•  1498
    Deontological theories face difficulties in accounting for situations involving risk; the most natural ways of extending deontological principles to such situations have unpalatable consequences. In extending ethical principles to decision under risk, theorists often assume the risk must be incorporated into the theory by means of a function from the product of probability assignments to certain values. Deontologists should reject this assumption; essentially different actions are available to t…Read more
  •  75
    Representing collective agency
    Philosophical Studies 172 (12): 3379-3386. 2015.
    This paper examines whether Bratman’s succeeds in provides a reductive account of collective intention
  •  46
    In Defense of “Appearances”
    Dialogue 48 (2): 411. 2009.
    Reply to critics on panel on "Appearances of the Good"
  •  88
    'We desire all and only those things we conceive to be good; we avoid what we conceive to be bad.' This slogan was once the standard view of the relationship between desire or motivation and rational evaluation. Many critics have rejected this scholastic formula as either trivial or wrong. It appears to be trivial if we just define the good as 'what we want', and wrong if we consider apparent conflicts between what we seem to want and what we seem to think is good. In Appearances of the Good, Se…Read more
  •  2374
    In this paper we advance a new solution to Quinn’s puzzle of the self-torturer. The solution falls directly out of an application of the principle of instrumental reasoning to what we call “vague projects”, i.e., projects whose completion does not occur at any particular or definite point or moment. The resulting treatment of the puzzle extends our understanding of instrumental rationality to projects and ends that cannot be accommodated by orthodox theories of rational choice.
  •  2
    10. Douglas Portmore, Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality Douglas Portmore, Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality (pp. 179-183) (review)
    with Henry S. Richardson, Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek, Peter Singer, Karen Jones, Diana Raffman, Simon Căbulea May, Stephen C. Makin, and Nancy E. Snow
    Ethics 123 (1). 2012.
  • Subjectivism is the mainstream view of practical reason. According to subjectivism, what has value for an agent must ultimately be grounded in what the agent actually desires. Subjectivism is motivated by a conservative view of the scope and extent of practical reason. Against this view, my dissertation argues that any coherent conception of an end must endow practical reason with a scope that goes beyond anything that subjectivism could accommodate. ;Subjectivism correctly grasps that nothing c…Read more
  •  1137
    Akrasia and Irrationality
    In C. T. Sandis O'Connor (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, Blackwell. pp. 274-282. 2010.
    This chapter contains sections titled: References.
  •  138
    Reconsidering Intentions
    Noûs 443-472. 2016.
    This paper argues that the principles of instrumental rationality apply primarily to extended action through time. Most philosophers assume that rational requirements and principles govern in the first instance momentary mental states, as opposed to governing extended intentional actions directly. In the case of instrumental rationality, the relevant mental states or attitudes would typically be preferences, decisions, or intentions. In fact, even those who recognize the extended nature of our a…Read more
  •  109
    Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2010.
    Most philosophers working in moral psychology and practical reason think that either the notion of "good" or the notion of "desire" have central roles to play in our understanding of intentional explanations and practical reasoning. However, philosophers disagree sharply over how we are supposed to understand the notions of "desire" and "good", how these notions relate, and whether both play a significant and independent role in practical reason. In particular, the "Guise of the Good" thesis - …Read more
  •  10
    Belief, Action and Rationality Over Time (edited book)
    Routledge. 2016.
    Action theorists and formal epistemologists often pursue parallel inquiries regarding rationality, with the former focused on practical rationality, and the latter focused on theoretical rationality. In both fields, there is currently a strong interest in exploring rationality in relation to time. This exploration raises questions about the rationality of certain patterns over time. For example, it raises questions about the rational permissibility of certain patterns of intention; similarly, it…Read more
  •  1421
    Knowing the Good and Knowing What One is Doing
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (S1): 91-117. 2009.
    Most contemporary action theorists accept – or at least find plausible – a belief condition on intention and a knowledge condition on intentional action. The belief condition says that I can only intend to ɸ if I believe that I will ɸ or am ɸ-ing, and the knowledge condition says that I am only intentionally ɸ-ing if I know that I am ɸ-ing. The belief condition in intention and the knowledge condition in action go hand in hand. After all, if intending implies belief, and if ɸ-ing intentionally i…Read more
  •  57
    Accidie, Evaluation, and Motivatlon
    In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of will and practical irrationality, Oxford University Press. pp. 147. 2003.
    Accidie, depression, and dejection seem to be psychological phenomena that are best characterized as cases in which an agent has no motivation to pursue what he or she judges to be good or valuable. The phenomena thus seem to present a challenge to any view that draws a close connection between motivation and evaluation. ‘Accidie, Evaluation, and Motivation’ aims to show that the phenomena are actually best explained by a theory that postulates a conceptual connection between motivation and eval…Read more
  •  1081
    The Idea of Freedom and Moral Cognition in Groundwork III
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3): 555-589. 2012.
    Kant’s views on the relation between freedom and moral law seem to undergo a major, unannounced shift. In the third section of the Groundwork, Kant seems to be using the fact that we must act under the idea of freedom as a foundation for the moral law. However, in the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant claims that our awareness of our freedom depends on our awareness of the moral law. I argue that the apparent conflict between the two texts depends on a reading of the opening paragraphs of Grou…Read more
  •  354
  •  57
    Review of J. David Velleman, Self to Self: Selected Essays (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (8). 2007.
  •  563
    Direction of Fit and Motivational Cognitivism
    In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Oxford University Press. pp. 235-64. 2006.
    The idea of direction of fit has been found appealing by many philosophers. Anscombe’s famous examples have persuaded many of us that there must be some deep difference between belief and desire that is captured by the metaphor of direction of fit. Most of the aim of the paper is to try to get clear on which intuitions Anscombe’s example taps into. My view is that there is more than one intuition in play here, and I will try to show that various distinctions and points are confused in the litera…Read more
  •  29
    Foreword
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5-6): 561-561. 2015.
  •  802
    Minimalism about Intention: A Modest Defense
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (3): 384-411. 2014.
    Inquiry, Volume 57, Issue 3, Page 384-411, June 2014