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251Well-Being as Fitting HappinessIn Christopher Howard & Richard Rowland (eds.), Fittingness, Oxford University Press. pp. 267-289. 2022.There is an intuitive connection between well-being and happiness. Accordingly, many theories of well-being hold that well-being consists in (either unqualified or properly qualified) happiness. Traditional happiness-based theories are subject, however, to several important objections. The goal in this chapter is to offer a new happiness-based theory that is immune to the main objections raised against traditional happiness-based theories. The authors’ own fitting happiness theory of well-being …Read more
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242Virtue, Happiness, and WellbeingThe Monist 99 (2): 112-127. 2016.What is the relation between virtue and wellbeing? Our claim is that, under certain conditions, virtue necessarily tends to have a positive impact on an individual’s wellbeing. This is so because of the connection between virtue and psychological happiness, on the one hand, and between psychological happiness and wellbeing, on the other hand. In particular we defend three claims: that virtue is constituted by a disposition to experience fitting emotions, that fitting emotions are constituents of…Read more
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212Mais où va l'éthique fondamentale ? IntroductionLes ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 7 (3): 89-91. 2012.
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194Truth pluralism and many-valued logics: A reply to BeallPhilosophical Quarterly 50 (200): 382-385. 2000.Mixed inferences are a problem for those who want to combine truth-assessability and antirealism with respect to allegedly nondescriptive sentences: the classical account of validity has apparently to be given up. J.C. Beall's response is that validity can be defined as the conservation of designated valued (Beall 2000). I argue that since it presupposes a truth predicate that can be applied to all sentences, this suggestion is not helpful. I also consider problems arising from mixed conjunction…Read more
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156Emotion, motivation and action: The case of fearIn Goldie Peter (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion, . pp. 325-45. 2010.Consider a typical fear episode. You are strolling down a lonely mountain lane when suddenly a huge wolf leaps towards you. A number of different interconnected elements are involved in the fear you experience. First, there is the visual and auditory perception of the wild animal and its movements. In addition, it is likely that given what you see, you may implicitly and inarticulately appraise the situation as acutely threatening. Then, there are a number of physiological changes, involving a v…Read more
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146Reasons and EmotionsIn Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, Oxford University Press. 2018.
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140Through thick and thin: good and its determinatesDialectica 58 (2): 207-221. 2004.What is the relation between the concept good and more specific or ‘thick’ concepts such as admirable or courageous? I argue that good or more precisely good pro tanto is a general concept, but that the relation between good pro tanto and the more specific concepts is not that of a genus to its species. The relation of an important class of specific evaluative concepts, which I call ‘affective concepts’, to good pro tanto is better understood as one between a determinable and its determinates, w…Read more
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136The modularity of emotions (edited book)University of Calgary Press. 2008.Can emotions be rational or are they necessarily irrational? Are emotions universally shared states? Or are they socio-cultural constructions? Are emotions perceptions of some kind? Since the publication of Jerry Fodor’s The Modularity of Mind (1983), a new question about the philosophy of emotions has emerged: are emotions modular? A positive answer to this question would mean, minimally, that emotions are cognitive capacities that can be explained in terms of mental components that are functio…Read more
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129Truth as One and Many, by Michael P. Lynch.: Book Reviews (review)Mind 119 (476): 1193-1198. 2010.For someone who is inclined towards truth monism and moral realism, reading this book is like journeying through a foreign country: somewhat disconcerting, but nonetheless enjoyable. Michael Lynch’s world is a stoutly naturalistic world, in which representation is conceived in terms of causal or teleological relations. This is a world in which it is hard to fit normative facts. Thus, the reader is told that there are good reasons to think that ‘moral properties, should they exist, would not be t…Read more
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107Philosophical Perspectives on Negative Emotions: Shadows of the SoulRoutledge. 2011.Negative emotions are familiar enough, but they have rarely been a topic of study in their own right. This volume brings together fourteen chapters on negative emotions, written in a highly accessible style for non-specialists and specialists alike. It starts with chapters on general issues raised by negative emotions, such as the nature of valence, the theoretical implications of nasty emotions, the role of negative emotions in fiction, as well as the puzzles raised by ambivalent and mixed emot…Read more
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107Evaluative vs. Deontic ConceptsIn Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Wiley. pp. 1791-99. 2022.Ethical thought is articulated around normative concepts. Standard examples of normative concepts are good, reason, right, ought, and obligatory. Theorists often treat the normative as an undifferentiated domain. Even so, it is common to distinguish between two kinds of normative concepts: evaluative or axiological concepts, such as good, and deontic concepts, such as ought. This encyclopedia entry discusses the many differences between the two kinds of concepts.
