Robert Pippin

ABSTRACT Nietzsche's texts invite perplexing questions about the justification and objectivity of his ethical views. According to the interpretation suggested here, Nietzsche does not advance a substantive normative ethics, but proposes, based on his ontological idea of will to power, an instrumentalist theory of value. He is not a realist about value—according to him, nothing is intrinsically valuable. However, things, actions, beliefs, and values can be evaluated with reference to their capacities in serving our fundamental quest for power. The central advantage of this interpretation against competing readings is that it attempts to make sense of how an “objective” evaluation fits together with antirealism or nihilism about value, including how the “ethics” of will to power is to be understood alongside the metaphysical and ethical doctrine of eternal recurrence.

The project defended in this article is a forty-plus year attempt to argue for the continuing philosophical importance of the positions in theoretical and practical and aesthetic philosophy defended in what has come to be known as ‘German Idealism’ (or ‘post-Kantian German philosophy.’) For the most part this has concerned Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and the relations among them, with most of the attention focused on Hegel. The Hegel interpretation has been criticized for its claim about the influence of Kant on Hegel’s account of apperceptive judgment, for the nature of the idealism ascribed to Hegel, and for the Kantian-Hegelian insistence on the autonomy and self-grounding authority of pure reason. The interpretation of Hegel’s practical philosophy has been criticized for defending an excessively social theory of agency, and the theory of modernization ascribed to Hegel has been criticized for claiming that philosophy could and should have a historically diagnostic task. The interpretation of Hegel’s theory of art argues that elements of Hegel’s basic philosophical position puts one in the best position to understand the meaning and importance of post-Hegelian pictorial modernism, that his general approach can be of great value in understanding his claim that great art had become ‘a thing of the past.’ A clarification of these positions, and a brief case for their philosophical importance comprises the substance of this recapitulation.

Any interpretation of Hegel which stresses both his deep dependence on and radical revision of Kant must account for the nature of the difference between what Hegel calls a merely finite idealism and a so-called ’Absolute Idealism’. Such a clarification in turn depends on understanding Hegel’s claim to have preserved the distinguishability of intuition and concept, but to have insisted on their inseparability, or, to have defended their ’organic’ rather than ’mechanical’ relation. This is the main issue in this chapter, which invokes John McDowell’s notion of ’the unboundedness of the conceptual’ to clarify the issue, as well as noting a number of similar claims in Wittgenstein. The implications of Hegel’s view for the issues of metaphysics generally is explored.

In this latest book, renowned philosopher and scholar Robert B. Pippin offers the thought-provoking argument that the study of historical figures is not only an interpretation and explication of their views, but can be understood as a form of philosophy itself. In doing so, he reconceives philosophical scholarship as a kind of network of philosophical interanimations, one in which major positions in the history of philosophy, when they are themselves properly understood within their own historical context, form philosophy’s lingua franca. Examining a number of philosophers to explore the nature of this interanimation, he presents an illuminating assortment of especially thoughtful examples of historical commentary that powerfully enact philosophy. After opening up his territory with an initial discussion of contemporary revisionist readings of Kant’s moral theory, Pippin sets his sights on his main objects of interest: Hegel and Nietzsche. Through them, however, he offers what few others could: an astonishing synthesis of an immense and diverse set of thinkers and traditions. Deploying an almost dialogical, conversational approach, he pursues patterns of thought that both shape and, importantly, connect the major traditions: neo-Aristotelian, analytic, continental, and postmodern, bringing the likes of Heidegger, Honneth, MacIntyre, McDowell, Brandom, Strauss, Williams, and Žižek—not to mention Hegel and Nietzsche— into the same philosophical conversation. By means of these case studies, Pippin mounts an impressive argument about a relatively under discussed issue in professional philosophy—the bearing of work in the history of philosophy on philosophy itself—and thereby he argues for the controversial thesis that no strict separation between the domains is defensible.