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37Shadows of the Soul: Philosophical Perspectives on Negative Emotions (edited book)Routledge. 2011.Negative emotions are familiar enough, but they have rarely been a topic of study in their own right. This volume brings together fourteen chapters on negative emotions, written in a highly accessible style for non-specialists and specialists alike. It starts with chapters on general issues raised by negative emotions, such as the nature of valence, the theoretical implications of nasty emotions, the role of negative emotions in fiction, as well as the puzzles raised by ambivalent and mixed emot…Read more
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35Value, Reasons, and OughtsIn Maria E. Reicher & Johan C. Marek (eds.), Experience and Analysis, The Proceedings of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium, Öbv&hpt. 2005.What’s the relation between values and reasons for action ? According to some all reasons are grounded in values. If one adds to this the thought that values themselves depend on non-evaluative or factual features of things, one gets what one can call after Jonathan Dancy the “layer-cake conception”. According to others, we should replace the layer-cake picture by what he calls the “buck-passing account of values” (Scanlon 1998). The main characteristic of this conception is that it denies that …Read more
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33Reply to Kurth, Crosby, and Basse’s review of Emotions, Values, and AgencyPhilosophical Psychology 31 (4): 500-504. 2018.In this reply, I argue that the worries raised by Kurth and this coauthors are not fatal for the perceptual theory of emotions. A first point to keep in mind in discussing the analogy argument in favor of that account is that what counts is the overall balance of similarities and differences, given their respective weight. In any case, I argue that none of the alleged differences between sensory perceptual experiences and emotions are such as to rule out that emotions are a kind of perceptual ex…Read more
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32Le droit au suicide assisté et à l'euthanasie: une question de respect de l'autonomie?Revue Philosophique De Louvain 101 (1): 43-57. 2003.The author maintains that the liberal argument advanced by Dworkin et al. implies a more general moral right, one that is not restricted to people in their terminal phase. The author then discusses Velleman's claim that this argument is subject to the following incoherence: invoking the idea that death is a benefit for a person implies that the person in question is endowed with a value that death would destroy. The author shows that the apparent plausibility of this counterargument is due to a …Read more
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28IntroductionIn Christine Tappolet, Fabrice Teroni & Anita Konzelmann Ziv (eds.), Shadows of the Soul: Philosophical Perspectives on Negative Emotions, Routledge. pp. 1-9. 2018.
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26Response-DependenceEuropean Review of Philosophy 3 227. 1998.Some concepts, such as colour concepts or value concepts, seem to bear traces of the mind's own make-up. For instance, the character of perceptually-determined colour concepts seems in some sense derivative from the character of the visual system. Thus, it has seemed plausible to claim that the corresponding colour properties are dispositions to elicit certain visual experiences in normal observers under suitable conditions. Much the same has been suggested for value concepts. An extreme positio…Read more
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21Philosophical Perspectives on Moral and Civic Education: Shaping Citizens and Their Schools (edited book)Routledge. 2019.Many people place great stock in the importance of civic virtue to the success of democratic communities. Is this hope well-grounded? The fundamental question is whether it is even possible to cultivate ethical and civic virtues in the first place. Taking for granted that it is possible, at least three further questions arise: What are the key elements of civic virtue? How should we cultivate these virtuous dispositions? And finally, how should schools be organized in order to make the education…Read more
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19Précis de Emotions, Values, and AgencyPhilosophiques 45 (2): 461-465. 2018.This is a summary of my 2016 book.
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16Review of "Balance and Refinement" (review)Mind 107. 1998.Review of Michael R. DePaul's "Balance and Refinement"
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12Price, Carolyn. Emotion. Cambridge: Polity, 2015. Pp. viii+199. $22.95Ethics 127 (4): 953-958. 2017.
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12Emotions, Reasons, and AutonomyIn Andrea Veltman & Mark C. Piper (eds.), Autonomy, Oppression and Gender, Oxford University Press. pp. 163-180. 2014.Personal autonomy is often taken to consist in self-government or self-determination. Personal autonomy thus seems to require self-control. However, there is reason to think that autonomy is compatible with the absence of self-control. Akratic action, i.e., action performed against the agent’s better judgement, can be free. And it is also plausible to think that free actions require autonomy. It is only when you determine what you do yourself that you act freely. It follows that akratic actions …Read more
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11Emotion and Virtue, by Gopal SreenivasanMind. forthcoming.What would a person look like if she were to possess a virtue like compassion or courage? This is the question that will come to mind when contemplating the hau.
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10Une Théorie du Bien-Être Comme Bonheur AppropriéLes Ateliers de l'Éthique / the Ethics Forum 17 112-125. 2022.Il existe un lien intuitif entre le bien-être et le bonheur. Nous souhaitons proposer une nouvelle théorie selon laquelle le bien-être consiste en un bonheur approprié. Notre théorie peut être considérée comme la combinaison de quatre thèses. La première thèse est que le bonheur psychologique consiste en une balance largement positive d’états affectifs tels que les émotions, les humeurs et les plaisirs sensoriels. La seconde est que les émotions, les humeurs et les plaisirs sensoriels sont diffé…Read more
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6Introduction: Modularity and the Nature of Emotions1Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 32. 2006.
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4Introduction : Les vertus de l’imaginationLes Ateliers de L’Ethique 5 (1): 23-25. 2010.Introduction to the dossier on Imagination and Moral Reasoning.
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2Emotions and Motivation: The Case of FearIn Peter Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion, Oxford University Press. 2009.
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2Ambivalent EmotionsIn David Sander & Klaus R. Scherer (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Emotion and the Affective Sciences, Oxford University Press. pp. 27. 2009.This encyclopedia entry spells out the concept of ambivalence in emotions
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1Éthique et mort(s) - Le droit au suicide assisté et à l'euthanasie: une question de respect de l'autonomie?: une question de respect de l'autonomie?Revue Philosophique De Louvain 101 (1): 43-57. 2003.
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Philosophical Perspectives on Moral and Civic Education: Shaping Citizens (edited book)Routledge. 2019.
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ValueIn David Sander & Klaus R. Scherer (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Emotion and the Affective Sciences, Oxford University Press. 2009.This entry specifies the possible relations between values and emotions.
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The right to assisted suicide and euthanaisa: a question of respecting the individual's autonomy?Revue Philosophique De Louvain 101 (1): 43-57. 2003.