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99La philosophie de la normativité ou comment tenter de faire un peu d’ordreDialogue 50 (2): 239-246. 2011.Cette introduction à une collection d'articles sur la normativité propose d'adopter les divisions trouvées habituellement en éthique pour aborder la normativité. Ainsi, il semble utile de diviser les questions en cinq groupes: l'ontologie normative, la sémantique normative, l'épistémologie normative, la psychologie normative, et finalement, les questions normatives substantielles.
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95Values and Emotions: Neo-Sentimentalism's ProspectsIn Carla Bagnoli (ed.), Morality and the Emotions, Oxford University Press. 2011.Neo-sentmentalism is the view that to judge that something has an evaluative property is to judge that some affective or emotional response is appropriate with respect to it. The difficulty in assessing neo-sentimentalism is that it allows for radically different versions. My aim is to spell out what I take to be its most plausible version. I distinguish between a normative version, which takes the concepts of appropriateness to be normative, and a descriptive version, which claims that appropri…Read more
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81Procrastination and personal identityIn Andreou Chrisoula & Marck D. White (eds.), The Thief of Time. Philosophical Essays on Procrastination, Oxford University Press. pp. 115-29. 2010.The special concern we have for our future selves is often seen as making for a problem for psychological continuity theories, such as Derek Parfit's. On the basis of an account of the various kinds of procrastination, and of the ways imprudent procrastination involves harm to future selves, the paper argues that procrastinators often impose an uncompensated burden on their future selves, something that is best explained by a lack of concern for their future selves. Given this, the objections to…Read more
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76Desires and Practical Judgments in Action: Sergio Tenenbaum’s Scholastic ViewDialogue 48 (2): 395. 2009.In his book Appearances of the Good, Sergio Tenenbaum has offered an impressive new defence of a classical account of practical reason, which marks him as heir to a philosophical tradition going back to Aristotle and Kant or, more recently, to Anscombe and Davidson. This account has come under heavy attack in the past twenty years, and it would be no exaggeration to say that it is now a minority view. This is at least so if one counts the number of living philosophers who deny that strict akrati…Read more
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75Précis of Emotions, Values, and AgencyPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2): 494-499. 2018.
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68Neo-Sentimentalism's ProspectsIn Carla Bagnoli (ed.), Morality and the Emotions, Oxford University Press. pp. 117. 2011.Neo-sentimentalism is the view that to judge that something has an evaluative property is to judge that some affective or emotional response is appropriate with respect to it. The difficulty in assessing neo-sentimentalism is that it allows for radically different versions. My aim is to spell out what I take to be its most plausible version. I distinguish between a normative version, which takes the concept of appropriateness to be normative, and a descriptive version, which claims that appropri…Read more
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61Émotions et ValeursPresses Universitaires de France. 2000.Pour contrer le scepticisme au sujet de la connaissance des valeurs, la plupart soutiennent avec John Rawls qu’une croyance comme celle qu’une action est bonne est justifiée dans la mesure où elle appartient à un ensemble de croyances cohérent, ayant atteint un équilibre réfléchi. Christine Tappolet s’inspire des travaux de Max Scheler et d’Alexius von Meinong pour défendre une conception opposée au cohérentisme. La connaissance des valeurs est affirmée dépendre de nos émotions, ces dernières ét…Read more
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58Philosophy and the Good Life: Reason and the Passions in Greek, Cartesian and Psychoanalytic EthicsMind 111 (441): 92-95. 2002.A critical review of John Cottingham's "Philosophy and the Good Life: Reason and the Passions in Greek, cartesian, and psychoanalytic ethics" Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998.
