•  18
    Perceiving reasons?
    Iride: Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica 25 (1): 119-134. 2012.
    The paper analyses the discussion in the last decades on whether perceptions can, as such, justify empirical beliefs, and develops it along two fundamental lines: the nature of perceptual content and the nature of the justifications in play. Starting with Sellars' attack on the «Myth of the given», it examines Davidson's, McDowell's, Peacocke's and Burge's positions. On the one hand, it contends that also creatures that aren't endowed with the relevant concepts can have genuine perceptions; on t…Read more
  •  14
    Does scepticism threaten our common sense picture of the world? Does it really undermine our deep-rooted certainties? Answers to these questions are offered through a comparative study of the epistemological work of two key figures in the history of analytic philosophy, G. E. Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein.
  •  153
    In the contemporary expanding literature on transmission failure and its connections with issues such as the Closure principle, the nature of perceptual warrant, Moore’s proof of an external world and the effectiveness of Humean scepticism, it has often been assumed that there is just one kind of it: the one made familiar by the writings of Crispin Wright and Martin Davies. Although it might be thought that one kind of failure is more than enough, Davies has recently challenged this view: appare…Read more
  •  99
    Human diagrammatic reasoning and seeing-as
    Synthese 186 (1): 121-148. 2012.
    The paper addresses the issue of human diagrammatic reasoning in the context of Euclidean geometry. It develops several philosophical categories which are useful for a description and an analysis of our experience while reasoning with diagrams. In particular, it draws the attention to the role of seeing-as; it analyzes its implications for proofs in Euclidean geometry and ventures the hypothesis that geometrical judgments are analytic and a priori, after all
  •  83
    Stopping points: ‘I’, immunity and the real guarantee
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (3): 233-252. 2017.
    The aim of the paper is to bring out exactly what makes first-personal contents special, by showing that they perform a distinctive cognitive function. Namely, they are stopping points of inquiry. First, I articulate this idea and then I use it to clear the ground from a troublesome conflation. That is, the conflation of this particular function all first-person thoughts have with the property of immunity to error through misidentification, which only some I-thoughts enjoy. Afterward, I show the…Read more
  •  50
  •  13
    Origins of Objectivity di Tyler Burge
    Iride: Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica 26 (1): 183-200. 2013.
  •  1
    Wittgenstein Today (edited book)
    with Eva Picardi
    Il poligrafo. 2004.
  •  281
    The paradox of Moore's proof of an external world
    Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231). 2008.
    Moore's proof of an external world is a piece of reasoning whose premises, in context, are true and warranted and whose conclusion is perfectly acceptable, and yet immediately seems flawed. I argue that neither Wright's nor Pryor's readings of the proof can explain this paradox. Rather, one must take the proof as responding to a sceptical challenge to our right to claim to have warrant for our ordinary empirical beliefs, either for any particular empirical belief we might have, or for belief in …Read more
  •  65
    Self-Knowledge for Humans (review)
    Analysis 76 (2): 246-252. 2016.
  •  101
    Peacocke's self-knowledge
    Ratio 21 (1). 2008.
    knowledge. His proposal relies on the claim that first-order mental..
  •  152
    Moore's Proof And Martin Davies's Epistemic Projects
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1): 101-116. 2010.
    In the recent literature on Moore's Proof of an external world, it has emerged that different diagnoses of the argument's failure are prima facie defensible. As a result, there is a sense that the appropriateness of the different verdicts on it may depend on variation in the kinds of context in which the argument is taken to be a move, with different characteristic aims. In this spirit, Martin Davies has recently explored the use of the argument within two different epistemic projects called res…Read more
  •  169
    Which Hinge Epistemology?
    International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (2-3): 79-96. 2016.
    _ Source: _Volume 6, Issue 2-3, pp 79 - 96 The paper explores the idea of a “hinge epistemology,” considered as a theory about justification which gives center-stage to Wittgenstein’s notion of _hinges_. First, some basic methodological considerations regarding the relationship between merely exegetical work on Wittgenstein’s texts and more theoretically committed work are put forward. Then, the main problems raised in _On Certainty_ and the most influential interpretative lines it has given ris…Read more
  •  134
    How to Commit Moore’s Paradox
    Journal of Philosophy 112 (4): 169-192. 2015.
