•  94
    Wanted Dead or Alive: Two Attempts to Solve Schrodinger's Paradox
    PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990 277-285. 1990.
    We discuss two recent attempts two solve Schrodinger's cat paradox. One is the modal interpretation developed by Kochen, Healey, Dieks, and van Fraassen. It allows for an observable which pertains to a system to possess a value even when the system is not in an eigenstate of that observable. The other is a recent theory of the collapse of the wave function due to Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber. It posits a dynamics which has the effect of collapsing the state of macroscopic systems. We argue that t…Read more
  •  93
    Dyadic deontic detachment
    Synthese 54 (2). 1983.
  •  87
  •  78
    The truth pays
    Synthese 43 (3). 1980.
    Why is truth valuable? Why are true beliefs generally preferable to false beliefs and why should we often be willing to expend energy and resources to obtain the truth? Pragmatist theories of truth, whatever their shortcomings, are the only ones which attempt to answer these questions. According to James’ version of the pragmatic theory.
  •  77
    A companion to David Lewis (edited book)
    Wiley-Blackwell. 2015.
    In _A Companion to David Lewis_, Barry Loewer and Jonathan Schaffer bring together top philosophers to explain, discuss, and critically extend Lewis's seminal work in original ways. Students and scholars will discover the underlying themes and complex interconnections woven through the diverse range of his work in metaphysics, philosophy of language, logic, epistemology, philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, ethics, and aesthetics. The first and only comprehensive study of the work of David…Read more
  •  76
    Leibniz and the ontological argument
    Philosophical Studies 34 (1). 1978.
    According to leibniz, Descartes' ontological argument establishes that if God possibly exists then God exists. To complete the argument a proof that God possibly exists is required. Leibniz attempts a proof-Theoretic demonstration that 'god exists' is consistent and concludes from this that 'god possibly exists is true'. In this paper I formalize leibniz's argument in a system of modal logic. I show that a principle which leibniz implicitly uses, 'if a is consistent then a is possibly true' is e…Read more
  •  70
    Translational semantics
    Synthese 48 (1). 1981.
  •  67
  •  58
  •  58
    What is wrong with 'wrongful life' cases?
    Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 10 (2): 127-146. 1985.
    torts raise a number of interesting and perplexing philosophical issues. In a suit for ‘wrongful life’, the plaintiff (usually an infant) brings an action (usually against a physician) claiming that some negligent action has caused the plaintiff's life, say by not informing the parents of the likely prospect that their child would be born with severe defects. The most perplexing feature of this is that the plaintiff is claiming that he would have been better off if he had never been born. A numb…Read more
  •  58
    Editorial introduction
    with Terry M. Goode, Roger D. Rosenkrantz, and John R. Wettersten
    Synthese 30 (1-2): 1-1. 1975.
  •  56
    Three Trivial Truth Theories
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 13 (3). 1983.
    According to Tarski, a theory of truth for a language L is a theory which logically implies for each sentence S of L a sentence of the form:S is true-in-L if and only if p,where rS1 is replaced by a canonical description of a sentence of L and rp1 is replaced by that sentence if L is contained in the metalanguage or by a translation of S if it is not so contained. Tarski constructed consistent and finitely axiomatized theories of truth for various formal languages and showed how to explicitly de…Read more
  •  54
    Humean laws and explanation
    Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 23 (3): 373-385. 2019.
    My primary focus in this paper is on an objection to Humean account of laws and specifically to David Lewis’ “best systems analysis” (BSA). The objection is that the laws according to the BSA (which I call L-laws) fail to account for the ability of laws to explain. In contrast governing laws (which I will call G-laws) are alleged to account for the role of laws in scientific explanations by virtue of their governing role. If governing is required for laws to be explanatory then Humean accounts l…Read more
  •  54
    A Putnam's Progress
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12 (1): 459-473. 1988.
  •  51
    Comments on Joseph Agassi
    Synthese 30 (1-2). 1975.
  •  51
    Help for the good samaritan paradox
    Philosophical Studies 50 (1). 1986.
  •  50
    Understanding Scientific Reasoning (review)
    Teaching Philosophy 6 (2): 177-181. 1983.
  •  40
    Absolute obligations and ordered worlds
    Philosophical Studies 72 (1). 1993.
  •  40
    Knowledge and the Flow of Information
    Philosophy of Science 49 (2): 297-300. 1982.
  •  35
    Information and belief
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1): 75-76. 1983.
  •  31
    Newton, the sensorium of God, and the cause of gravity
    with John Henry
    Science in Context 33 (3): 329-351. 2020.
    ArgumentIt is argued that the sensorium of God was introduced into theQuaestionesadded to the end of Newton’sOptice(1706) as a way of answering objections that Newton had failed to provide a causal account of gravity in thePrincipia. The discussion of God’s sensorium indicated that gravity must be caused by God’s will. Newton did not leave it there, however, but went on to show how God’s will created active principles as secondary causes of gravity. There was nothing unusual in assuming that God…Read more
  •  30
    An argument for strong supervenience
    In Elias E. Savellos & Ümit D. Yalçin (eds.), Supervenience: New Essays, Cambridge University Press. pp. 218--225. 1995.
  •  29
    Probability and Typicality in Statistical Mechanics
    In Angelo Bassi, Sheldon Goldstein, Roderich Tumulka & Nino Zanghi (eds.), Physics and the Nature of Reality: Essays in Memory of Detlef Dürr, Springer. pp. 423-430. 2024.
    Detlef Dürr was inspirational to many who write about issues in the philosophical foundations of physics and probability. For many years I have been interested in his work on statistical mechanics and Bohmian mechanics and especially by the role of typicality in these theories. In my contribution I will say a few words comparing typicality and probability approaches to statistical mechanics and ask whether the approaches are friends or foes.