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Fiona Macpherson

University of Glasgow
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  •  Publications
    62
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 More details
  • University of Glasgow
    Department of Philosophy
    Professor
University of Stirling
Law and Philosophy
PhD, 2000
Homepage
Glasgow, Glasgow City, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
0000-0002-4950-3309
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Consciousness
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Metaphysics of Mind
Mental States and Processes
Perception
Mental Imagery
Intentionality
Self-Knowledge
Knowledge of Consciousness
5 more
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Consciousness
Metaphysics of Mind
Perception
Mental States and Processes
Intentionality
Self-Knowledge
Knowledge of Consciousness
Epistemology
Aesthetics
Philosophy of Action
6 more
  • All publications (62)
  •  256
    Review of The Problem of Perception By A.D. Smith (review)
    Philosophical Books 45 (3): 255-257. 2004.
    Philosophy of Perception, GeneralDirect and Indirect PerceptionThe Nature of Perceptual Experience, …Read more
    Philosophy of Perception, GeneralDirect and Indirect PerceptionThe Nature of Perceptual Experience, MiscPerception and the Mind, MiscThe Causal Theory of PerceptionMoral States and ProcessesPhilosophy of Mind, Miscellaneous
  •  137
    Introduction: The Admissible Contents of Experience
    In The Admissible Contents of Experience, Wiley-blackwell. 2011.
    Forthcoming (2011) in K. Hawley and F. Macpherson (eds.) The Admissible Contents of Experience, Wiley‐Blackwell. The Admissible Contents of Experience Fiona Macpherson This essay provides an overview of the debate concerning the admissible contents of experience, together with an introduction to the papers in this volume. The debate is one that takes place among advocates of a certain way of thinking of perceptual experiences: that they are states that represent the world. For to say that…Read more
    Forthcoming (2011) in K. Hawley and F. Macpherson (eds.) The Admissible Contents of Experience, Wiley‐Blackwell. The Admissible Contents of Experience Fiona Macpherson This essay provides an overview of the debate concerning the admissible contents of experience, together with an introduction to the papers in this volume. The debate is one that takes place among advocates of a certain way of thinking of perceptual experiences: that they are states that represent the world. For to say that a state has content is to say that it represents; and its content is usually taken to be that which is represented. One should not be tempted to think that the debate is therefore marginal or esoteric, for this view of perceptual experience has been by far the dominant view of perceptual experience in recent years in philosophy (and in psychology and neuroscience). The debate is about what answer to give to a fundamental question about the nature of perceptual experience, namely: what objects and properties can it represent?
    The Nature of ContentsThe Contents of Perception, Misc
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