Robert Pippin

There is an unusual link between the two most prominent themes in Proust’s In Search of Time Past: the psychological dimensions of love and the experience of lived temporality. Each experience is shadowed by, and intensified by, even seems to require, absence. The absence of the beloved is the source of jealousy, and that experience is treated as inseparable, and sometimes as indistinguishable, from love itself. And the absence of reliable access to the past, or the vanishing of the past into a realm of fantasy and projection, undermines any confidence in our mutual interpretability. At the extreme, jealousy is depicted as sustaining a love all by itself, something captured in Swann’s famous, puzzling closing statement at the end of the “Swann in Love” section of the first novel: “To think that I have wasted years of my life, that I’ve longed to die, that I have experienced my greatest love, for a woman who didn’t appeal to me, who wasn’t even my type.” The aim of this paper is to understand the dynamic of presence and absence, its role in the link between these two themes, and thereby to understand such a claim as much more than a singular character’s expression of a neurotic obsession.

Robert Pippin presents here the first detailed interpretation of J.M. Coetzee's "Jesus" trilogy as a whole. Pippin treats the three fictions as a philosophical fable. Everyone in the mythical land explored by Coetzee is an exile, removed from their homeland and transported to a strange new place. While discussing the social and psychological dimensions of the fable, Pippin also treats the literary aspects of the fictions as philosophical explorations of theimplications of a deeper kind of homelessness--a version that characterizes late modern life itself--and he treats the theme of forgetting as a figure for modern historical amnesia and indifference to reflection and self-knowledge.

Forthcoming in Conference Proceedings, Jena Phänomenologie conference I Hegels Charakterisierungen der neuen, von ihm entwickelten philosophischen Form, der Phänomenologie des Geistes, stellen vor allem deswegen ein Problem dar, weil sie so zahlreich sind. Bei einigen handelt es sich um klar erkennbare Reformulierungen oder Spezifizierungen anderer, in vielen Fällen aber scheinen die Beschreibungen inkonsistent zu sein oder unterschiedliche Perioden in Hegels Denken widerzuspiegeln, das sich während der Jenaer Zeit zwischen 1802 und 1806 rasch entwickelte. Ursprünglich war eine Phänomenologie eine „Wissenschaft der Erfahrung des Bewußtseins“. Sie ist auch eine „Wissenschaft der Phänomenologie des Geistes“. Sie stellt eine Einführung in das wissenschaftliche System dar und bildet zugleich den ersten Teil eines solchen Systems. Die Enzyklopädie bezeichnet die PhG als „die wissenschaftliche Geschichte des Bewußtseyns.“ Im Hauptteil nennt Hegel das Werk den „Weg der Seele, welche die Reihe ihrer Gestaltungen, als durch ihre Natur ihr vorgesteckter Stationen durchwandert, daß sie sich zum Geiste läutere, indem sie durch die vollständige Erfahrung ihrer selbst zur Kenntniß desjenigen gelangt, was sie an sich selbst ist” (55). Berühmt ist seine Bezeichnung der Phänomenologie als „Weg des Zweifels“, ja, als „Weg der Verzweiflung“, und als „ausführliche Geschichte der Bildung des Bewußtseyns selbst zur Wissenschafft“. (56).

ABSTRACT In this article, I discuss the legacy of Alexander Nehamas's 1985 book, Nietzsche: Life as Literature. I concentrate on his basic claim that “Nietzsche's model for the world, for objects, and for people turns out to be the literary text and its components; his model for our relation to the world turns out to be interpretation.” The criticisms of this notion that I raise have to do with whether this “model” accounts for the way Nietzsche understands self-knowledge and self-realization. I note as well the dangers of too aestheticized a view of Nietzsche's enterprise.

Bernard Williams once made the interesting point that both Wittgenstein and Nietzsche were trying to say something about what it might mean for philosophy to come to an end, for a culture to be cured of philosophy. He meant the end of philosophical theory, the idea that unaided human reason could contribute to knowledge about substance, being, our conceptual scheme, the highest values, the meaning of history or the way language works. For both Wittgenstein and Nietzsche there is no good or modest version of these attempts, any more than there are good and bad versions of astrology or alchemy. There is no such thing as philosophical theory and there never was[i]. Of course it has always been obvious that the status of the account that somehow makes this observation is immediately problematic, but Williams also noted that the case of Nietzsche was even more difficult than that of Wittgenstein.

In this pathbreaking book one of America’s most distinguished philosophers brilliantly explores the status and authority of law and the nature of political allegiance through close readings of three classic Hollywood Westerns: Howard Hawks’ _Red River_ and John Ford’s _The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance_ and _The Searchers._ Robert Pippin treats these films as sophisticated mythic accounts of a key moment in American history: its “second founding,” or the western expansion. His central question concerns how these films explore classical problems in political psychology, especially how the virtues of a commercial republic gained some hold on individuals at a time when the heroic and martial virtues were so important. Westerns, Pippin shows, raise central questions about the difference between private violence and revenge and the state’s claim to a legitimate monopoly on violence, and they show how these claims come to be experienced and accepted or rejected. Pippin’s account of the best Hollywood Westerns brings this genre into the center of the tradition of political thought, and his readings raise questions about political psychology and the political passions that have been neglected in contemporary political thought in favor of a limited concern with the question of legitimacy.

This important book argues that Henry James reveals in his fiction a sophisticated theory of moral understanding and moral motivation. The claim is that in his novels and short stories James is engaged in a distinctive kind of original thinking and reflecting on modern moral life. Sensitive to the precarious and extremely confusing situation of moral understanding in modern societies, James avoids skepticism and presents powerfully the full nature of moral claims and moral dependence. The book is written by one of the pre-eminent interpreters of the modern European philosophical tradition and will interest both philosophers and literary critics. However, the style is completely non-technical with no reliance on terms from contemporary literary or philosophical theory and will therefore be accessible to students and general readers of James.

Kant says there is a duty to exit the state of nature, to enter into a civil state. He says this is a duty of right, not a duty of virtue. The article discusses the argument he gives to support this view, as well as the contemporary discussion on the relationship between this duty of right and the categorical imperative. The discussion is full of implications. Particularly significant is the view of the Kantian state emerging from it, which challenges the conventional account: instead of a state designed to protect pre-existing individual property rights, property rights are seen as something resulting from the very constitution of the state.