    Moore’s paradox is taken to be emblematic of peculiarities in the first person point of view, and to have significant implications for several issues in epistemology, in philosophy of language and mind. Yet, its nature remains elusive. In the first part of the paper, the main kinds of analysis of it hereto proposed in the literature are criticized. Furthermore, it is claimed that there are cases in which its content can be legitimately judged. Close inspection of those cases reveals that they de…Read more
  •  29
    Tyler Burge's Origins of Objectivity
    Iride: Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica 26 (1): 183-200. 2013.
  •  244
    Self-knowledge and commitments
    Synthese 171 (3). 2009.
    In this paper I provide an outline of a new kind of constitutive account of self-knowledge. It is argued that in order for the model properly to explain transparency, a further category of propositional attitudes—called “commitments”—has to be countenanced. It is also maintained that constitutive theories can’t remain neutral on the issue of the possession of psychological concepts, and a proposal about the possession of the concept of belief is sketched. Finally, it is claimed that in order for…Read more
  •  5
    On the Ontology of Human Embodiment
    Ratio (Misc.) 21 (1): 13-27. 1979.
  •  184
    Was Wittgenstein an epistemic relativist?
    Philosophical Investigations 33 (1): 1-23. 2010.
    The paper reviews the grounds for relativist interpretations of Wittgenstein's later thought, especially in On Certainty . It distinguishes between factual and virtual forms of epistemic relativism and argues that, on closer inspection, Wittgenstein's notes don't support any form of relativism – let it be factual or virtual. In passing, it considers also so-called "naturalist" readings of On Certainty , which may lend support to a relativist interpretation of Wittgenstein's ideas, finds them wan…Read more
  •  94
    Jordi Fernández. Transparent Minds. A Study of Self-Knowledge (review)
    Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 29 (3): 442-445. 2014.
  •  91
    Moore’s proof of an external world is a piece of reasoning whose premises, in context, are true and warranted and whose conclusion is perfectly acceptable, and yet immediately seems flawed. I argue that neither Wright’s nor Pryor’s readings of the proof can explain this paradox. Rather, one must take the proof as responding to a sceptical challenge to our right to claim to have warrant for our ordinary empirical beliefs, either for any particular empirical belief we might have, or for belief in …Read more
  • Filosofia Analitica: Temi E Problemi (edited book)
    Carocci. 2007.
  •  38
    Replies
    Philosophia 41 (1): 81-96. 2013.
  •  163
    In the last few years there has been a resurgence of interest in Moore’s Proof of the existence of an external world, which is now often rendered as follows:1 (I) Here’s a hand (II) If there is a hand here, there is an external world Therefore (III) There is an external world The contemporary debate has been mostly triggered by Crispin Wright’s influential—conservative —“Facts and certainty” and further fostered by Jim Pryor’s recent—liberal—“What’s wrong with Moore’s argument?”.2 This debate is…Read more
  •  72
    It is a striking feature of philosophical reflection on the self that it often ends up being revisionary of our commonsensical intuition that it is identical to a living human being with, intrinsically, physical and psychological properties. As is well known, Descartes identified the self with a mental entity, Hume denied the existence of such an entity and Kant reduced it to a transcendental ego—to a mere condition of possibility for experience and thought. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein follow…Read more
  •  57
    How to perceive reasons
    Episteme 13 (1): 77-88. 2016.
    This paper deals with the question whether, and to what extent, perceptions can provide a justification for our empirical beliefs. In particular, it addresses the issue of whether they need to be conceptualized by a subject in order to play a justificatory role. It is argued that the conditions under which a subject can have perceptual representational contents and those under which those representational contents can play a justificatory role differ. The upshot is that perception can provide ju…Read more
  •  59
    On What There Really Is to Our Notion of Ownership of a Thought
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (1): 41-46. 2002.