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57Indefinite probability statementsSynthese 26 (2). 1973.Indefinite probability statements can be analysed in terms of statements which attribute probability to propositions. Therefore, there is no need to find a special place in probability theory for them; once we have an adequate account of statements that straightforwardly attribute probability to propositions, we will automatically have an adequate account of indefinite probability statements
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7Reply to a responsePhilosophy of Science 37 (3): 449-451. 1970.While disagreeing with some of the detail of my argument in [2] F. John Clendinnen accepts its conclusion, namely, that the vindication he proposed in [1] fails. I will thus confine myself to saying, very briefly, why I think the new vindication of induction that he sketches in [3] also fails.
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21A reply to "induction and objectivity"Philosophy of Science 37 (3): 440-443. 1970.In “Induction and Objectivity” [1], F. John Clendinnen puts forwards a vindication of induction. I wish to argue that the vindication fails. As Clendinnen's argument is complex and presents certain difficulties it is necessary and only fair to quote his summary of it.“I shall attempt to vindicate induction by showing that it is the only possible way of predicting that is objective, and further that, while objectivity is not a necessary condition for success in predicting, objective methods are t…Read more
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13Propositions and probabilityAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3). 1970.This Article does not have an abstract
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70A note on incorrigibility and authorityAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 45 (3): 358-363. 1967.This Article does not have an abstract
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28Viii notes on contributors Alvin Goldman is Board of Governors Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science at Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey. His principal research areas are episte-mology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science. His most recent book is Simulating Minds (2006) (review)In Michael Bishop & Dominic Murphy (eds.), Stich and His Critics, Blackwell. 2009.
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303Perception: A Representative TheoryCambridge University Press. 1977.What is the nature of, and what is the relationship between, external objects and our visual perceptual experience of them? In this book, Frank Jackson defends the answers provided by the traditional Representative theory of perception. He argues, among other things that we are never immediately aware of external objects, that they are the causes of our perceptual experiences and that they have only the primary qualities. In the course of the argument, sense data and the distinction between medi…Read more
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180Is there a good argument against the incorrigibility thesis?Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51 (1): 51-62. 1973."the incorrigibility thesis", The thesis that it is logically impossible to be mistaken about such things as whether I am now in pain or am seeing or seeming to see something red, Is very widely supposed to be false. I consider the arguments designed to show this, And argue that they all fail
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290The teleological theory of contentAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (4): 474-89. 1997.This Article does not have an abstract
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121Philosophy of Mind and Cognition: An IntroductionWiley-Blackwell. 1996.David Braddon-Mitchell and Frank Jackson’s popular introduction to philosophy of mind and cognition is now available in a fully revised and updated edition. Ensures that the most recent developments in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science are brought together into a coherent, accessible whole. Revisions respond to feedback from students and teachers and make the volume even more useful for courses. New material includes: a section on Descartes’ famous objection to materialism; extended t…Read more
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117A pyrrhic victory for teleonomyAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (3): 372-77. 2002.This Article does not have an abstract
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85The Divide and Conquer Path to Analytical FunctionalismPhilosophical Topics 26 (1-2): 71-88. 1999.
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697The Philosophy of Mind and Cognition: An IntroductionBlackwell. 1996.David Braddon-Mitchell and Frank Jackson’s popular introduction to philosophy of mind and cognition is now available in a fully revised and updated edition. Ensures that the most recent developments in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science are brought together into a coherent, accessible whole. Revisions respond to feedback from students and teachers and make the volume even more useful for courses. New material includes: a section on Descartes’ famous objection to materialism; extended t…Read more
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492Philosophy of Mind and CognitionBlackwell. 1996.The philosophy of mind and cognition has been transformed by recent advances in what is loosely called cognitive science. This book is a thoroughly up-to-date introduction to and account of that transformation, in which the many strands in contemporary cognitive science are brought together into a coherent philosophical picture of the mind. The book begins with discussions of the pre-history of contemporary philosophy of mind - dualism, behaviourism, and early versions of the identity theory of …Read more
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79Mind, morality, and explanation: selected collaborationsOxford University Press. 2004.Frank Jackson, Philip Pettit, and Michael Smith have been at the forefront of philosophy in Australia for much of the last two decades, and their collaborative work has had widespread influence throughout the world. Mind, Morality, and Explanation collects the best of that work in a single volume, showcasing their seminal contributions to philosophical psychology, the theory of psychological and social explanation, moral theory, and moral psychology.
Acton, Australian Capital Territory, Australia