Michael Bradie

One of the central themes of Hilary Putnam’s recent book, Reason, Truth and History, is the objectivity of values. The objectivity of values is a central component of the position Putnam calls “internal realism.” Internal realism is an attempt to delimit a point of view which is, on the one hand, objective, and, on the other, non-absolutistic. Internal realism is located precariously between an absolutist position which Putnam calls “metaphysical realism” and a sceptical relativism. The trick is to maintain the viability of the middle way without having the position collapse into either extreme. In this paper, I want, first, to outline the steps Putnam employs to articulate and defend his view, and second, to evaluate the extent to which Putnam is successful in threading his way between metaphysical realism and scepticism. Putnam is not completely successful insofar as the end of the book signals a partial return to the metaphysical realist position from which Putnam had been at such pains earlier to distance himself. The scheme of the paper is as follows. In section 2, I lay out the internal realist position and distinguish it from metaphysical realism and sceptical relativism. In section 3, Putnam’s central argument against metaphysical realism, which Putnam claims is also an argument against reductionism, is presented and discussed. In section 4, Putnam’s case for the objectivity of epistemic values, based upon considerations of rationality, is examined. In section 5, it is shown how the objectivity of epistemic values, conjoined with the anti-reductionist argument of section 3, leads Putnam to argue for the objectivity of ethical and aesthetic values as well. Finally, the extent to which Putnam’s position maintains its balance between realism and relativism is discussed.

Anthony O’Hear’s target is the claim that Darwinism provides a complete explanation of what it means to be human. The gist of his argument is that there are key normative dimensions to being human that escape the explanatory net of Darwinian or other naturalistic explanations. This is not to say that Darwinian and evolutionary accounts are not relevant to understanding what it means to be human. The point rather is that these accounts do not provide “complete” explanations. That human beings have evolved is not at issue. We are embodied natural beings. As such, we are material objects just like any other animals. But, we are much more as well. We have minds. We are not only conscious but self-conscious. Whereas our capacities for consciousness and self-consciousness have no doubt evolved, these capacities allow us to entertain and pursue “goals and projects puzzling or even inexplicable on biological terms” As conscious beings, we have beliefs. As self-conscious beings, we can and do reflect on and assess these beliefs. We can reason about them and, in so doing, come to sort out “good” beliefs from “bad” beliefs, true beliefs from false ones. We can develop projects such as pursuing “what is true because it is true, rather than because it serves some interest of ours.” In pursuing such a project, O’Hear argues, we have transcended the limitations of naturalistic accounts of our behavior.

The paper reviews the arguments for and against a number of criteria for event identity. The proliferation of such criteria in the 1970’s raises the question of how one is to choose between them. Eight adequacy conditions, whose own adequacy has been argued for elsewhere, are determined to be insufticient for deciding among the criteria. Some concluding remarks about the role of the adequacy conditions and the problem of choosing a criterion are offered. Finally, questions about the nature of and role of an identity criterion are raised.