Steffen K. Herrmann

In this paper, I discuss three objections against climate activism often voiced in the public, namely that their practices of civil disobedience are ultimately insincere, illegal, and ineffective. The main part of my paper focuses on this last point. This is because this objection points us to a deeper conceptual problem of political protest: if one of the conditions for the success of civil disobedience is that political demands must have been first voiced via democratic channels of opinion-formation, then why should we assume that a re-articulation of these demands in the course of civil disobedience leads to a different result? To answer this question, I propose a phenomenological approach to civil disobedience. Drawing on the protest practices of activist group Act Up, I argue that climate activism can escape the charge of ineffectiveness if it resorts to what I call the “aesthetic rationality of phenomenological demonstration.”

ABSTRACT According to Max Horkheimer, a critical theory of society has to fulfil two tasks: the elimination of social injustice and the critical reflection of its own conceptual means. Based on this definition, I argue that Axel Honneth’s critical theory of recognition is at risk of losing sight of the ambivalence of recognition which limits the scope of his analysis of social pathologies. By drawing on the concept of misrecognising recognition it can be shown that recognition itself is an ambivalent concept which can not only serve the purpose of self-realisation but also the purpose of self-subjection. Following the lead of Jean-Paul Sartre in this article I will unfold the concept of misrecognising recognition and put it at work to show how a variety of social pathologies of self-subjection can only be addressed if the ambivalence of recognition is taken into account.

Our political present is characterized by the rise of right-wing populism. This trend has not only led to a repoliticization of society, but also of academic philosophy, including phenomenology. In the U.S., a strong movement has emerged under the label of critical phenomenology whereas in Europe the movement of political phenomenology has become prominent. Both projects have in common the aim of positioning phenomenology as a critical project, questioning social relations of domination and power. These projects relate to Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology in different ways. In the following, I want to uncover this relation by fleshing out the horizons of critique that come with transcendental, critical, and political phenomenology. In particular I will show how the phenomenological method of demonstration can become a means of critique in political confrontations.

In this article, I argue that Hegel’s concept of recognition and Levinas’ concept of responsibility complement each other and lead to the idea of an asymmetrical reciprocity in which the origin of our social relations is not mutual equality, but rather mutual inequality. I will unfold this argument in three steps. I will first work out a fundamental asymmetry of recognition in Hegel by means of the figure of the bondsman before elucidating in a second step the asymmetry of responsibility in Levinas by means of the figure of the hostage. In the last and third step, I will correlate both asymmetries and show how far the asymmetry of recognition and the asymmetry of responsibility constantly develop from and transition into one another in our social relationships.

In recent years phenomenology has become a resource for reflecting on political questions. While much of this discussion has primarily focused on the ways in which phenomenology can help reformulate central concepts in political theory, the chapters in this volume ask in a methodological and systematic way how phenomenology can connect first-person experience with normative principles in political philosophy. The chapters are divided into three thematic sections. Part I covers the phenomenology of political experience. The chapters in this section focus on a variety of experiences that we come across in political practice. The chapters in Part II address the phenomenology of political ontology by examining the constitution of the realm of the political. Finally, Part III analyzes the phenomenology of political episteme in which our political world is grounded. Political Phenomenology will be of interest to researchers working on phenomenology, Continental philosophy, and political theory.

Husserl endeavoured to establish phenomenology as a ‘rigorous science’ and therefore linked its development to methodological considerations from the very beginning. Such considerations are often lacking in current debates on political phenomenology. This article aims to remedy this deficit. It argues that political phenomenology reinterprets Husserl’s methodological principles of epoché and reduction and transforms them into what can be termed interrogation and exposition. In addition, a further, often overlooked, principle of Husserl’s method is uncovered, which is referred to here as demonstration. It is through this triad of interrogation, exposition and demonstration that contemporary political phenomenology adapts and transforms the method of classical phenomenology. The topics of whiteness and race are employed to show how these principles can facilitate the analysis of political struggles.

Worte verletzen und kränken. Woher aber kommt diese Verletzungsmacht? Während in der deutschsprachigen Philosophie Sprache meist als Gegenmittel zur Gewalt begriffen wird, hat die US-amerikanische Debatte um "hate speech" gezeigt, dass das Sprechen Gewalt nicht nur androhen oder verhindern, sondern selbst eine Form von Gewaltausübung sein kann. Wie nun sind sprachliche Verletzung, Ausgrenzung und Missachtung zu erklären und zu verstehen? Aus der Sicht verschiedener Disziplinen untersuchen die Beiträge dieses Bandes, welcher Logik, Grammatik und Rhetorik unser verletzendes Sprechen gehorcht. Mit Beiträgen von u.a. Pierre Bourdieu, Penelope Brown/Stephen Levinson, Harold Garfinkel und Rae Langton. Steffen Kitty Herrmann (M.A.) und Hannes Kuch (M.A.) sind wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiter am Institut für Philosophie der Freien Universität Berlin und arbeiten im Forschungsprojekt”Zur Performanz sprachlicher Gewalt“am Sonderforschungsbereich 447”Kulturen des Performativen“. Sybille Krämer ist Professorin für Philosophie an der FU Berlin und Permanent Fellow am Wissenschaftskolleg Berlin.

Populism and degradation are closely related. Not only is the insulting and slandering of political opponents part of the standard repertoire of populists, but the experience of degradation is also one of the most important sociopsychological conditions for the emergence of contemporary populism. Accordingly, the populist politics of degradation must be understood as a response to their own experiences of degradation. However, this strategy leads into an aporia because it systematically undermines the solidarity and recognition it seeks. I will therefore ask what a political solution to the challenge of populism might look like and argue that radical democratic republicanism is a remedy for populism because it allows the experience of degradation that underlies it to be both taken seriously and kept at a critical distance.

Sartre kann als einer der Stifter des negativen Anerkennungsparadigmas gelten. Im Gegensatz zum positiven Anerkennungsparadigma, welches den hervorbringenden und ermöglichenden Charakter intersubjektiver Wertschätzung betont, wird hier der formierende und subordinierende Charakter von Anerkennung hervorgehoben. Als Anerkennungsvollzüge gelten folglich nicht nur befürwortende Formen des Verhaltens, sondern auch Zuschreibungen, die ambivalenten, verkennenden oder entfremdenden Charakter besitzen. Im Folgenden wird ein Überblick über die Entwicklung, Anwendung und Rezeption von Sartres Anerkennungstheorie gegeben.