Robert Noggle

In this unique volume, some of today's most eminent political philosophers examine the thought of John Rawls, focusing in particular on his most recent work. These original essays explore diverse issues, including the problem of pluralism, the relationship between constitutive commitment and liberal institutions, just treatment of dissident minorities, the constitutional implications of liberalism, international relations, and the structure of international law. The first comprehensive study of Rawls's recent work, The Idea of Political Liberalism will be indispensable for political philosophers and theorists interested in contemporary political thought

A person enters the moral realm when she affirms that other persons matter in the same way that she does. This, of course, is just the beginning, for she must then determine what follows from this affirmation. One way in which we treat other persons as mattering is by respecting them. And one way in which we respect persons is by respecting their wishes, desires, decisions, choices, ends, and goals. I will call all of these things ‘aims.’ Sometimes we respect another person's aims simply byrefrainingfrom doing certain things, such as treating her in ways that thwart her aims, or interfering with her attempt to pursue them. Other times we respect a person's aims by taking positive action to help her pursue them.But how exactly does respect forpersonstranslate into respect for theiraims?And which aims merit respect? One answer comes from Kant.

Intuitionism—in some form or another—is the most widely recognized and thoroughly discussed method of justification for moral theories. It rests on the claim that a moral theory must not deviate too much from our pre-theoretical moral convictions. In some form or another, this methodology goes back at least as far as Aristotle, and has been discussed, refined, and defended by such contemporary philosophers as John Rawls and Norman Daniels.There is, however, another methodology for constructing and defending moral theories. It draws on premises about human nature or the nature of persons to support conclusions about the nature and structure of morality. This method—which I will call thenature to morality methodology—evaluates a moral claim or moral theory on the basis of its relation to some facts about the kind of beings we are. For brevity, I will use the term ‘nature-claims’ to refer to claims about human nature or the nature of persons, and the term ‘nature-facts’ to refer to true nature-claims. The nature-claims that have been used to support or criticize various moral theories include claims about human motivation, personal identity, the human soul, and the conceptual features of personhood or rational agency.

Several ethical and political theories favor the satisfaction of self-regarding desires. Desire theories of welfare say that their satisfaction creates welfare. Liberalism says that the state must allow the satisfaction of these desires. This pro-desire stance is plausible because the goal of satisfying self-regarding desires seems attractive. A challenge for pro-desire theories is that the satisfaction of certain self-regarding desires is not attractive. These desires seem to be in some sense "alien" to the self. Examples are desires associated with addictions, psychological compulsions, and psychological conditioning. Their satisfaction does not seem to be an attractive goal, yet pro-desire theories seem committed to favoring their satisfaction. I examine analyses of alien desires suggested by the literature and argue that none of them provides an adequate solution to this problem. I suggest that alien desires are desires that would be rational if the person believed something that in fact she believes is false. Such desires could be produced by a mental representation--other than a belief--with a content that conflicted with the content of one's beliefs. It turns out that we must postulate belief-like mental representations, or quasi-beliefs, to explain important empirical facts about our behavior. Alien desires involve quasi-beliefs with contents that conflict with the contents of beliefs. This theory provides the distinction between alien and authentic desires that pro-desire theories need.