Sebastian Luft

Dieses Handbuch gibt einen umfassenden Überblick über das Gesamtwerk Husserls und seinen Einfluss auf die nachfolgende Philosophie und andere Wissenschaften. Es ist gleichzeitig das erste Referenzwerk, was nicht nur Husserls veröffentlichte Schriften, sondern auch die Themen des zur Husserls Lebzeiten unveröffentlichten Nachlasses berücksichtigt.​Edmund Husserl gilt als der Begründer der Phänomenologie und als einer der wichtigsten Philosophen des 20. Jahrhunderts. Er stand jedoch lange im Schatten seiner Nachfolger wie etwa Martin Heidegger oder Jean-Paul Sartre. Etwa ab den 1990er Jahren setzte eine Wendung ein, da nun Husserls unveröffentlichter Nachlass zunehmend rezipiert wird. Dabei wird deutlich, dass Husserl mit seiner Phänomenologie für die Philosophie wichtiges Neuland erschlossen sowie zu vielen traditionellen Themen der Philosophie wichtige Beiträge geleistet hat. Seine feingliedrigen Beschreibungen und Strukturbestimmungen der Erfahrung und des Bewusstseins hatten darüber hinaus bedeutende Einflüsse auf Disziplinen, wie etwa Psychologie, Anthropologie oder Soziologie.

In this essay, I first present Husserl's project of phenomenology as first philosophy, its meaning and its scope. My second intention in this text is to lay out the project of the »science of the lifeworld«. But my intention is not merely exegetical; instead, I want to show how both projects hang together systematically. Clarifying this project is a special lacuna in Husserl scholarship as well as in phenomenology and in the reception of Husserl's thought in general. Scholars typically either see the science of the lifeworld as a »hermeneutical« project, disregarding its transcendental underpinnings; or they stick to Husserl's transcendental considerations in conjunction with his focus on subjectivity, ignoring the lifeworld. By showing how both projects belong together I rectify an erroneous Husserl image, and demonstrate how the lifeworld can be a topic within transcendental philosophy.

Phenomenology was one of the twentieth century’s major philosophical movements and continues to be a vibrant and widely studied subject today. The Routledge Companion to Phenomenology is an outstanding guide and reference source to the key philosophers, topics and themes in this exciting subject, and essential reading for any student or scholar of phenomenology. Comprising over fifty chapters by a team of international contributors, the Companion is divided into five clear parts: main figures in the phenomenological movement, from Brentano to Derrida main topics in phenomenology phenomenological contributions to philosophy phenomenological intersections historical postscript. Close attention is paid to the core topics in phenomenology such as intentionality, perception, subjectivity, the self, the body, being and phenomenological method. An important feature of the Companion is its examination of how phenomenology has contributed to central disciplines in philosophy such as metaphysics, philosophy of mind, moral philosophy, aesthetics and philosophy of religion as well as disciplines beyond philosophy such as race, cognitive science, psychiatry, literary criticism and psychoanalysis.

This paper draws out the "speculative" consequences of Husserl's late philosophy which centers around the two major forms of life, the prephilosophical and philosophical attitude. Husserl also calls the philosophical sphere that of the "absolute," since every other form of life is relative upon it. The way to attain this state is, as I try to show, carried out in a certain "dialectical" fashion which attempts to synthesize both at first seemingly contradictory attitudes. In conclusion, I am drawing out a critique of this idea

This essay attempts to spell out what might be left of Husserlian phenomenology when one leaves behind Husserl's own grounding ambitions. Husserl construes transcendental phenomenology as first philosophy. In a pragmatist vein of leaving it behind in the interest of something other, I discuss what would happen if one were to 'pragmatize' phenomenology. After first laying out Husserl's vision, in a second part I reconstruct the motives that led to it in reaction to a 'Cartesian anxiety' of not securing an indubitable ground of knowledge. After that, the article spells out some pragmatic reflections on what phenomenology would be, without the need to secure foundations of knowledge. Such a liberation would in effect enable phenomenology to more fully make true on the ideals of the Enlightenment (which Rorty, too, underwrites) of emancipating oneself of one of the last vestiges of a dogmatic slumber.

What does it mean to be a community and to be in a community? Can this social phenomenon be analogized to an individual person with her interwoven opinions, wants, and desires? Or is a community a phenomenon sui generis that requires its own methods and tools for research? Concretely: What does it mean that a community may achieve certain acts? And what about the intentional object of such an act, which has also been referred to as “social act”? These questions raise the methodological ones: how is it even possible to characterize a community, such that it can be said to issue social acts? And how can such an inquiry be carried out, does it require an outside perspective or one from within a community, or can it be done by both?

Immanuel KantKant, Immanuel war für Simmel ein ständiger Begleiter. Bereits Simmels Dissertation von 1881 an der Berliner Universität trug den Titel Die Natur der Materie nach Kants Physikalischer Monadologie und seine Habilitationsschrift aus dem Jahre 1885 handelte von Kants Lehre von Raum und Zeit. Seit dem Beginn seiner Lehrtätigkeit an der Berliner Universität hielt Simmel weiterhin zahlreiche Lehrveranstaltungen zu Kant, so dass Kant – zumindest in Simmels Berliner Zeit bis 1914 – zum ständigen Repertoire von Simmels Lehrtätigkeit gehörte.