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56La procrastination est-elle possible? Procrastination, souci de soi et identité personnelleRÉPHA, revue étudiante de philosophie analytique 7 13-43. 2013.
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54Les ombres de l'âme: Penser les émotions négatives (edited book)Markus Haller. 2011.Les émotions peuvent être pénibles, voire néfastes. Pensons par exemple à la peur, la colère, la haine, la jalousie ou au mépris. De telles émotions sont souvent qualifiées de négatives. Mais que sont les émotions négatives et comment se distinguent-elles des émotions positives ? Plus généralement, qu’impliquent-elles pour notre compréhension des émotions ? Et quels sont concrètement leurs effets sur nos pensées et nos vies ? De plus, comment analyser l’ambivalence affective, comme quand on ress…Read more
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53Faiblesse de la raison ou faiblesse de volonté: peut-on choisir?Dialogue 42 (4): 627-. 2003.This introduction consists in a historical overview of the debate about practical irrationality, as illustrated by weakness of will. After a brief reminder of the discussions after Davidson, we consider three important moments of the debate: the ancient debate from Socrates to Xenophon, the medieval debate from Augustine to Buridan, and the modern debate after Descartes. We suggest that it is useful to distinguish weakness of will (a failure to act as one wills) from so-called strict akrasia (a …Read more
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53Autonomy and the emotionsEuropean Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 (2): 45-59. 2006.C an actions caused by emotions be free and autonomous? The so-called rationalist conception of autonomy denies this. Only actions done in the light of reflexive choices can be autonomous and hence free. I argue that the rationalist conception does not make room for akratic actions, that is, free and intentional actions performed against the agent’s best judgement. I then develop an account inspired by Harry Frankfurt and David Shoemaker, according to which an action is autonomous when it is det…Read more
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52Music Alone. Philosophical Reflections on the Purely Musical Experience, by Peter Kivy (review)Mind 102 (406). 1993.A critical review of Peter Kivy's "Music Alone: Philosophical Reflections on the Purely Musical Experience" Cornelle, Cornell University Press, 1990.
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50The Receptive Theory: A New Theory of EmotionsPhilosophies 8 (6): 117. 2023.Cognitive Theories of emotions have enjoyed great popularity in recent times. Allegedly, the so-called Perceptual Theory constitutes the most attractive version of this approach. However, the Perceptual Theory has come under increasing pressure. There are at least two ways to deal with the barrage of objections, which have been mounted against the Perceptual Theory. One is to argue that the objections work only if one assumes an overly narrow conception of what perception consists in. On a bette…Read more
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46Long-term emotions and emotional experiences in the explanation of actionsEuropean Review of Philosophy 5 151-161. 2002.This paper consists in a critical review of Peter Goldie's book, The Emotion. A Philosophical Exploration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). Goldie is right to distinguish between long-term emotions and emotional experiences. And he is also right to reject the view that emotions are reducible to 'feelingless' states plus some extra feelings. However, Goldie's own account in terms of "feeling towards" is problematic. Goldie would have been better advised to claim that emotional experiences …Read more
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44Friendship and Partiality in EthicsLes ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 3 (1). 2008.Special volume on Friendship and Partiality. Christine Tappolet, Guest Editor.
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42Review: Emotion and Value. Edited by Sabine Roeser and Cain Todd (review)Analysis 77 (3): 675-678. 2017.© The Authors 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected] is widely accepted that emotions have something to do with values. The major task of contemporary philosophy of emotion is to say precisely what that something is. How exactly are emotions related to evaluative properties? Unsurprisingly, there are various ways they may be related. First, emotions might themselves be bearers …Read more
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35Shadows of the Soul: Philosophical Perspectives on Negative Emotions (edited book)Routledge. 2011.Negative emotions are familiar enough, but they have rarely been a topic of study in their own right. This volume brings together fourteen chapters on negative emotions, written in a highly accessible style for non-specialists and specialists alike. It starts with chapters on general issues raised by negative emotions, such as the nature of valence, the theoretical implications of nasty emotions, the role of negative emotions in fiction, as well as the puzzles raised by ambivalent and mixed emot…Read more