given time, an individual has certain beliefs and certain procedures or methods for modifying those beliefs. In The Realm of Reason, as in his previous book, Being Known (1999), Christopher Peacocke is concerned with the elusive question of what it is for someone to be “entitled” to a given belief or procedure.1..
  •  2092
    Lay Denial of Knowledge for Justified True Beliefs
    with Valerie San Juan and Raymond A. Mar
    Cognition 129 (3): 652-661. 2013.
    Intuitively, there is a difference between knowledge and mere belief. Contemporary philosophical work on the nature of this difference has focused on scenarios known as “Gettier cases.” Designed as counterexamples to the classical theory that knowledge is justified true belief, these cases feature agents who arrive at true beliefs in ways which seem reasonable or justified, while nevertheless seeming to lack knowledge. Prior empirical investigation of these cases has raised questions about wheth…Read more
  •  1207
    Factive and nonfactive mental state attribution
    Mind and Language 32 (5): 525-544. 2017.
    Factive mental states, such as knowing or being aware, can only link an agent to the truth; by contrast, nonfactive states, such as believing or thinking, can link an agent to either truths or falsehoods. Researchers of mental state attribution often draw a sharp line between the capacity to attribute accurate states of mind and the capacity to attribute inaccurate or “reality-incongruent” states of mind, such as false belief. This article argues that the contrast that really matters for mental …Read more
  •  723
    Motivating Williamson's Model Gettier Cases
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (1): 54-62. 2013.
    Williamson has a strikingly economical way of showing how justified true belief can fail to constitute knowledge: he models a class of Gettier cases by means of two simple constraints. His constraints can be shown to rely on some unstated assumptions about the relationship between reality and appearance. These assumptions are epistemologically non-trivial but can be defended as plausible idealizations of our actual predicament, in part because they align well with empirical work on the metacogni…Read more
  •  689
    Authentic Gettier Cases: a reply to Starmans and Friedman
    with Valerie San Juan and Raymond Mar
    Cognition 129 (3): 666-669. 2013.
    Do laypeople and philosophers differ in their attributions of knowledge? Starmans and Friedman maintain that laypeople differ from philosophers in taking ‘authentic evidence’ Gettier cases to be cases of knowledge. Their reply helpfully clarifies the distinction between ‘authentic evidence’ and ‘apparent evidence’. Using their sharpened presentation of this distinction, we contend that the argument of our original paper still stands
  •  1643
    Intuition, Reflection, and the Command of Knowledge
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1): 219-241. 2014.
    Action is not always guided by conscious deliberation; in many circumstances, we act intuitively rather than reflectively. Tamar Gendler (2014) contends that because intuitively guided action can lead us away from our reflective commitments, it limits the power of knowledge to guide action. While I agree that intuition can diverge from reflection, I argue that this divergence does not constitute a restriction on the power of knowledge. After explaining my view of the contrast between intuitive a…Read more